

ON PINDAR'S *OLYMPIAN II*: ΑΧΙΛΛΕΥΣ, AND MUCH MORE*

This paper is a conceptual commentary on *O. 2*. It contains polemic against Lloyd-Jones, Nisetich, Solmsen, Thummer, and others, and makes a number of new suggestions regarding ἀρετά, πλοῦτος, and the questions of whether the eschatology is relevant to Theron, and the poem could imply heroization of Theron to the Acragantines. If correct, the paper, which is a miscellany and yet not deprived of unity since it focuses on a single poem, will open a new vista in the logical, ethical, and esthetic understanding of the poem.

* References to Pindar's Greek text follow *Pindarus, Carmina*, pars I: *Epinicia*, post B. Snell, ed. H. Maehler, Leipzig 1971; pars 2: *Fragmenta*, ed. B. Snell, Leipzig 1964. In the discussion the following books and articles are also mentioned (referred to in the notes by the authors' surname only; abbreviations of periodicals as in *L'Année Philologique*): P. Altenhoven, Note sur trois passages de Pindare (= *Ol. II* 58-66), *AIPhC* 5 (1937) 13-18 (Mél. Boisacq). — A. Boeckh, *Pindari Epinicionum interpretatio Latina cum Commentario Perpetuo*, vol. 2. I. Leipzig 1821. — C. M. Bowra, *Greek Lyric Poetry*, Oxford 1961; id. *Pindar*, Oxford 1964. — J. Carrière, Sur l'Olympique de Pindare. A propos d'un récent examen, *REG* 86 (1973) 436-443. — P. Radici Colace, Considerazioni sul Concetto di 'πλοῦτος' in Pindaro, in *Studi Ardizzoni* 1978, 737-745. — J. Defradas, Sur l'Interprétation de la Deuxième *Olympique* de Pindar, *REG* 84 (1971) 131-143. — N. Demand, Pindar's Olympian 2, Theron's Faith, and Empedocles' Katharmoi, *GRBS* 16 (1975) 347-357. — H. Erbse, Beiträge zum Pindartext, *Hermes* 88 (1960) 23-33. — L. R. Farnell, *The Works of Pindar*, vol. 2. London 1932. — J. H. Finley, *Pindar and Aeschylus*, Cambridge Mass. 1955. — W. Fitzgerald, Pindar's Second Olympian, *Helios* 10, no. 1 (1983) 49-70. — H. Fränkel, *Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy* (translated from the German by M. Hadas and J. Willis), New York 1973. — G. F. Gianotti, Sull'Olimpia seconda di Pindaro, *RFIC* 99 (1971) 26-52. — R. Hampe, Zur Eschatologie in Pindars zweiter Olympischer Ode, in *Επιμνητα* Festschrift Otto Regenbogen. Heidelberg, 1952: 46-65. — A. Hurst, Observations sur la deuxième Olympique de Pindare, *ZAnt* 31 (1981) 121-133. — S. Impellizzeri, La II Olimpica e i Frammenti di Θρηνοι di Pindaro, *SIFC* 16 (1939) 105-110. — B. Lavagnini, Gerone e Terone nelle due prime Olimpiche di Pindaro, *ASSO* 29 (1933) 5-14. — J. van Leeuwen, *Pindarus' Tweede Olympische Ode*, ed. cum app. cr. et trad. [in Dutch], 2 vols., 1964. — A. Lesky, *A History of Greek Literature* (translated from the German by J. Willis), New York 1966. — H. Lloyd-Jones, Pindar and the After-Life, in *Pindare* (Entretiens sur l'Antiquité Classique 31. Vandoeuvres-Geneve 1985) 245-283. — K. Merentites, Αί ιδεώδεις πνευματικοί και ήθικοί ἀρεταί του ανθρώπου παρά Πινδάρω, *EEAth* 14 (1963-1964) 9-70. — G. W. Most, Pindar, *O. 2*. 83-90, *CQ* 36 (1986) 317-321. — J. K. and F. S. Newman, *Pindar's Art*, Weidmann, Munich 1984. — F. J. Nisetich, Immortality in Acragas: Poetry and Religion in Pindar's Second Olympian Ode, *CP* 83 (1988) 1-19. — G. Norwood, *Pindar*, Univ. of Calif. Press, 1945. — A. Perosa, Ia

