AGAIN ON PINDAR'S *O.2*
II. POINTS *MINORIS MOMENTI*

Continuing my discussion of Professor M. M. Willcock's commentary on *Olympian* 2, I proceed in this second installment with matters *minoris momenti*, as I have indicated at the beginning of the first installment[*].

Commenting (p. 142) on (v. 1) ἀναξιφόρμιγγες Willcock writes «the hymn "rules" the lyre, i.e. the words are more important than the music». However, hymn for a Greek is a «song», the «victory song» here, not just «words». The φόρμιγξ *accompanies* the song (= the singer(s)). The meaning is: "songs of victory, (you) whom the phorminx (= the music of the harp) accompanies»[1]. Accompaniment is less important than the song, and so, in quasi-personification, the song «rules» over the phorminx.

On p. 142 Willcock suggests that in the sequence (vv. 2-5) τίνα - νιχα-φόρου «Pindar has ... implied that Theron is the *greatest on earth*» [italics mine]. This is incorrect. The words τίνα ἄνδρα mean only «what (victorious) man?». There are many gods and many heroes, i.e. many athletic games relating to gods and heroes, and many man-victors in each of these games. Pindar asks: *To what Games (Olympian, Pythian, etc.) and to what man-victor (to a man-victor in boxing, wrestling, etc.) shall I dedicate this ode?* The following (vv. 3-4) ἤτοι (= ἦ τοι)[2] - πολέμου, narrows down the choice of Games to the Olympic games and to an Olympic victor, and the name (v. 5) Θήρωνα identifies this victor (among Olympic victors) as *Theron*, while the words (v. 5) τετραορίας νιχαφόρου specify (among events) the event

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[*] The first installment of this paper has been published on pp. 7-34 of the present volume. For a list of abbreviations the reader is requested to consult note 1 of the first installment.

1. It is better to take (v. 2) χελαδήσομεν as future (with Willcock) rather than as de-liberative subjunctive (= aorist subjunctive with short vowel). Why focus on uncertainty (de-liberation - doubt) which detracts from Theron as victor, when the future indicative suggests uncertainty but without focusing on it? Logically (v. 2) τίνα θεόν, τίν' ἤρωα form one unit = τίνα ἱερά (= *what games*), see Hummel, § 454.

2. (v. 3) ἤτοι introduces the answer to the previous question, which answer extends down to (v. 7) ὀρθόπολιν.

Theron won, the four-horse chariot race[3]. Willcock calls the chariot race
«the most glorious event», but Pindar does not evaluate the event in what
he says in vv. 1-7 (after all, for a poet celebrating victors for pay dis-
criminatory treatment of one event over other events would not have
made good business). Besides, the four-horse chariot race in 476 B.C.,
although the most *spectacular* and *popular* event, is not necessarily the
most glorious event, seeing that the winner can win using someone else as
charioteer (which is the case of Theron), and in an ethical sense such
winner κλέπτει τὴν νίκην, as opposed, say, to a pentathlon winner, who
invariably wins in person, without proxy.

Commenting (p. 143) on (v. 6) γεγωνητέον Willcock translates «one
must proclaim». But (v. 2) κελαδήσομεν (= *we...*) suggests ἀμῖν (= *by us*
[= by me]), with γεγωνητέον = *we must sing of...* .

On p. 143 Willcock translates (v. 7) εὐωνύμων τε πατέρων ἄωτον ὀρθό-
πολιν as «the culminating glory of his famous forefathers, who keeps the
city straight». His translation stresses the forefathers beyond what the
Greek says. The word εὐωνύμων simply presents those forefathers as
individuals of good report (εὖ + ὄνομα), the genitive εὐωνύμων ... πατέρων
being one of origin-possession. The stress is reserved for Theron (v. 7 ἄωτον
ὀρθόπολιν): «the incomparable guardian of the city, son of respectable
sires». Theron is the grand tyrant of Acragas, his πατέρες only reputable
individuals. A little later, however, when Pindar focuses on the eulogy of
these «sires», they are praised exuberantly as (vv. 9-10) the «eye» of Sicily
etc.. (v. 6) ὄπι is dative of reference (=*regarding his care*) and ξένων is
objective genitive depending on ὄπι. From (v. 6) ὄπι till (v. 7) ὀρθόπολιν
we have a tripartite apposition to (v. 5) Θήρωνα.

On p. 143 Willcock commenting on (v. 14) εὔφρων writes «predicative,
as is usual with this word». The reader would have been served better if
Willcock had made a reference to a grammar (e.g., Smyth, § 1043) thereby

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3. (v. 3) Διός is possessive genitive and Πίσα (the name of the city connotes Ὀλύμπια [sc.
ἱερά] = *Olympic games*) constitutes the city-area possessed. On p. 142, commenting on Πίσα,
Willcock writes: «The ι is short at this period later long». Apparently he means in the Doric
dialect, for we do not have reason to believe that in the Ionic-Attic dialect of Pindar's time the
accent on this toponym was Πίσα rather than Πῖσα. Without comma after (v. 3) Ἡρακλέης the
words (v. 4) ἀκρόθινα πολέμου become predicate, with comma, they become apposition. Willcock
puts no comma but calls ἀκρόθινα πολέμου apposition. I do not know why Farnell, vol. 1, p. 10,
translates «*as* trophy of victorious wars», but in vol. 2, p. 13 calls ἀκρόθινα πολέμου an apposi-
tion.

explaining that εὔφρων functions here as a predicative adjective of manner (= ἐν εὐφροσύνη = εὐφρόνως) in relation to κόμισον[4].

On p. 144 Willcock paraphrases (v. 10) αἰὼν ... ἔφεπε μόρσιμος as «their due status came to them». Yet αἰὼν does not mean «status», but «a period of existence», «life», «age», ... If we take αἰὼν (the subject of ἔφεπε) in this meaning, Willcock's «came to them» for ἔφεπε makes no sense (what can *life coming to the living* mean?). On the basis of *P*.1.50 and *P*.4.133 (where respectively Hieron «embraces [therefore *favors*]» the attitude of Philoctetes, and the kinsmen of Jason «support [therefore *favor*]» Jason's report of what has happened, see Slater s.v. ἐφέπω a. and β.b), I am inclined to translate ἔφεπε here as «favored (them)», the favor (cf. vv. 10-11 πλοῦτον - ἀρεταῖς) seen in that αἰὼν responding to the γνήσιαι ἀρεταί of the «fathers» brings to the «fathers» wealth and renown. I translate (vv. 10-11): *and the flow of existence allotted to them by fate favored (them), bringing wealth and renown to them in response to (their) achievements in the sphere of aristocratic excellence.* I may add that αἰὼν is not always favorable, for in *I*.8.14 αἰὼν is called δόλιος, «devious».

It is not clear whether (v. 11) ἐπ(ί) + dat. introduces cause or purpose. I avoided preference translating «in response». ἄγων is a participle of manner-means. (v. 8) καμόντες indicates time before (v. 9) ἔσχον, and (vv. 9-10) ἔσαν ... ἔφεπε continuous time after ἔσχον. In its timing (v. 10) ἄγων is imperfect of the same time with ἔσαν ... ἔφεπε.

On p. 145 Willcock translates (vv. 15-17) τῶν - τέλος as «not even Time, father of all things, could undo the results of past actions good and bad». Apparently he renders τέλος as «the results». But here «the results» obscure and weaken the logic of the gnome. One expects the thought to be: *not even Time, father of all things, could undo past deeds, whether deeds done in justice or in injustice.* Why speak of undoing the «results» of

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4. κόμισον presents κόμιζε compressed in time, but it may well be that Pindar uses the present and aorist imperatives without difference to facilitate the meter (see Hummel, § 326). (v. 12) Κρόνιε (= patronymic) ... 'Ρέας = Κρόνου καὶ 'Ρέας. The sequence (vv. 13-14) ἰανθεὶς ἀοιδαῖς (sc. ἐμαῖς) ... κόμισον presents Pindar asking from Zeus *quid pro quo* (= *having been pleased by my present song ... preserve ...*). Some scholars understand (v. 14) σφίσιν = (v. 15) λοιπῷ γένει (see Hummel, § 142 and ib. note 1). But the very word λοιπῷ (= remaining) seems to differentiate the future Emmenidai from the other Emmenidai (i.e. from both those who are living now and those who lived in the past). I take σφίσιν (= αὐτοῖς = τοῖς νῦν καὶ πάλαι 'Εμμενίδαις) to depend on πατρίαν, and λοιπῷ γένει to be a dative of advantage. If so (v. 14) ἔτι = *still* = in the future, i.e. *save the fatherland of the Emmenidai in the future as well for the benefit of the family's future descendants.*

past actions, rather than the past actions themselves?