Commenting on Achilles' appearance on the *Isles*¹ of the *Blessed* (henceforth in this paper referred to as *Isles*) in *O.* 2, 71, Solmsen observes² that the hero's presence there could not easily be assumed by the Greeks of Pindar's time, and for this reason the poet explains the matter with the comment: *his mother* [= Thetis] *brought there Achilles*³, *after she convinced the heart of Zeus with her entreaties*. Solmsen finds it highly probable that Pindar himself invented this explanation, and that the appearance of Achilles on the *Isles* constituted a novelty for the poet's contemporaries.

In *Odyssey* 11, 488-491, Achilles in the Underworld states that he would have preferred to be alive on earth as a day-laborer employed by a poor peasant rather than as the king of all the Shades in Hades. To think of the ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν in the gloomy Hades and in such unhappiness must have been very distressing to the Greeks of Pindar's time, says Solmsen, and he adds that a more pleasant alternative for Achilles would be welcomed. Yet such an alternative, Solmsen thinks, had against it the tremendous authority of Homer, and therefore had to be a very convincing alternative in order to be taken seriously. Thus, Solmsen concludes that Pindar, in order to combat Homer's authority successfully, borrows from Homer a «motif» and a «motivation». As Solmsen explains⁴: «Thetis' capacity

Seconda Ode Olimpica di Pindaro, *SIFC* 18 (1941) 25-53. — W. H. Race, The End of Olympian II. Pindar and the Vulgus, *CSCA* 12 (1979) 251-267. — W. Schadewaldt, *Der Aufbau des Pindarischen Epinikion*, Halle (Saale), 1928. — W. J. Slater, *Lexicon to Pindar* (de Gruyter, 1969). — F. F. Solmsen, Achilles on the Islands of the Blessed: Pindar vs. Homer and Hesiod, *AJP* 103 (1982) 19-24; id., Two Pindaric Passages on the Hereafter, *Hermes* 96 (1968) 503-506. — E. Thummer, *Die Religiosität Pindars*, Innsbruck 1957. — U. v. Wilamowitz-Moellendorff, *Pindaros*, Berlin 1922. — L. Woodbury, Equinox at Acragas: Pindar, *O.* 2, 61-62, *TAPhA* 97 (1966) 597-616.

1. Modern editors of Pindar's text in *O.* 2, v. 71 print μακάρων νᾶσον (the *Isle* of the Blessed), rather than μακάρων νᾶσος ([= the *lectio solitaria* of Codex G — Triclinius interpreted νᾶσος as Doric acc. pl. = Attic νήσους] = the *Isles* of the Blessed). In this paper I use *Isles* rather than *Isle* because «Isles (or Islands) of the Blessed» is the usual English designation (going back to translating the plural in Hesiod, *Op.* 171).

2. Solmsen, p. 20.

3. In this paper I do not intend to enter upon a discussion of defining the soul. When I refer to «soul», or «dead» in the Underworld, I refer to what a person becomes when death has taken away his body. The question remains whether those who go to the *Isles* are meant by Pindar to go there as «souls», or as «souls plus bodies» (in the latter case full translation taking place, analogous to the one which is announced to Menelaus in Homer's *Od.* 4, 561). In what precedes the eschatology Pindar speaks of death and life after death. The likelihood then is that he either takes the inhabitants of the *Isles* as well to be «souls», or else (in the case of Achilles, Cadmus, and Peleus), treats them as if they were «souls», disregarding the presence of their «bodies» (see also note 73, and p. 253-54).