I construe: οὐδ(ὲ) Χρόνος ὁ πάντων (sc. πραγμάτων) πατὴρ ἂν δύναιτο θέμεν ἀποίητον (τὸ) τέλος τῶν πεπραγμένων ἐν δίϙα καὶ παρὰ δίϙαν ἔργων = *Not even Time, the father of all, could render undone the end of deeds, whether just or unjust deeds, that have taken place.* Unless the end of a deed has occurred, the deed is not πεπραγμένον, but πραττόμενον. Strictly speaking ἀποίητον is predicate to (τὸ) τέλος (= direct object of θέμεν). Pindar, I think, concentrates on τέλος because if something is to be «undone» in terms of time, the undoing must take place by starting from the «end» and unraveling backwards, towards the «beginning». If so, τῶν ... πεπραγμένων ... ἀποίητον ... ἔργων τέλος = τὰ ... πεπραγμένα ... ἀποίητα ... ἔργα. We might translate freely «unraveling the existence of deeds done ... into the inexistence (= ἀποίητον) of deeds undone».

In the following verse Pindar tells us that forgetfulness, provided that one's fate is favorable, succeeds in achieving what time cannot. Construe: σὺν εὐδαίμονι δὲ πότμῳ λάθα ([= λήθη] sc. (τοῦ) τέλους [= objective genitive] τῶν πεπραγμένων ἔργων ἐν δίϙα καὶ παρὰ δίϙαν) γένοιτο ἄν = *but, if fate be favorable, forgetfulness ([of the end] of deeds accomplished justly or unjustly) would [= can] take place.* The folowing three and a half verses (vv. 19-22) explain the importance of favorable fate towards achieving forgetfulness. If so, the (v. 19) πῆμα apparently refers to an ἔργον πεπραγμένον παρὰ δίϙαν which memory brings back again and again (cf. v. 20 παλίγϙοτον) to make one suffer until happiness deriving from favorable fate allows for the death (cf. v. 19 θνάισϙει) of the πῆμα and its memory. The (v. 19) γὰρ (= because) argues in favor of the statement in v. 18. The following *exempla* of Semela validate the correctness of what was stated in (vv. 18-22) λάθα - ὑψηλόν.

On p. 145 commenting on (v. 19) ὑπὸ χαρμάτων Willcock writes: «ὑπὸ with the genitive for the agent with a passive verb is used here because of the metaphorical personification of πῆμα; it dies, overcome by the reasons for joy and satisfaction». This is wrong. ὑπὸ + genitive (instead of simple instrumental dative) is used because the χάρματα are *personified* and treated as agent —that πῆμα (subject of θνάισϙει ... δαμασθέν) is personified or not personified is irrelevant to the construction of ὑπὸ χαρμάτων. Also Willcock's «metaphorical personification» is confusing (*personification* or *quasi-personification* would have been better).

On p. 145 Willcock says that (v. 20) παλίγϙοτον «should be taken predicatively with δαμασθέν. The πῆμα is overcome in spite of its hostility;

"reluctantly conquered" (Fitzgerald 55)». But a) παλίγκοτος does not mean «reluctant», b) «reluctantly conquered» is nonsense. Both παλίγκοτον and δαμασθέν qualify πῆμα. The aorist participle δαμασθέν is circumstantial indicating time before θνᾴσκει, while παλίγκοτον (with an understood ὄν = καίπερ ὄν) returns as predicate to πῆμα (παλίγκοτον *cannot* be meaningfully predicate to δαμασθέν). The translation is: *For the πῆμα, [although] malignant* [and malignant πήματα as a rule do not die], *dies subdued by the ἐσ(θ)λὰ χάρματα.* The adj. παλίγκοτον (πάλιν = [again] + κοτεύω [= to be angry]) is properly used for a wound or ulcer that closes for a while and then breaks open again, therefore for a malignancy.

On p. 145 Willcock translates (vv. 21-22) ὅταν - ὑψηλόν as «when fortune sent from god sends a man's prosperity up [ἀνεκάς] on high». I think we would come a little closer to the meaning of the text if we understand ὑψηλόν proleptically (= ὥστε ὑψηλὸν γενέσθαι) = *when (ever) Fortune issuing from god sends a man's prosperity up to become towering.* In θεοῦ (= θεόσδοτος) Μοῖρα, the genitive is probably that of «origin» (cf. Smyth, § 1298)[5].

On p. 147 Willcock translates (v. 36) ἔχει as «controls», but he has not explained what would then be the construction and translation of πατρώιον —the adjective clearly has the predicate position since it precedes τὸν. Following Slater (s.v. ἔχω 5.b) I think we should translate ἔχει as «keeps» or as «preserves» taking τὸν εὔφρονα πότμον as direct object, and πατρώιον, «ancestral» or «hereditary», as predicate. The point of πατρώιον is that (on the whole) the «merry lot» passes from father to son as an abiding blessing of the family through the ages.

On p. 148 Willcock discussing (v. 37) παλιντράπελον ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ writes «that turns back again at another time; good fortune turns to bad, and bad again to good». Does he take τι .. πῆμα to recur («turns back again»)? If he does, this would create a problem, I think, in that it makes the «merry lot» of the Emmenidai become cancerous, suffering from a πῆμα that comes and

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5. The sequence (vv. 19-21) ... θνᾴσκει ... ὅταν (= whenever) ... πέμπηι constitutes an indefinite temporal sentence parallel to a general present conditional sentence. (v. 22) ἕπεται = *follows = accords with = is shown to be true by.* (v. 22) λόγος = *my statement* (cf. vv. 19-22). (v. 23) μεγάλα (sc. πάθη) = inner object. πίτνει [= πίπτει] = falls = is forgotten [= historical present]. (v. 24) κρεσσόνων (= mightier) sc. ἢ τὸ βαρὺ τοῦτο πένθος. πίτνει and κρεσσόνων suggest a battle, therefore πρός = *by* [= agent] rather than with Willcock «in consequence of» (Pindar's poetry thrives in personifications and quasi-personifications).

goes intermittently. I take τι ... πῆμα in an indefinite sense, to mean *a trouble of some kind or other*. I further understand ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ = ἄλλοτε = ἐνίοτε = *now and then*. Pindar used ἄλλῳ meaning *at another (rare) occasion than (the usual occasions) when she* [= Μοῖρα] *sends only bliss-sprung-from-the-gods*. I am inclined to believe that παλιντράπελον (= παλίν-τροπον) does not mean «that turns back again» in the sense of *recurring*, but «*that causes a change*» (so Slater s.v. παλιντράπελος). It should be stressed that here what is demanded by the logic of the passage is that a πῆμα enters the picture, not that one and the same πῆμα returns. The course of the «merry lot» is steady (cf. my remark above on [v. 35] πα-τρώιον), but *occasionally* its steadiness suffers from *this or that* unexpected πῆμα (= trouble).

It is true that Oedipus *killed* his father, and the sons of Oedipus *killed* one another, but these two instances, although involving *killing*, should not be seen as one recurring πῆμα but as two πήματα. Killing one's father is not killing one's brother, and besides, it would be strange to suppose that killing is here projected as the recurring cause of suffering in the family of the *laudandus* Theron, for such persistent *killing* would make Theron and his family abominable.

The comma (v. 37) after ἄγει in Willcock's text is not needed; παλιν-τράπελον refers directly to (v. 37) πῆμ(α) as attribute: οὕτω Μοῖρ(α), ἅ τε [= ἥ (see LSJ⁹ s.v. ὅστε)] ἔχει [= keeps] τὸν εὔφρονα πότμον τῶνδε [= τῶν Ἐμμενιδῶν] πατρώιον, ἄλλῳ χρόνῳ ἐπάγει ([= present of general truth] = sends) σύν (= together with) θεόρτῳ ὄλβῳ καί (= also) πῆμ(ά) τι παλιν-τράπελον [= ὅ ἐστι παλιντράπελον].

On p. 148 Willcock calls (v. 42) οἱ «possessive dative, "for him", "his"». But the possessive dative appears with εἰμί, and verbs that come close to the meaning of «exist» (ῥήματα ὑπαρκτικά, e.g. γίγνομαι, ὑπάρχω, ἔφυν, etc.). Here the dative οἱ (= οἷ = Attic αὐτῷ) is, I think, that of dis-advantage (see Smyth § 1481ff.). I take σὺν ἀλλαλοφονίαι as instrumental dative of means (see Smyth § 1511).

On p. 149 commenting on (vv. 46-7) ὅθεν Willcock writes: «the relative pronoun is used to bring us back to the present day, as often». But the Greek relative pronoun does not have such properties —it is the sentence that brings us to the present. In addition, ὅθεν cannot possibly be genitive of ὅς, ὅ in the Greek language of c. 476 B.C. If so, ὅθεν must construe as adverb, not as a pronoun (though in pre-Homeric Greek it could possibly have been genitive of the relative pronoun, cf. the genitives

ἐμέθεν, σέθεν, ἕθεν, ἑθεν). Consequently ὅθεν means «whence» and refers to
v. 45 δόμοις, equaling ἐξ ὧν δόμων = ἐξ ἐκείνων δέ τῶν δόμων (= ἐκ δὲ τοῦ
Θερσάνδρου), just as ὅς may equal ἐκεῖνος δὲ at the beginning of a clause
(see Smyth § 2490).