4. Solmsen, p. 20-21.

to sway the heart of Zeus by her *λιταί* was proved in the First Book of the *Iliad* (vv. 493-530). If her pleading succeeded in securing for Achilles his *τιμή* among the living, she would be able to win him also a place of honor among the dead». The «motif» is: *Thetis sways the heart of Zeus with her prayers on behalf of her son*; the «motivation» is: *Thetis wants a place of honor for her son among the dead*.

In a recent article Nisetich, objecting to Solmsen's interpretation, writes⁵: «For Pindar, as for the poet of the *Iliad*, Achilles is the hero who chooses to avenge his friend though he knows it will lead to his own death. In the background is another choice, between a long life in obscurity and a brief life filled with heroic action leading to fame. Achilles' early death and his glorification in poetry belong together; to mitigate the first would be to deprive the second of its special, compensatory value». In simpler terms, Nisetich says that Achilles has been recompensed commensurably for his tragic life with the glory he received as ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν; to be recompensed additionally with becoming an inhabitant of the *Isles* is meaningless.

And yet, in fairness to Solmsen, one should observe that in *O. 2* there is absolutely nothing about Achilles' choice, his friend Patroclus, etc., and Solmsen's argument is only that in *O. 2* Pindar expresses an un-Homeric sentiment with a «motif» and a «motivation» taken from Homer. Under the circumstances Nisetich's objection has no relevance either to the text of *O. 2*, or to Solmsen's suggestion —pace Nisetich, *O. 2* is not an integral part of the *Iliad*.

Elsewhere Nisetich argues⁶: «The presentation of Achilles saved from Hades in the same way and by the same goddess who had saved him from dishonor in the *Iliad* recapitulates, at the conclusion of Pindar's eschatology, the movement from poetic to actual immortality that we have seen taking place at its opening. The appropriateness of Achilles' translation supersedes any need that Pindar might have felt to seek support for it elsewhere». And yet, in fairness to Solmsen again, one must stress that neither in the eschatology nor in any other part of *O. 2* is there evidence of a «movement from poetic to actual immortality», and, moreover, Thetis is the *mother* of Achilles, not, say, Muse, or Apollo with his lyre in hand, and it is difficult to see how Pindar would have chosen the *mother*⁷ here if he had wished others to understand him as «recapitulating» such a movement as that advocated by Nisetich.

5. Nisetich, p. 9.

6. Nisetich, p. 9.

7. If Nisetich wants vv. 79-80 to recapitulate his «movement», the recapitulation must include inter alia «immortality by poetry», and in this connection Nisetich must give the role of immortalizing poetry to «saving» Thetis. I may add here that Nisetich (p. 14) defines divine favor in the case of Achilles as «Thetis' intercession with Zeus». This is wrong. Thetis is Achilles' *mother* and therefore represents Achilles' interests. Her appeal to Zeus is a *petitio* on behalf of her

Nisetich evokes his «movement from poetic to actual immortality» with his interpretation of πλοῦτος in *O.* 2, 53⁸. Let us, then, critically pursue this evocation and interpretation.

Pindar (vv. 48-51), briefly repeating what we already know in more detail from preceding passages of *O.* 2, states that Theron won at Olympia, and to this he now adds that Theron's brother (= Xenocrates), whom he introduces without naming, also won the four-chariot race at both the Pythian and the Isthmian games. The victories of the two brothers close with the gnome (vv. 51-52) τὸ δὲ τυχεῖν πειρώμενον ἀγωνίας δυσφρονᾶν παραλύει, *to compete and win the victory gives the victor release from hardships*. It is after this gnome that πλοῦτος (v. 53) is introduced.

If upon hearing or reading the word πλοῦτος (v. 53) one asks oneself of the word's possible thought-relation to what precedes, and if one takes (as one should) the word πλοῦτος to mean «wealth», then the emerging thought-relation is more or less: *Theron and his brother were victorious in the games, and enjoyed all good that comes with such victories because they could undertake the prerequisite expenses. For without their wealth they could not afford the thoroughbreds, chariots, charioteers, stables, grooms, exercising grounds, round-trip from Acragas to Olympia, to Boeotia, and to Isthmus, and whatever else was required to give them the chance of winning the four-horse chariot victory at the three national games.* The aristocrat is proud of his ancestors (whom he likes to trace back to a hero, and preferably to a god), of his wealth, and of his ἀρετά. Pindar, one would presume, having already spoken extensively of Theron's ancestors, is at this point, with the introduction of πλοῦτος, entering upon celebrating Theron's wealth.

If now one leaves aside what one *supposed* was the thought-relation of the word πλοῦτος (v. 53) with the text that precedes this word, and examines what Pindar proceeds to say about πλοῦτος, one will find that the poet speaks not about the πλοῦτος of Theron (and his brother), but rather about a *category* of πλοῦτος. The word ἀνδρῖ (= *for a man* [v. 56]) and the word τις (= someone = *anyone* [v. 56]) make it clear that Pindar treats πλοῦτος as the πλοῦτος of the aristocrat *generaliter*, rather than as the πλοῦτος of Theron (/Xenocrates) *specialiter*. This is important for understanding the meaning of the expression (v. 53) πλοῦτος ἀρετᾶς δεδαιδαλμένος. This is the brand of πλοῦτος which is stamped and adorned by the Greek aristocrat's ἀρετὰ through the centuries.

Wherever the aristocrat demonstrates excellence in his way of feeling, thinking, and acting, he demonstrates ἀρετὰ (whether one likes to think of the aristocrat's excellence in terms of many ἀρεταὶ or of one ἀρετὰ that takes various forms makes little difference). True, the Greek had probably to wait till the day of Socrates in order to be fully aware of ἀρετὰ as moral virtue, and yet the aristocrat of 476 B.C. can hardly be considered either immoral, amoral, or moral but unable to perceive a relation of ἀρετὰ to morality. When Heraclitus, an aristocrat and earlier contemporary of Pindar, says (fr. 112) σωφρονεῖν ἀρετὴ μέγιστη, would he have had any difficulty identifying, say, δικαιοσύνη, or εὐεργεσία, or εὐσέβεια as ἀρετή? But let us stay with *O.* 2. When Pindar calls

son which may be granted or not granted by Zeus. Zeus grants it, and therefore the divine favor comes from Zeus. Thetis begging for her son can hardly be perceived as rendering a «favor» to her son, but only as contributing to the favorable reaction of Zeus —the favor comes from Zeus. We cannot see the favor as just coming on the part of the two gods, for Thetis is introduced explicitly (v. 80) as Achilles' mother, the words (vv. 79-80) ἐπεὶ ... ἔπεισε make it clear that Thetis could not take Achilles to the *Isles* without Zeus' approval, while obviously Zeus could have sent him there, had he so wished, without asking for her or anyone else's opinion, let alone permission. This is, I think, what the Greek text and common sense suggest.