I construe as follows: πρέπει δὲ τὸν Αἰγησιδάμου (sc. παῖδα), ἔχοντα
(= τὸν ἔχοντα = ὃς ἔχει, or ἔχοντα = ἅτε ἔχοντα = ἐπεὶ ἔχει) ῥίζαν σπέρματος
(= the origin of his family) ἐκεῖθεν (= ἐξ ἐκείνων τῶν δόμων = ἐκ τοῦ Θερ-
σάνδρου ἐκείνου), τυγχανέμεν ἐγκωμίων τε μελέων λυρῶν τε.

From ὅθεν = whence = ἐξ ὧν δόμων = ἐξ ἐκείνων δὲ τῶν δόμων trans-
ferring δὲ and placing it after πρέπει, I reduce ἐξ ἐκείνων to ἐκεῖθεν (thereby
using the demonstrative adverb ἐκεῖθεν in place of its correlative [= rela-
tive adverb] ὅθεν). I take (v. 46) σπέρματος with (v. 46) ῥίζαν and under-
stand the genitive as adnominal, of the possession-belonging type (Hum-
mel § 116 understands it as partitive, with ὅθεν as the part, which I find
difficult). σπέρματος, *of seed*, refers collectively to the males of Theron's
ancestors, and ῥίζαν points to the first ancestor, i.e. to the γενάρχης of the
Emmenidai, to Thersander (see also Koniaris, p. 268, note 76). (v. 47)
ἐγκωμίων τε μελέων λυρᾶν τε = both song(s) and lyre(s) (= accompaniment
by lyre(s)) *belonging to the victory-komos.* ἐγκωμίων is, of course, adjective
and qualifies both μελέων and λυρᾶν.

The construction of (vv. 48-51) Ὀλυμπίαι - ἄγαγον is: αὐτὸς (= ipse =
Theron) μὲν γὰρ ἔδεκτο γέρας Ὀλυμπίαι, κοιναὶ δὲ Χάριτες ἄγαγον ἐς ὁμό-
κλαρον ἀδελφεὸν (= Xenocrates) ἄνθεα τεθρίππων δυωδεκαδρόμων Πυθῶνί τε
(= καὶ vel τε καὶ) Ἰσθμοῖ. Willcock, p. 149, correctly understands (v. 50)
Χάριτες as «poetic celebrations», but then renders (v. 50) ἄνθεα as «victory
crown», which, I think, sounds insincere on the lips of Pindar, for the
victory crown properly comes from the judge of the games, and without it
there can be neither victor, nor «poetic celebrations». We should better
translate (v. 50) ἄνθεα as «victory flowers» or «victory song(s)».

The preceding (v. 49) γέρας, however, refers to the crown of victory
given to Theron by the judge (Ἑλλανοδίκας). The word γέρας by itself can
refer either to the crown of victory that the judge places on the head of
the victor, or else to the poet's song in honor of the victor. Nevertheless
the past tense (v. 49) ἔδεκτο makes clear that (v. 49) γέρας is the crown of
victory given by the judge. The song in honor of Theron's victory is given
now and is *O*.2. We may suppose that immediately after his victory Theron
received a song at Olympia, but it would be rhetorically very strange that
ἔδεκτο in *O*.2 refers to *that* song, thereby detracting from the significance
of the *present* song, *O*.2. By the way, I am inclined to follow Willcock and

take ἔδεκτο as aorist (see also Chantraine, vol. 1, § 137) rather than as imperfect (LSD[9] s.v. δέχομαι; Slater, s.v. δέχομαι). ἔδεκτο as aorist corresponds nearty to the aorist (v. 51) ἄγαγον. As for (v. 50) τεθρίππων, the genitive is clearly adnominal, probably that of the cause-origin type.

On p. 150 Willcock commenting on (vv. 51-2) τὸ δὲ τυχεῖν πειρώμενον ἀγωνίας δυσφρονᾶν παραλύει (= present of general truth) translates: «success in an attempt at *the games* [italics mine] relieves a man of unhappy thoughts». I think, he unnecessarily weakens the gnome by limiting it exclusively to athletics. The word δυσφρονᾶν (= anxieties) need not be limited to athletic events. Nor need πειρώμενον ἀγωνίας be limited to the athlete in athletic games. Here we have a γνώμη, a maxim, and maxims have by definition broad applications. The word ἀγωνία refers to struggle towards a goal (cf. ἀγών). The athlete is, of course, accommodated, but in a γνώμη of wider application, meaningful in every context where a strenuous effort is made toward achieving something. πειρώμενον need not mean πειρώμενον ἀθλητήν but πειρώμενον ἄνδρα.

If we follow Mommsen and instead of δυσφρονᾶν read ἀφροσυνᾶν (supported by the discovery of a new papyrus, see Willcock p. 151), we should probably understand the word ἀφροσυνᾶν as meaning «pessimism», but pessimism seen as «foolishness» from the quarters of success and concomitant optimism (we may then translate ἀφροσυνᾶν as «foolish pessimism»). But, like Willcock, I prefer to read δυσφρονᾶν.

On p. 152 Willcock cites Sappho fr. 148 L-P and translates πάροικος as «house-guest». I think we should translate it as «neighbor» (= γείτων), and recollect what Hesiod says, in his *Works* 346ff., about the neighbor's importance toward the individual's well-being. παροικεῖν and ἐνοικεῖν/συνοικεῖν differ in meaning, πάροικος does not mean ἔνοικος/σύνοικος (and of course «house-guest» in Willcock's translation is all the more unacceptable).

On pp. 153-4 commenting on (vv. 55-6) ἀστὴρ - φέγγος Willcock allows the possibility that ἀστὴρ may have an «echo» of mystic terminology, and cites Aristophanes' *Frogs* 341-2. To the extent that I know ἀστήρ is not a specialized word of «mystic terminology». The use of ἀστήρ in these two passages is accidental —πλοῦτος as ἀστήρ in *O*.2 has nothing «mystical» in and of itself, and that this πλοῦτος proves pertinent to the following eschatological passage (see Koniaris, pp. 242-3 and ibid. note 14) does not render ἀστὴρ «mystic».

On p. 155 Willcock identifies (v. 56) τις with Hades and he may be right. Hades as judge will appropriately stress the significance of human ethics, for he will be punishing and rewarding the souls in person rather than through a representative of his. But Willcock does not tell us why Pindar used the indefinite τις. He cites Aesch. *Suppl.* vv. 230-1, but there the identification of Ζεὺς ἄλλος as Hades is clear enough through Ζεύς, for the ἄλλος must be a *god* comparable to Zeus (the ἄλλος can therefore hardly be Minos or Aeacus —what is Zeus for heaven is Hades for the nether world). Above all, to quote H. J. Rose in *OCD²* s.v. Hades, «He [= Hades] is quite often called Zeus with some distinguishing title». Therefore, for Aeschylus' audience Ζεὺς ἄλλος = *Hades* beyond any hesitancy. In Koniaris, pp. 263-4 I have offered an explanation of why Pindar used τις. I need here add that if τις refers to Hades, then τις in *meiosis* means «some great one» (see LSJ⁹ s.v. A.II.5).

On p. 156 Willcock translates (v. 63) ἐν χερὸς ἀκμᾷ as «in the strength of their hands». ἐν ... ἀκμᾷ is instrumental dative of means, and therefore «by the strength» would perhaps render more accurately the meaning (see Smyth § 1511 and Slater s.v. ἐν 7). The thought of the passage is that the ἐσ(θ)λοί do not do in the underworld the exhaustive work they used to do on earth (= digging, plowing, and rowing) for a salary that did not suffice even to satisfy their hunger. Under the circumstances ... χερὸς ἀκμᾷ translated as «... the *strength* of their hands» does not function meaningfully, for it amounts to «strength» on the part of «starved» individuals. Following LSJ⁹ s.v. ἀκμή, we may take ἐν χειρὸς ἀκμᾷ as a periphrasis meaning no more than ἐν χερί = ἐν χερσίν (= instrumental construed with [v. 63] ταράσσοντες). The point is that by reducing the impact of ἀκμᾷ we remove the illogicality that «*strength*» introduces.

On p. 156 commenting on (v. 65) τιμίοις Willcock, if I understand him correctly, takes the word as referring to the gods of the underworld, translating παρὰ ... τιμίοις θεῶν «with the honored among the gods». I agree, taking τιμίοις as a compliment to the gods of the underworld and θεῶν as a partitive genitive (see also Koniaris, p. 260, note 59). Surely, those who translate τιμίοις θεῶν as «the honored *by* the gods» [see Hummel § 111] have to explain how the genitive θεῶν can mean «by the gods», and also what is the reason for presenting, in the area of the ἐσθλοί, a special group of souls «honored by the gods» in contrast to the other ἐσθλοί⁶.

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6. I construe (vv. 65-7) ἀλλὰ - αἰῶνα: ἀλλ' οἵτινες (= *all those who*) μὲν ἔχαιρον (sc. ἐπὶ γῆς =

It remains, then, only to explain why the gods of the underworld are
called τίμιοι (= *the honored gods*) θεῶν (= among gods), for the gods of the
upper world (say, Poseidon and Zeus) are certainly not ἄτιμοι (= *disho-
nored*). In Plu. *Moralia* 647B Sophocles is quoted calling the flower nar-
cissus ἀρχαῖον μεγάλων θεῶν (i.e. τῶν χθονίων θεῶν) στεφάνωμα. Of course,
μεγάλων θεῶν is not meant to imply that the other gods, the οὐρανίωνες,
are μικροὶ θεοί[7]. Similarly τιμίοις in Pindar does not imply that the
οὐρανίωνες are ἄτιμοι. Again in Aesch. *Choephori* 967 the Moirai (= Fates)
are called τιμιώταται θεῶν which does not suggest that the other divinities
are less honored (let alone unhonored). In the Homeric hymn to Delian
Apollo (III), vv. 2-4, we are told that «through the house of Zeus, the gods
tremble before him (= Apollo) and all spring up from their seats when he
draws near ...», but surely this is only a hyperbole, for no Greek, not even
the composer of the hymn, could believe that Poseidon or Athena trembled
and ran away before Apollo. And if one wishes to see how far a Greek can
go in praising a god, he may read Agathon's speech in praise of Eros in
Plato's *Symposium*.

When the Greek honors a given god he sometimes makes this god the
god *par excellence*, with the understanding that the excessive praises
offered are not meant to dishonor the other gods, each of whom is similarly
treated as the god *par excellence* on some other occasion. After all to call
the nether gods τίμιοι θεῶν is not much of an exaggeration, considering
that Hades is the «Zeus» of the underworld, and Persephone, his wife, is
the daughter of Olympian Zeus and Demeter.

On p. 156 Willcock commenting on v. 66 paraphrases εὐορχίαις too
freely when he writes «Honesty, keeping one's word...». The word εὐορχία
involves ὅρχος (= oath), and means (as Slater says s.v. εὐορχία) «fidelity to
oath», i.e. fulfilling what one has promised under oath. The ἐσ(θ)λοί are
εὐσεβεῖς as we have already argued (see p. 25, also Koniaris, pp. 248-9 and
ibid. notes 32-3). This is of importance in understanding the eschatology
correctly, i.e. in understanding that the ἐσ(θ)λοί of *O.*2 are living in a
paradise not substantially different from the paradise in which the εὐσεβεῖς
of fr. 129 are living.

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on their earthly life) εὐορχίαις, νέμονται (sc. νῦν ὑπὸ γῆς = *now in their underworld life*) ἄδακρυν
αἰῶνα παρὰ (= *near*) τιμίοις (sc. θεοῖς) θεῶν (= *among gods*).

7. The Sophoclean mss (= *O.C.* vv. 683-4) give μεγάλαιν θεαῖν [= Persephone and De-
meter] ἀρχαῖον στεφάνωμ'. The argument will not change. If Persephone and Demeter are
«great goddesses», certainly Hera, Athena, Aphrodite, and Hestia are not meant to be «less
great» or «small goddesses».

Willcock's text reads (v. 74) ὅρμοισι τῶν χέρας ἀναπλέχοντι καὶ στε-
φάνους. On p. 159 he remarks that χέρας ἀναπλέχοντι καὶ στεφάνους con-
stitutes «a harsh zeugma», which he translates «they entwine (ἀναπλέχοντι
[= ἀναπλέχουσι]) their wrists, and they weave (πλέχοντι [= πλέχουσι])
crowns». The notion of a zeugma here is not certain, for if Aristophanes
can say ἀνείρω στέφανον (cf. Ar. *Ach.* v. 1006 τοὺς στεφάνους ἀνείρετε = *wea-
ve the garlands*) we may reasonably suppose (since Greeks use εἴρειν στέ-
φανον and πλέχειν στέφανον as synonymous expressions) that Pindar also
could use στεφάνους sc. ἀναπλέχοντι (= ἀναπλέχουσι) even though the only
example of ἀναπλέχειν στέφανον known to me is from c. 100 B.C., from
Aristeas' (ed. M. Hadas, p. 130) ἐλαίας ἀνέπλεξαν στέφανον ἔκτυπον (= *they
entwined in relief a wreath of olive*). In such case we shall have the verb
ἀναπλέχω not in zeugma but in two different meanings and constructions
of ἀναπλέχω, viz. ἀναπλέχω (= entwine) χέρας ὅρμοισι, and ἀναπλέχω
(= weave) στεφάνους —with στεφάνους understanding χεφαλαῖς, *for their
heads*, or χροτάφοις, *for their temples*, or even αὐχέσιν, *for their necks* (cf.
the περιδέραιοι στέφανοι).

Whether with zeugma or without zeugma, v. 74 is a halting (if not
altogether wretched) verse, and one wonders why Pindar could introduce it
in this glorious context. I am inclined to believe that στεφάνους does not
belong to Pindar's hand, and that originally the text had something like
χεφαλὰς (B), or χροτάφους (coni. Karsten [C]). Willcock further takes χέρας
as «wrists» (= χαρπούς), but this cannot be certain since χείρ from the time
of Hesiod (see LSJ[9] s.v. χείρ 1.2) can mean not only «hand» but also «arm»
(just as χέρι (τὸ) in modern Greek has both meanings), nor do Greeks use
χείρ for χαρπὸς or for χαρπὸς χε(ι)ρός. Therefore the ὅρμοι (cf. v. 74 ὅρ-
μοισι) need not be located around the «wrists», or only around the «wrists».
τῶν is ablatival genitive of the relative pronoun (= ἀφ' ὧν = ἀπὸ δὲ τούτων
τῶν ἀνθέων), and, of course, ὅρμοισι is instrumental. If ὅρμος means στέφα-
νος (= wreath), then the sequence (v. 74) ὅρμοισι ... στεφάνους becomes
tautological. But perhaps here ὅρμος = *flowers strung on a cord*. In such a
case an ὅρμος may be tied around wrist or arm to become a bracelet,
around the neck to become a necklace, and around the head to become a
chaplet, by itself an ὅρμος being neither a bracelet, nor a necklace, nor a
chaplet.

On p. 160, commenting on vv. 75-77 Willcock writes: «it is not
immediately clear why Kronos is referred to allusively, as "husband of
Rhea, of her who has the highest throne of all" ...». One of the ἡδύσματα of
poetry is allusiveness. Indeed, human language by itself is allusive (do not

all pronouns allude to nouns?). Moreover, in view of the preceding (v. 70) Κρόνου τύρσιν, the introduction of πατὴρ μέγας avoids the dullness of repetition (i.e. Κρόνου ... Κρόνος) in the interest of lexical *variatio* sought by Greek (and not only Greek) authors in general, not exclusively or especially by Pindar. Moreover, it is likely that πατὴρ μέγας was a standard appellation of Kronos (even though there seems to be no other extant instance where Kronos is called πατὴρ [or Πατὴρ] μέγας), in which case allusiveness disappears (see and Koniaris, p. 264).

Homer διὰ στόματος Ποσειδῶνος (*Il.* 15.187-93) tells us that the three sons of Kronos and Rhea (Poseidon, Hades, and Zeus) have divided, among themselves by lot, the world[8]. What other «father» (including even Zeus) could be more aptly called πατὴρ μέγας than Kronos (not to mention that he was also the father of Demeter, Hera, and Hestia)?

Be it as it may, a more interesting question is the significance of the (cf. v. 70) τύρσις of Kronos. We may suppose that some authority must check the credentials of the soul before she is allowed to enter the Isle, and that this checking is done in the area designated as Κρόνου τύρσις (whether it is Kronos or Rhadamanthys or both that perform this checking). τύρσις means *tower*, and tower connotes prevention of unauthorized entrance[9]. The Διὸς ὁδός is likely to be a road which leads from Hades to the *Isle* (the *Isle* being on the upper world), and probably beyond the Isle all the way to Olympus —after all Zeus is the father of Rhadamanthys, the son of Kronos and Rhea, the brother of Hades, and the father of Persephone, therefore an ὁδὸς Διὸς joining Olympus with the Isle and with Hades is anything but surprising, it is the road by which (Orphic?) Zeus visits his relatives in the two paradises, the one of the Isle and the other of the underworld where the τίμιοι θεοί reside surrounded by the ἐσ(θ)λοί (not the ugly Homeric underworld of *Il.* 20.61-5).

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8. Only earth and Olympus remained common property.

9. The underworld «judge», whom we met as (v. 59) τις, is likely to keep checking the record of the soul during her ἑστρίς ordeal, except the record of her last life, in which case the checking of the soul's performance in her last life (the last one on earth) takes place perhaps in the Κρόνου τύρσις area. Even if the soul after her last life on earth returns momentarily to the underworld to be judged by the underworld judge and then to be placed on the (v. 70) Διὸς ὁδὸν which leads to Κρόνου τύρσιν, we may suppose that still some checking takes place (checking of the «passport», so to speak, which the underworld judge issued) in the Κρόνου τύρσις area. (v. 77) πάντων = πάντων τῶν ἐκεῖ θρόνων. ἐχοίσας (= (τῆς) ἐχούσης) is attributive (= ἥ ἔχει). (v. 78) ἐν τοῖσιν = ἐν (= among) τούτοις = ἐν τοῖς μαχάρεσ(σ)ιν. (v. 80) ἔπεισε indicates time prior to (v. 79) ἔνειχ(ε). (vv. 81-2) σφᾶλε and πόρεν indicate time before ἔπεισε. The antecedent of (v. 81) ὅς is (v. 79) Ἀχιλλέα. (v. 82) ἄμαχον ἀστραβῆ (= asyndeton) = ἄμαχον καὶ ἀστραβῆ (see Hummel, § 455).