8. Nisetich, p. 5 (section III) -7.

Theron (v. 6) ὅτι δίκαιον ξένων, *just in his regard for guests*⁹, or when he describes him with the word εὐεργέταν, *benefactor* (v. 94), could Pindar have denied that δικαιοσύνη and εὐεργεσία are Theron's ἀρεταί, and would he have failed to feel something of their moral implications even if he lacked a clear concept of ethical virtue? Again, when Pindar (v. 66) says in praise of the ἐσ(θ)λοὶ of the Underworld that in their life on earth ἔχαIRON εὐορχίαις, or when he speaks of *complete abstinence from evil* (vv. 68-70), is he not referring to manifestations of ethical ἀρετά, and is he not likely to feel some moral implications in connection with this ἀρετά? An impressive instance of ethical virtue in Pindar, all the more important because it is specified by him as ἀρετά, is found in *P. 6*, 39-42, where Antilochus «bought with his own life the rescue of his father, and, by doing this magnificent deed, was deemed by those of a younger generation to have proven himself, among men of old, supreme in the virtue of filial devotion (ὑπατος ἀμφὶ τοκεῦσιν ἔμμεν πρὸς ἀρετάν)». Clearly then, when Pindar (v. 53) says ὁ μὲν πλοῦτος ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος, he has in mind the entire *gamut* of the aristocrat's ἀρετά (Bacchylides' statement [13, 8] μυρίαὶ ἀνδρῶν ἀρεταὶ comes to mind), and therefore moral ἀρετά as well in its pre-Socratic stage of evolution.

I may point out that the πλοῦτος ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος finds a parallel at the opening of *P. 5*: ὁ πλοῦτος εὐρυσθενής, ὅταν τις ἀρετᾶ κεκραμένον καθαρᾶ κτλ., and that Pindar's sentiment on πλοῦτος combined with ἀρετά had been essentially expressed by Sappho 148 (31) ὁ πλοῦτος ἄνευ † ἀρέτας οὐκ ἀσίνης πάροικος / ἄ δ' ἀμφοτέρων κρᾶσις † εὐδαιμονίας ἔχει τὸ ἄκρον † = *wealth without virtue is a very harmful neighbor, but the blending of both yields the highest degree of prosperity*.

One certainly should not minimize the importance of athletic ἀρετά in a poem which is by definition an epinician. But when in *O. 2* Pindar celebrates the ἀρεταί of the Greek aristocrat *generaliter*, one sees no good reason to suppose that Pindar confines them to the liberality of victorious athletes toward their guests in parties celebrating their victories, and toward poets extolling those victories.

In discussing this πλοῦτος Pindar tells us (vv. 53-54) that *it brings various opportunities*¹⁰ and that *it prompts the heart to a keen and eager quest*¹¹. What does

9. ὅτι δίκαιον ξένων celebrates Theron as providing under the auspices of Ζεὺς ξένιος the traditional ξενία in the grand fashion of the aristocrat. I see no reason to believe that Pindar in *O. 2* trivializes Theron's ξενία and liberality by applying them exclusively or predominantly to self-serving victory parties as Nisetich believes (see his p. 7).

10. τῶν τε καὶ τῶν indubitably points to opportunities in all directions, to opportunities in general. Since πλοῦτος is eulogized, τῶν τε καὶ τῶν cannot mean ἀγαθῶν τε καὶ κακῶν (see and Slater, p. 367); nor, I think, is Erbse, p. 31, likely to be correct in interpreting τῶν τε καὶ τῶν in terms of «Anstrengung und Erfolg», for «Anstrengung» in the context of this ode cannot be seen in a favorable light, as καλόν/ἀγαθόν. True, τὰ ἀγαθὰ πόνους κτώμεθα, and πόνος as producer of τὸ καλόν / τὸ ἀγαθόν cannot be a κακόν, and yet πόνος in such a positive light is alien to the persona's mode of thinking, cf. vv. 51-52 τὸ δὲ τυχεῖν πειρώμενον ἀγωνίας δυσσφρονᾶν παραλύει (and also cf. vv. 15-22 τῶν - ὑψηλόν). See also Hurst, p. 131-132. In short: τῶν τε καὶ τῶν refers to various opportunities for *excellence*. Thoughts of *Anstrengung*/πόνος may be understood behind τῶν τε καὶ τῶν, but not be included in τῶν τε καὶ τῶν (i.e. neither τῶν, nor καὶ τῶν should be rendered as πόνων or as καὶ πόνων, but τῶν τε καὶ τῶν should be rendered as καλῶν τε καὶ καλῶν = παντοίων καλῶν).