On p. 160 Willcock thinks that with the Zeus - Thetis scene (vv. 79-83) Pindar explains why Achilles is in the Isle of the Blessed rather than elsewhere. This is highly improbable (see also Koniaris, pp. 260-3). Long before the time of Pindar poets had taken Achilles away from Hades and placed him back on earth. Therefore the appearance of Achilles on the Isle of the Blessed in *O.2* needs no more explanation than, say, his appearance on the «White isle» in *N.* 4.49-50 (where, in fact, no explanation is offered —the date of N.4 is not known, but the *communis opinio*, with which Willcock agrees, sets it in 473 B.C. [Willcock, p. 93], three years after *O.2*). After all, Hesiod in *Op.* 167-73 had already presented heroes in massive numbers on the Isle(s) of the Blessed, and the famous Attic scolion of Harmodius and Aristogiton, which shows no contact with *O.2* and which may well have been written in 510 or 477 B.C. (see Koniaris, p. 262, note 64), presents Achilles on the Isle(s) of the Blessed. I have already argued (pp. 12-3) that the reason Pindar presents Thetis taking her son to the Isle after having contacted Zeus is to make clear that in *O.2* Achilles (and by extension Peleus and Kadmos) is meant to have entered the Isle in the old-fashioned way, not through the ἐστρίς ordeal, and that this clarity is highly desirable, because any understanding of the ἐστρίς ordeal as applying to Achilles (to Peleus, and to Kadmos) would have turned the eschatology into a farce. I have also argued (pp. 17-9, see also Koniaris, pp. 260-3) that Pindar brings Achilles on the Isle because the poetic economy of *O.2* needs Achilles there, not because Pindar is preoccupied with defending his views about the abode of Achilles' soul vis-à-vis Homer's views —after all *O.2* presents an eschatology which is extensively un-Homeric but Pindar shows no interest to explain.

On p. 161, commenting on vv. 83-4 Willcock writes: «The quiver, as the scholia say, is the poet's mind; the target is Theron». The correctness of the equation *quiver = Pindar's mind* can be verified from v. 90 ἐκ φρενὸς ... ὀιστοὺς ἱέντες. The position of the words (vv. 83-5) πολλά - συνετοῖσιν is rhetorically very interesting. Pindar has not introduced the «arrows» ima-gery prior to v. 83. But when immediately after the end of the eschatology we hear him say «I have many swift arrows in my quiver beneath my hand» we are likely to think: *we believe you for we just heard your eschatology.* Notice that (a) there is no particle or anything else in the text to ascertain that (v. 83ff.) πολλά κτλ. is detached from the eschatology and looking ahead toward a new topic, and that (b) the end of the eschatology, (v. 83) Αἰθίοπα, and the following πολλά share the same verse. It may well be, therefore, that the words (vv. 83-8) πολλά - θεῖον are still attached to

the eschatology, thus allowing the eschatology to fade out slowly. If so, a fade-in toward Acragas - Theron begins with the words (v. 89) ἔπεχε νῦν, the whole sequence from (v. 83) πολλά to (v. 88) ἔπεχε νῦν forming a bridge that allows the return from the transcendental to the earthly.

This understanding of the text seems to me preferable to supposing that the eschatology ends with (v. 83) Αἰθίοπα, and that with (v. 83) πολλά the transition from the transcendental to the earthly has been accomplished. In either case, and this is important, the text from (v. 83) πολλά till (v. 89) ἔπεχε νῦν constitute a transitional bridge. In v. 85 φωνήεντα (= denominative adjective with suffix -εντ- denoting fullness - abundance) means «capable of speaking». Arrows are capable of whizzing only when they fly, not when they are in the φαρέτρα, and Pindar's «arrows» must be understood as speaking when they fly, not when they are in his φαρέτρα - mind. After all, unless the Pindaric «arrow» is aimed at a specific target (and no arrow in its «quiver» is so directed), it cannot say anything pertinent. Presumably, Pindar has already delivered the eschatology by shooting some of his mind's many and swift arrows[10].

The word (v. 83) πολλά would then suggest that there are still «arrows» left to be used after the eschatology, and (v. 89) ἔπεχε ... σκοπῷ would make this clear[11]. If so, (v. 83) ὑπ' ἀγκῶνος (*under my elbow or under my bent arm*) suggests that the φαρέτρα has been since some time brought into the position which permits the bowman Pindar to take out arrows and shoot them and that he has already shot one or more «arrows» in the eschatological section (the φαρέτρα, when not used, is likely to be on the bowman's back).

I am not certain of what exactly Willcock means when he says (see his statement above) «the target is Theron». It is clear that Pindar speaks *about* Theron (vv. 92-100), but I think that the «arrow(s)» Pindar sends

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10. The appearance of the σοφός ... φυᾷ (v. 86) in the «arrow» context (vv. 83-91) suggests that the arrows are arrows of wisdom (compare also [v. 83] πολλά ... βέλη with [v. 86] πολλά ... εἰδώς which seems a deliberate παίγνιον binding the σοφός with the «arrows» rather than an accidental repetition of πολλά), i.e. of truth, propriety and the like. The revelation of what takes place after death cannot, I think, be shown to be irrelevant to the σοφός ... φυᾷ and his «arrows». True, the arrows which Pindar sends to Akragas (vv. 90-1) are arrows celebrating Theron's record, but this hardly shows that the content of Pindar's quiver is limited to only that kind of arrows.

11. We should imagine Pindar in Thebes directing, from there, his «arrow(s)» to Akragas even if Pindar was in Acragas during the performance of O.2. Why the plural (v. 84) ἐντί (= εἰσὶν). Perhaps we have ἐντὶ instead of the expected singular ἐστι, because the meaning of (v. 83) πολλά causes the collective neuter plural ὠκέα βέλη to be perceived piecemeal (see Hummel, § 42). But perhaps the plural is used because the «arrows» being φωνήεντα are felt as individually personified, cf. Th. 4.88 τὰ τέλη (= the magistrates) ἐξέπεμψαν...

to Acragas convey his statement about Theron to the Acragantines
(especially the aristocrats there), i.e. Pindar *speaks to them about Theron.*
Notice that Pindar speaks under oath, (v. 92) ἐνόρχιον λόγον, and while it
makes excellent sense to perceive him speaking to the Acragantines under
oath, therefore truthfully, about his client's excellence, it seems awkward
to make Pindar take an oath to eulogize Theron truthfully to Theron.
Notice also that Pindar in vv. 90-100 uses Theron as third person (= he).
While it makes excellent sense for Pindar to speak to the Acragantines
about Theron (= him), it is strange to suppose that here Pindar addresses
Theron saying «Theron, Theron is..» instead of «Theron, you are ...». And
let us not forget that *O.*2 will be performed in Acragas before an Acra-
gantine audience.

I take (v. 89) τίνα βάλλομεν as meaning «whom are we to celebrate?»
(i.e. βάλλομεν = present indicative [*pro futuro* βαλοῦμεν, see Smyth § 1879
a.]. Why the plural? Perhaps (unless the case is merely *pluralis pro nu-
mero singulari*) because of the preceding (v. 89) θυμέ, i.e. the subject of
βάλλομεν is ἐγώ τε καὶ σύ, θυμέ, «I and you, my soul». At any rate, with (v.
92) αὐδάσομαι Pindar returns from the «we» to the «I» level.

On p. 161 Willcock translates (vv. 85-6) φωνάεντα - χατίζει as «that
have a voice for those who understand; but in general they lack inter-
preters», and concludes by obscurely remarking that «The secrets[?] of
Pindaric composition are not generally[?] understood. His arrows speak to
those with understanding, but there is no overall[?] appreciation of his
poetry». Let us try to recover Pindar's thought here. It is not easy to see
how Pindar, in a context where he alludes to himself with (vv. 86-8) σοφὸς
ὁ πολλὰ εἰδὼς φυᾷ and Διὸς ... ὄρνιχα θεῖον, is likely to complain that the
crowd does not understand and/or appreciate his poetry (how could they
qua crowd?). If someone had told Pindar that the crowd understands and/or
appreciates him, we may be certain that Pindar would have been asto-
nished and probably insulted. On the other hand, it would be unthinkable
to suppose that Pindar is here complaining that the συνετοί among whom
we must obviously include Pindar's aristocratic clients, do not understand
and/or do not appreciate Pindar's poetry. Who is to function as ἑρμανεύς of
Pindaric poetry except the συνετός, and what ἑρμανεύς the συνετός can be if
he lacks in understanding and/or appreciation of Pindaric poetry? Why
suppose that Pindar raised a gap in communication between his poetry and
the συνετοί, including his clientele? It makes no sense at all. I conclude
that Pindar speaks with the crowd in mind, and that he allows for the
possibility that the crowd may understand his «arrows» indirectly, through

an ἑρμανεύς, not because he truly wants or expects the crowd to under-
stand his poetry, but simply because his *laudandus*, Theron, is a public
figure, the tyrant of Acragas, and in a poem celebrating Theron Pindar
must be political enough not to close the door in the face of the «crowd». It
is not a question of their understanding «secrets of Pindaric composition»,
or of «appreciating Pindaric poetry», but merely of grasping the poet's
message. They do not understand the language of Pindar's «arrows», but
perhaps an ἑρμανεύς (a συνετός —for only a συνετός can understand what
the «arrows» say) can translate for them what the Pindaric «arrow(s)» say.

Is a συνετός interested in taking up the part of ἑρμανεύς, and, if he is,
is the crowd in a mood to utilize him? Pindar does not care to answer such
questions. In vv. 85-6 we basically hear the familiar jingles of aristocratic
poetry praising the few and rejecting the many, but the rejection mingles
with some tolerance Θήρωνος ἔνεκεν. Pindar's message then in the words
(vv. 85-6) ἐς - χατίζει is: «but [since the συνετοί are few] in general my
«arrows» need ἑρμανεῖς in order that they may be understood not only by
the few (who do not need ἑρμανεῖς), but also by the many»[12].

Can we imagine Pindar himself as an ἑρμανεύς for the crowd? Since a
συνετός can function as ἑρμανεύς, Pindar also can. But we would not
succeed if we try to find an ἑρμανεύς in Pindar's persona, inside *O*.2. We
will do better if we imagine Pindar as ἑρμανεύς outside *O*.2, in his contact
with the people of Acragas (as Pindar rather than as the persona of *O*.2),
especially in a trip to Acragas as guest of Theron and the people of Acragas.

The συνετός (= *he who can* [= *has the abilities to*] *understand*, verbal
adjectival of συνίημι) presents no difficulty perceived as ἑρμανεύς if what he
does is «to translate» what the «arrows» say (the «arrows» speaking a lan-
guage the crowd does not understand). There is difficulty if the συνετός as
ἑρμανεύς «expounds», for there is no evidence that at that time ἑρμανεύς
could mean *expounder - commentator*.

Willcock also translates (v. 86) φυᾷ as «intuitively». But are not know-
ledge and judgment rather than intuition characteristic of the σοφός? More
likely then Pindar means that the σοφὸς φυᾷ grows in knowledge and
judgment out of himself, like an eaglet grows into an eagle or a lion cub
into a lion, while his inferiors, incapable of growing into «eagles» and
«lions», can only pretend to be «eagles» and «lions» by imitating them (like
the ass in Aesop which poses for a lion utilizing a lion's skin). If so, φυᾷ

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12. The construction is: (sc. τὰ ἐμὰ βέλη) χατίζει (= χρῄζει) ἑρμανέων. For the various
views on the interpretation of ἐς ... τὸ πὰν see Hummel, p. 193, note 2. πὰν (pro πᾶν) is, of
course, Doric-Aeolic.

means *by his own nature = by the special gifts his pedigree has endowed him*[13].

Pindar's compatriot Hesiod, in *Works and Days* vv. 293-4, has divided men into three categories: (a) the man who decides correctly on his own; (b) the man who adopts good advice from someone else; (c) the man who can neither think on his own, nor take advice from others. Hesiod pronounces the man of the first category πανάριστος. I think that Pindar's ὁ πολλὰ εἰδὼς φυᾷ is basically Hesiod's πανάριστος but presented in terms of the blue-blooded club (whether we suppose that the σοφός Pindar is an aristocrat by pedigree, or, more likely, by fiat of the Muses in the absence of such a pedigree).

On p. 163 commenting on the dual (v. 87) γαρύετον, Willcock follows the view of those who think that the dual is due to κόρακες (crows, is the argument, frequently fly in pairs) equaling κόρακε, and to the «interaction between the "vehicle" and the "tenor" of the simile». The «interaction» strikes me as an example of hyper-philology at its best, even though the explanation of κόρακες as two crows is clever[14]. Even if we assume that κόρακες equals κόρακε, still interference of κόρακες with the number of the verb to which (v. 87) μαθόντες is the subject is strange since not only the hyperbaton created by κόρακες ὥς is too small to derail the plural construction but also κόρακες ὥς is parenthetically said (syntax demands a comma before κόρακες and after ὥς), and it really calls for the understanding of no specific verb (= «like crows»).

I am convinced that nothing else but γαρύετον makes clear to the listener that Pindar wants him to understand this verb's subject, μαθόντες,

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13. Cf. *P*.5.114 where Arcesilas is complimeted as ἔν τε Μοίσαισι ποτανὸς ἀπὸ μητρὸς φίλας, as having been a votary of the Muses since babyhood, from the time he was sitting on his mother's knees, or even from the time he was in his mother's womb (see LSJ[9] s.v. μήτηρ (1)). Is there much difference between Muses and σοφία? I am aware that Lefkowitz, p. 54, understands (v. 114) ἐν ... Μοίσαισι ποτανὸς ἀπὸ ματρὸς to mean «his mother has taught him poetry». But the context does not speak of poetry, Μοίσαισι clearly means *arts* in this context (see and Slater s.v. μοῖσα 2 b), and it is not the mother, but the king father and male instructors who teach a prince the arts that pertain to making him a thoughtful (cf. v. 110 νόον), eloquent (cf. v. 111 γλῶσσαν), courageous (cf. v. 111 θάρσος), strong in contests (cf. v. 113 ἀγωνίας ... σθένος) etc. monarch. Moreover, Pindar is not likely to have mentioned the queen as educator of Arcesilas while saying nothing about the father. Nor is it likely that Pindar presented the queen as teacher of her son in poetry without complimenting her with credentials relevant to that teaching —φίλας means only «(his own) dear», see LSJ[9] s.v. φίλος 2c, and Slater s.v. 1.b. Arcesilas is ποτανός because his line of descent consists of ποτανοί kings in the royal arts all the way back to Battus.

14. In Koniaris, p. 245, note 21, I called «attractive» the suggestion that γαρύετον is due to κόρακες; I should have called it «ingenious but unlikely».

as equaling μαθόντε. The dual γαρύετον is not caused by κόρακες, for κόρακες by itself need not mean «two crows». When Aeschylus in *Suppl.* v. 751 writes κόρακες he obviously refers to «crows», not to «two crows», and so does Theognis when in v. 833 says ἐν κοράκεσσι. And it would be arbitrary to assume (see LSJ[9] s.v. κόραξ) that expressions such as ἐς κόρακας or ἔρρ' ἐς κόρακας or ἀπόφερ' ἐς κόρακας and the like refer to *two* crows. In the case of Aratus' *Phaen.* vv. 966-8 κόρακες ... κρώξαντε and v. 1023 βοῶντε κολοιοί, it is not the forms κόρακες and κολοιοί that project the notion of «two» but the duals κρώξαντε and βοῶντε, for κόρακες and κολοιοί, arbitrary assumptions left aside, mean just «crows» and «jackdaws»; nor is there any compelling reason to suppose that the poet wrote κρώξαντε and βοῶντε rather than κρώξαντες and βοῶντες seeking anything else than his metrical convenience (cf. the sequence (vv. 963-8) κοράκων ... κόρακες ... κρώξαντε). I would like to draw attention to Aratus' *Phaen.* vv. 1003-5 where the poet passes from κόρακες μοῦνοι, *single crows*, to crows in *fuller company*, πλειότεροι δ' ἀγεληδόν, therefore to many crows (ἀγεληδόν can hardly refer to a pair of crows, or to many crows but presented in pairs —ἀγέλη (ἡ) means «flock»). Obviously Aratus, too, speaks of «single» and «many» crows without pair restrictions.

In the old Scottish ballad, to which Willcock refers, «The twa corbies» makes the corbies two because «twa» means, *two*, not because «*corbies*» by itself means «*twa corbies*». It is true that the poet introduces a pair of corbies, but it is also true that he signalizes the pair by «twa», saying «twa corbies» rather than «corbies». This shows that even for this ballad's poet «corbies» by itself, is a usual plural.