11. The quest, μέριμνα (v. 54), which πλοῦτος prompts, is βαθεῖα, «deep», but also ἀγροτέρα «hunting». The scholiast correctly renders βαθεῖαν ὑπέχων μέριμναν ἀγροτέραν as

this mean? It means that the aristocrat's πλοῦτος encourages and guides the aristocrat towards ἀρετά, towards excellence. It gives to the aristocrat the message: *here is a chance for you to activate your ἀρετά; go ahead; you and I cooperating will achieve the desirable results.* And so the aristocrat in occasion after occasion moves towards accomplishing what is honorable in the estimate of his class, whether as warrior, athlete, judge, politician, or advisor, etc.¹².

Pindar then calls this πλοῦτος metaphorically (vv. 55-56) ἀστήρ ἀρίζηλος and ἐτυμώτατον ἀνδρὶ φέγγος. ἀρίζηλος means «very clear [to the eye or mind]». A star appeals to the eye, and ἀστήρ ἀρίζηλος means «a [very] shiny star». When πλοῦτος is called «a [very] shiny star», one may think of πλοῦτος in terms of «[very] shiny *gold*», suppose that *star* substitutes for *gold* in terms of a metaphor, and thereby explain how πλοῦτος becomes ἀστήρ ἀρίζηλος. Nevertheless, what precedes the appellation of πλοῦτος as ἀστήρ ἀρίζηλος in *O.* 2 guides one in a different direction regarding the understanding of this metaphor. The πλοῦτος is ἀρεταῖς (rather than χρυσῶ) δεδαιδαλμένος, brings to its owner opportunities to engage variously in the sphere of ἀρετά, and prompts the owner's heart to undertake a keen and eager interest in this engagement. Here πλοῦτος *directs* and *guides* its owner. If so, the «shiny star», as a metaphor of this πλοῦτος, must

συνετὴν ἔχων τὴν φροντίδα πρὸς τὸ ἀγρεύειν τὰ καλὰ. Surely, τὰ καλὰ should not be limited to athletic victories, but understood as covering the entire class of good. After all, Theron is a γέρων, and in an ode dedicated to him, it is tasteless (in addition to being arbitrary) to limit the aristocrat's wealth to athletic events which are mostly activities of the young. In *P.* 9, v. 6 the nymph Cyrene is called παρθένον ἀγροτέρων. Farnell (p. 16) has pointed out that ἀγροτέρα is an adjective of Ἄρτεμις as huntress. Attempts to emend ἀγροτέρων in *O.* 2 are simply misguided. For πλοῦτος in Pindar, especially in the sense of «ricchezza finanziaria», see Colace, p. 737ff. Cf. and Finley, p. 63: «The outlook resembles Aristotle's in the *Ethics*, that wealth serves virtue by giving opportunities...». For the understanding of vv. 53-54 see also Defradas, p. 135-137. That (v. 54) ἀγροτέρων should not be treated as «einfach Unsinn, heller Unsinn» (Wilamowitz, p. 246), has been established once and for all by Erbse, p. 28ff. See also Hurst, p. 131-132. Norwood, p. 131 and 137, suggests that (v. 54) ἀγροτέρων is a play on the name Θήρων (i.e. θηρῶν = *hunting*), and that (v. 53) ὁ ... πλοῦτος ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος playfully refers to the Demareteion, the silver coin issued by Gelon in 479 B.C. in honor of his wife Demarete (= δῆμος + ἀρετά), daughter of Theron. Both suggestions are clever but improbable. The name Θήρων (occurring in vv. 5 and 95) does not appear in the context of (v. 54) ἀγροτέρων, and, of course, Demareteion —Demarete and Gelon are mentioned nowhere in *O.* 2.