That Pindar and generally the Greeks speaking about κόρακες meant «two crows» (or «more than two crows but in pairs») is wishful thinking. With μαθόντες ... λάβροι preceding, no Greek was likely to think of κόρακες as «two crows» before reading γαρύετον, and when he reached γαρύετον he could only in retrospect understand κόρακες as κόρακε, and μαθόντες (the subject) ... λάβροι as μαθόντε ... λάβρω[15]. In short: Pindar writes γαρύετον not because crows fly in pairs but because he felt that at this point the dual was needed to express what he wanted. Only when the dual γαρύετον is heard (but *not* before it is heard) can μαθόντες ... λάβροι ... κόρακες become μαθόντε ... λάβρω ... κόρακε(ς) in our understanding. Why did Pindar

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15. In LSJ[9] and in the *TGL* s.v. κόραξ I do not find examples of the dual number of κόραξ. From κόραξ one expects the dual κόρακε (N.A.V.), κοράκοιν (G.D.). If the dual of κόραξ is indeed not attested, this is probably accidental. At any rate while μαθόντες ... λαῦροι must equal μαθόντε ... λαῦρω as subject of γαρύετον, the κόρακες, said parenthetically may even remain plural, i.e. «like crows [caw]», rather than «like *two crows* [caw]».

shift to the dual γαρύετον from the expected plural? The understood (v. 84) ἐστιν with (v. 86) σοφός is clearly a present of general truth (see also Hummel, § 471). Therefore σοφὸς ... φυᾷ is not exclusively Pindar but, say, Homer and Hesiod as well. Every σοφὸς ... φυᾷ need not have two rivals. For this reason Pindar begins with the plurals, μαθόντες ... λαῦροι ... κόρακες in the ambiance of general truth. But Pindar wants also the general truth of vv. 86-7 to gravitate to himself and to his personal opponents rather than to remain neutral in a broad gnomic sense, and for this reason he eventually introduces the dual γαρύετον. Of course γαρύετον presupposes that his audience knew of two specific persons as Pindar's opponents —the scholiast makes them to be Simonides and Bacchylides (whether correctly or incorrectly). So γαρύετον (instead of γαρύοντι [= γαρύουσι]) comes in at the last moment (humorously?). With this understanding γαρύετον becomes a quasi-anacoluthon. But perhaps Pindar from as early as μαθόντες had in mind δύο μαθόντες in which case γαρύετον only reveals what he had in mind from start.

For μαθόντες + dual verb cf. Homer *Il.* 4.452-6 χείμαρροι ποταμοὶ κατ' ὄρεσφι ῥέοντες ... συμβάλλετον. These χείμαρροι ποταμοὶ can be understood as two only when we reach the verb συμβάλλετον —no one upon hearing χείμαρροι ποταμοὶ is likely to think specifically of two torrents, rather than generally of torrents. *K.- G.* vol. 1, p. 71 2.b gives sufficient examples of the poetic use of subject in plural with verb in the dual, so that I need not say more on the subject. I need only add that Bergk's correction to γαρυέτων is serviceable only if taken as present imperative, third person plural (to agree with the plural subject μαθόντες κτλ.). However, the form γαρυέτων as third plural remains extremely doubtful in spite of the forms ἔστων (of εἰμί) and ἴτων (of εἶμι) both of which can be 3rd person present imperative dual and plural.

On p. 164, commenting on (v. 90) εὐκλέας ὀιστούς Willcock writes: «the arrows bring fame». I disagree. The fame of Theron, if it is to reach the audience as real rather than fake, must rise from the character and achievements of Theron. Pindar wrote *O.*2 in 476 B.C. when Theron was γέρων and since quite some time a towering figure of excellence in the Greek world. Under the circumstances, in 476 B.C. Theron could bestow fame on Pindar by the fact of hiring him to compose *O.*2, but Pindar could hardly bestow fame on Theron but only celebrate it. Surely, to argue that Pindar brings fame to Theron only in «conventional terms» (à la Theognis, vv. 237-54, bringing fame to Kyrnos) is an unsatisfactory argument, for «convention» need not be used by an intelligent poet when it violates

propriety and common sense (Theron is not any Kyrnos, cf. and Koniaris, pp. 245-6). Those who imagine Pindar in *O.2*, v. 90, to claim that he brings fame to Theron do not think in terms of 476 B.C. realities, but in terms of their admiration of Pindar, which they exercise in a historical vacuum. The words εὐκλέας ὀιστοὺς, I am convinced, are closely analogous to Bacchylides 5.196 εὐκλέα γλῶσσαν, which is correctly translated by LSJ[9] (s.v. εὐκλεής) as «a song that tells of his glory». Theron is saturated with fame, he does not need additional fame from Pindar but only Pindar's poetic record of the fame he, Theron, already has. In *O.3*, which celebrates the same victory of Theron that *O.2* celebrates, Pindar states (vv. 43-4) that through Theron's deeds of excellence Theron's fame has reached the Pillars of Heracles, that is to say the end of the inhabited world. Most Greeks in 476 B.C. would have said that this is not an exaggeration.

Willcock also translates (v. 90) ἐκ μαλθακᾶς ... φρενὸς as «"from gentle mind", i.e. "with friendly intent" —he is using bow and arrow but not in order to kill». *With friendly intent* toward whom? If it is toward Theron, then Pindar makes his eulogy of Theron partisan rather than objective. I am inclined to translate «from a fair [= just] mind», i.e., fair toward the truth and all concerned, therefore fair not only to Theron but also to Acragas and its people (praise or condemnation of Theron reflects obviously on Acragas and the Acragantines since he is their leader).

Rhetoric suggests that Pindar's praise of Theron can be effective only if presented as a result of objectivity and justice rather than partisanship, and apparently Pindar in order to claim for himself such an objectivity and justice he says that he speaks under oath (cf. v. 92 ἐνόρκιον). It seems to me that Willcock's polarity between Pindar's intention and what bows usually do constitutes a witticism that is not in step with the seriousness of the context. I think (v. 90) μαλθακᾶς, «soft», comes to mean «fair» in the sense that a fair mind presupposes «softness», openess and receptivity, pliability and flexibility, as opposed to the rigidity of the partisan mind.

Hummel, § 184, and LSJ[9] s.v. ἐπιτανύω take (vv. 90-1) ἐπὶ ... τανύσαις (= τανύσας) in tmesis. But as long as we have no example of ἐπιτανύω (in one word), we cannot speak of tmesis convincingly (Willcock, I think, agrees). Hummel with the verb supplies ὀιστούς, but I prefer χορδήν or τόξον (do Greeks say (ἐπι)τανύω ὀιστούς? One can «stretch» a bow or its string, not an arrow).

On p. 165 Willcock explains (v. 93) μή «because this is an oath». He would have been more helpful to his reader if he had said that the words αὐδάσομαι ἐνόρκιον λόγον equal ὀμοῦμαι, and then made a cross reference to

a Grammar (e.g. Smyth, § 2725) for emphatic μή in indirect discourse after verbs of asseveration and belief. Willcock takes (v. 92) αὐδάσομαι as encomiastic future. I think no such future is needed here[16]. I translate (vv. 90-93) «Having stretched the bowstring (to shoot [my arrow]) in the direction of Acragas, I *shall make* a sincere statement under oath, namely, that ...». Although it is Pindar who makes the statement *now,* the statement is represented figuratively by the «arrow» as well, not the «arrow» now, when it stays silent on Pindar's stretched bowstring, but when it will fly toward Acragas —arrows whiz and «speak» only when they fly, and Pindar's arrow will fly in a second or two. And so Pindar instead of αὐδῶμαι uses αὐδάσομαι, shifting from present into future.

Willcock takes (v. 93) τιν' to refer to ἄνδρα rather than πόλιν, «the point being that there has been no man in a hundred years rather than no city». He also sees ἑκατὸν ... ἐτέων as a reference to the fact that in 476 B.C. Acragas was a city about a hundred years old (founded c. 580 B.C.). Unfortunately he has not translated the passage and therefore I do not know how he handles (v. 93) πόλιν in this context.

It seems to me that if we follow the words of Pindar without self-willed departures from his *ordo verborum* (v. 93), μή τιν' goes with πόλιν, i.e. μή τιν' = μηδεμίαν. The translation of (vv. 93-5) τεκεῖν - Θήρωνος will then be: *For the last hundred years no city has given birth to a man more supportive of his friends in thought-and-feeling and more open-handed to them than Theron.* The number ἑκατόν is used here as a round number of a large slice of time (it is correct but irrelevant that in 476 B.C. Acragas was about a hundred years old).

True, the possibility remains that πόλιν = τὴν πόλιν (in poetry the article may be omitted) = Ἀκράγαντα (the name is given in v. 91), in which case ἑκατόν gives the years of Acragas, and Pindar says that in its hundred years of existence Acragas has given birth to no kinder man than Theron (construing μή τιν' [= μηδένα] with ἄνδρα). The problem with such understanding, however, is that it lessens Theron's distinction, for Theron is thus superior only among Acragantines, rather than among the inha-

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16. For «encomiastic» future, see Hummel, § 274-288. I may add that in grammatical theory the middle αὐδάσομαι, in contrast to the active αὐδάσω stresses the subject's personal interest in the verbal activity (see Humbert, §§ 165-9). Perhaps the preceding (v. 90) τοι (= «I can assure you») attests to this personal interest. The possibility, however, remains, that αὐδάσομαι was used for only metrical convenience. As to the aorist infinitive (v. 93) τεκεῖν, it indicates (in indirect statement) time before that of αὐδάσομαι, and is meant to synoptically cover all the hundred years distance from past to the time of αὐδάσομαι. In practical terms τεκεῖν can be replaced by τετοκέναι (= *what ... has given birth*).

bitants of all the cities of the world. The extravagant praise of Theron's kindness in verses 98-100 suggests that Pindar was not likely to have spoken restrainingly about the man of that kindness few verses earlier, but rather to have eulogized Theron as the world's most distinguished benefactor.