12. Here πλοῦτος comes close to the concept of ἀγαθὸς δαίμων. Fitzgerald, p. 57, finds it impossible to tell «whether it is ambition or wealth that is described as a 'conspicuous star'». The construction of the Greek, however, makes it clear that the nominative (v. 55) ἀστήρ ἀρίζηλος (as well as the nominative [vv. 55-56] ἐτυμώτατον ... φέγγος) can refer only to the nominative (v. 53) ὁ ... πλοῦτος. Pindar would have put (vv. 55-56) ἀστήρ ἀρίζηλος in the accusative if he had wanted to present (v. 54) μέριμναν as a «conspicuous star». For ἀρετή in early Greek thought see Fränkel, p. 532-533.

somehow *direct* and *guide* too, for the meaning of the metaphor must be relevant to the context. Stars guide the ancient in his travels by land and by sea, and they also constitute his calendar defining the seasons and the ἔργα that pertain to each season. See, for example, S. *O.T.* 794-96 τὴν Κορινθίαν, | ἄστροις τὸ λοιπὸν ἐκμετρούμενος, χθόνα | ἔφευγον, E. *Ph.* 835 τυφλῶ ποδὶ | ὀφθαλμὸς εἶ σύ, ναυβάταισιν ἄστρον ὤς, and Hes. *Op.* 383-4 Πληιάδων Ἄτλαγενέων ἐπιτελλομένων | ἄρχεσθ' ἀμήτου, ἀρότιοι δὲ δυσσομενάων. Just as stars help a man to chart his course when he travels and to put his activities in seasonal perspective, so the aristocrat's πλοῦτος helps the aristocrat to chart his course and activities in the ambiance of ἀρετά. Analogous to the metaphorical presentation of πλοῦτος as star is the presentation of πλοῦτος as φέγγος. *Light* easily brings to mind its opposite, *darkness*. With light we can see, and thus light protects us from going the wrong way, from stumbling, falling, and, depending on the circumstances, perishing. Having thus praised the aristocrat's πλοῦτος for its splendid services to the aristocrat on earth, Pindar goes on to say (vv. 56-57) εἰ δὲ νῦν ἔχων τις οἶδεν τὸ μέλλον, ὅτι θανόντων, and with ὅτι θανόντων and an ellipsis¹³ he begins the eschatological section of the ode —we descend into the Underworld while πλοῦτος is still in our ears (cf. v. 56 νῦν = πλοῦτον)¹⁴.

13. Since ὅτι (v. 57) seems to return to οἶδεν (v. 56), what one meets with here is probably an *ellipsis* caused by the suppression of the apodosis to εἰ - μέλλον, not an *anacoluthon*.

14. There can be no doubt that Pindar enters the eschatology still talking about the aristocrat's πλοῦτος, but the missing apodosis after (v. 56) εἰ — μέλλον does not allow one to pinpoint the logical relation between πλοῦτος and the eschatology. The major reason for Pindar's ellipsis here may well be this. He felt that he would detract from the importance of the eschatology if he were to make the eschatology part of the discussion on πλοῦτος. For this reason, through the suppression of the apodosis, he effects a striking break from the πλοῦτος topic, the break indicating that the poet's interest now is absorbed in something *new*. Thus the eschatology becomes a self-contained unit around which rotates the entire poem, rather than part of the πλοῦτος discussion. Pindar leaves to us to supply the relevance of πλοῦτος to the eschatology —he feels that the relevance is obvious enough to be grasped in its general terms, and that specific details on his part are poetically undesirable (after all Pindar is by no means particularly interested in the logical lucidity of his transitions, calculated *obscurity* being one of the major ἡδύσματα of his poetry). The eschatology as worded by Pindar concerns itself with ἀρετά rather than with πλοῦτος ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος, for example the *εὐορκία* (instances of εὐσέβεια) of the ἐσ(θ)λοὶ (v. 66) points to ἀρετά rather than to πλοῦτος, but in view of vv. 53-56 where πλοῦτος and ἀρετά are entwined, deeds of ἀρετά in the eschatology still echo πλοῦτος. As to the relevance of πλοῦτος to the eschatology which Pindar has left to us to supply, it is something like this: he who on earth, thanks to his πλοῦτος ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος, has compiled a record of ἀρετά, can expect, on the basis of this record, to be rewarded by the judge of the Underworld (see note 58) with the happy life of an ἐσ(θ)λός, and depending on how impressive the record is, he may even be given the option (see note 35) of the ἐστρίς ἐκατέρωθι process, which successfully accomplished leads to the *Isles*. Thus πλοῦτος, as being instrumental in the compilation of the record of ἀρετά