On p. 166, commenting on (v. 96) μάργων ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν, Willcock writes: «as if κόρος is a passive concept, which in a sense it is». This is obscure and contradictory. Apparently Willcock takes μάργων ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν as agent. In Greek the agent sometimes shifts from verb to noun, and so one may say, for example, παίδευσις Ἡρακλέους ὑπ' ἀρετῆς meaning ἐπαιδεύθη Ἡρακλῆς ὑπ' ἀρετῆς (see K.- G., vol. 1, p. 522). Can we then take (v. 96) κόρος with passive meaning, and ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν as its agent?

The construction of κορέννυμι on the basis of LSJ[9] and the *TGL* s.v. κορέννυμι (see also K.- G. I 355,2; II 54f) is: Μίδας ἐκόρεσε Σάτυρον οἴνου (or οἴνῳ); Σάτυρος ἐκορέσατο (= ἐκόρεσεν ἑαυτόν) οἴνου (or οἴνῳ); Σάτυρος ἐκορέσθη οἴνου (or οἴνῳ); Σάτυρος ἐκορέσθη ... πίνων[17]. Nowhere do we find an agent such as Σάτυρος ἐκορέσθη (οἴνου or οἴνῳ) ὑπὸ Μίδου (and this either because ἐκορέσθη = ἐκορέσατο = ἐκόρεσεν ἑαυτόν, or else ἐκορέσθη = ἐκορέσθη ὑφ' ἑαυτοῦ). Also s.v. κόρος there are no examples of construction with an agent. But let us assume that a Greek could say Σάτυρος ἐκορέσθη ὑπὸ Μίδου. This will explain κόρος (= ἐκορέσθη) μάργων ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν (= agent), but will leave κόρος (= ἐκορέσθη) without subject, seeing that O.2.95 ἀλλ' till v. 98 ἔργοις provides nothing that can function as such a subject. For to say that (vv. 95-6) κόρος μάργων ὑπ' ἀνδρῶν = ἐκορέσθησαν οἱ μάργοι ἄνδρες ὑφ' ἑαυτῶν is to disregard the wording of the text.

Therefore, it is much better to take ὑπ(ό) not as indicative of agent, but as meaning «under», i.e. *satiety of* μάργοι ἄνδρες. In such a case ὑπ(ό) approaches the meaning of ἀπ(ό) (= *from the quarters of*). Pindar uses ὑπό + gen. for a woman giving birth to a child (see Slater s.v. ὑπό 2b. «*from (out of)*»). Perhaps the construction has been extended to the μάργοι ἄνδρες as sometimes τίκτω is extended from the mother to the father (see LSJ[9] s.v. τίκτω I.2) and from *giving birth* to *begetting* (i.e. κόρος that λαῦροι ἄνδρες beget). At any rate, Willcock does not comply with his under-standing of (κόρος) ὑπ' when in p. 164 he translates ὑπ' as «[coming]

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17. I am aware that modern grammatical theory does not favor such renderings of the middle as λούω ἐμαυτόν for λούομαι and the like (see, for example, Humbert, § 165), but I still find such renderings very practical. Linguistically λούομαι means «j'accomplis l'action de baigne par rapport à moi», but logically this can hardly mean anything else than «je me baigne», λούω ἐμαυτόν.

from». The translation of (v. 95) ἀλλ' - (v. 98) ἔργοις is: *But satiety as-saults praise, satiety which does not conform to justice, but issuing from irresponsible individuals desires gossip and to place a cloud over the beautiful deeds of noble individuals*[18].

Willcock's translation of κόρος as «disapproval» (p. 165) misses, I think, Pindar's point. The logic that transpires in vv. 95-100 is this: Pindar has decided to close the poem without protracted praises on Theron, but he wants to give the impression that he does so against his will and only for the benefit of his client. He says, as we have seen, that long praises on a noble individual activate a malicious satiety in irresponsible men, who then in violation of justice attempt to fatally undermine the reputation of the praised man by their gossips. Accordingly, Pindar ends the poem with an epigrammatically brief praise of Theron to protect Theron from the satiety of those individuals. Who are the irresponsible individuals? We are not told, but we may assume that they are everywhere, a few of them may be found even among those who will witness the performance of *O*.2. In general, κόρος comes with quantity (for example, with much eating), not with quality, and therefore by restricting his praise quantitatively to less than three lines Pindar has extricated his client from the danger of κόρος, even though in these three lines Theron qualitatively is praised with enormous power: *none can number the sand, and none can number the joys that Theron has bestowed on others.*

Willcock finds vv. 98-100 p. 166 «anticlimactic». I disagree. The closing is certainly below the high flight of the eschatology (vv. 56-83), but below the eschatology's flight is everything else in *O*.2. I find the close tersely intense, by no means «anticlimactic». Referring to (v. 100) τίς Willcock sees a ring composition (even though he does not use the term), this τίς, according to him, taking us back to (v. 2) τίνα, ... τιν', τίνα ... I find his view unlikely. In v. 2 we have the anaphoric use of τίν(α) where the interrogative *adjective* τίν(α) is used *three* times, each time followed sym-

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18. Some construe (v. 95) οὐ συναντόμενος (sc. αἴνῳ) δίχᾳ (= δικαίως), «not meeting it fairly» (Willcock, p. 165; see and Hummel, § 137 who takes δίχᾳ as «datif de manière»). The construction seems to me too cryptic to be intended by Pindar. I also am inclined to follow the codices in v. 97, reading τε θέμεν. I take the articular infinitive, τὸ λαλαγῆσαι [= gossip(ing)], as noun-object (= λαλάγημα) of θέλων, and θέμεν (with subject ὁ κόρος) as infinitive not in indirect discourse depending on θέλων. I understand the construction as an asymmetric variation of the symmetric θέλων λαλαγῆσαί τε θέμεν (= desiring to gossip and to place). If we read τιθέμεν (pro θέμεν), we should take τὸ λαλαγῆσαι [= its own (= satiety's) gossip(ing)] as subject (in accusative) of τιθέμεν, see LSJ[9] s.v. ἐθέλω (I.1). The passage has been variously emended and construed (see Hummel, § 106), but its meaning remains basically the same.

metrically by a substantive (θεόν ... ἥρωα ... ἄνδρα), while in v. 100 we
have *once* the use of the interrogative *pronoun* τίς. Why is the appearance
of τίς in v. 100 more likely to be the result of ring composition intended by
Pindar rather than the product of mere chance? τίς (interrogative) occurs
frequently enough in Pindar, in *O.2* it is also found on v. 89. Therefore, to
connect v. 2 with v. 100 through τίς (and notice that v. 100, being the
last verse of the poem, does not correspond to v. 2 but to v. 1) is far-
fetched at best. In my view, ring composition is to be seen not in the use of
(v. 100) τίς or (v. 89) τίνα, but in that with v. 89 Pindar returns to the
topic Theron, and so *O.2* begins and ends with Theron (see pp. 33-4, and
cf. Koniaris, pp. 240 and 269).

Willcock calls the question (v. 100) τίς ἂν φράσαι δύναιτο «a sublimely
quiet question». I do not know what «sublimely quiet» is supposed to mean.
As far as the question is concerned we have here a rhetorical question
which equals the negative statement οὐδεὶς ἂν δύναιτο φράσαι ὅσα χάρματ'
ἄλλοις κεῖνος [= Θήρων] ἔθηκεν[19]. If vv. 98-100 are «anticlimactic», as Will-
cock wants them, how can the question be «sublime», and if the question is
«sublime», because its τίς takes us back to v. 2, how can vv. 98-100 be
«unclimactic» —can vv. 98-100 be both «anticlimactic» and «sublime», does
not sublimity exclude anticlimax, and anticlimax sublimity?

Willcock also calls *O.2* a «magnificent poem». Since he has avoided
commenting on the relevance of the eschatology to πλοῦτος ἀρεταῖς δε-
δαιδαλμένος and to Theron (which relevance is the sine qua non in the
logical - esthetic evaluation of *O.2* as a whole) I do not see how he can say
to the multi-culturalist of our time that *O.2* is a «magnificent poem» rather
than two poems in meaningless collage. For *O.2* to emerge as a «magni-
ficent» poem Willcock must either establish the poem's unity of thought, or
else explain how the collage permits one to pronounce *O.2* a «magnificent
poem».

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19. (v. 98) περιπέφευγεν (= has eluded) is a perfect of general truth in gnomic context (see
Hummel, § 292), i.e. ἀριθμὸν περιπέφευγεν = *the grains of sand are numberless*. Translate (v.
98) ἐπεὶ as «since», and (v. 99) καὶ as «then [by analogy]» (see Slater s.v. καὶ C.4.a, and
especially Hummel § 408). I take (v. 99) ὅσα as either equaling ὁπόσα (= «*how many*») in
indirect question, as if the direct question had πόσα(;), or else ὅσα χάρματ' equals τόσα (or
πάντα) χάρματ' ὅσα (= relative ὅσα = *as many ... as* or *all ... which*).