Instead of understanding πλοῦτος in this way, Nisetich limits πλοῦτος to the wealth which «has enabled Theron to compete in the games, to be hospitable, to commission the present ode»¹⁵. The commission of the present ode in particular is of the greatest importance for Theron, according to Nisetich, because in his wisdom Theron knows that only poetry can save from oblivion a mortal's name and his achievements¹⁶. So, according to Nisetich, Theron, being after such a salvation, hires Pindar, who as the master of bestowing salvation upon his clients proceeds to write *O. 2*, and the ἀστὴρ ἀρίζηλος and the ἐτυμώτατον ἀνδρὶ φέγγος in *O. 2* refer to such a poetry¹⁷. All this, besides trivializing the poem (both Theron and Pindar become selfish *hunculi*), is unsupported by the Greek text. It is also unsupported by common sense, since in 476 B.C. Theron was a towering figure in the Greek world who could hardly be treated as a foil in order that Pindar might glorify himself as a distributor of immortalizing fame. That Pindar, the Theban businessman, was commissioned by Theron need not mean that the persona of *O. 2* as well must appear as commissioned and as peddler of immortality, whether the persona is Pindar or his chorus speaking collectively as «I» instead of as «we». The persona sings of Theron because if encomiastic poetry fails to praise a great man such as Theron, such poetry is bankrupt —it is this poetry which suffers, not Theron (whether Pindar, the Theban businessman, is paid or not is irrelevant here). I am afraid that Pindar would have violated the πρέπον in an offensive manner if *O. 2* were to be perceived as the poem in which Pindar brags of giving great Theron of 476 B.C. «a permanent place in the memory of mankind»¹⁸.

According to Nisetich, Pindar in the πλοῦτος sequence (vv. 53-56) confers fame on Theron only implicitly, but with vv. 89-90 «the power of poetry to confer immortal fame ... emerges into

on earth, proves helpful to one's well-being in the Underworld as well. See also Gianotti, p. 40: «la prospettiva dell'aldilà si innesta sul motivo della πόνων ἀμοιβή, di cui costituisce l'ultima e più alta exemplificazione». But instead of πόνων ἀμοιβή I prefer ἀρετῆς ἀμοιβή, for, as I have stated in note 10, the persona's view in *O. 2* does not treat πόνος in a positive, laudatory manner.

15. Nisetich, p. 6.

16. Nisetich, p. 7.

17. Nisetich, (p. 6-7) bases his understanding of ἀστὴρ/φέγγος (vv. 55-56) as *poetry* on the following: (a) On *Nemean* 4, 12-13, on *Isthmian* 4, 55-60, and on *Pythian* 3, 72-76; (b) on his theory that vv. 53-56 must continue the praise of Theron's «liberality». In (a) Nisetich twists Pindaric passages to force them to say what their Greek does not say, and in (b) he imposes on vv. 53-56 thought and unity of thought that simply are not there. What surprises his reader in particular is his statement that (a) and (b) make us «certain» that the shiny star/light metaphor in *O. 2* is *poetry that confers immortal glory* (Nisetich, p. 7). Even if it were certain that in *Isthmian* 4 and *Pythian* 3 light symbolizes the power of poetry to confer immortal glory, one does not see why it would follow that in *O. 2* *light* as a metaphor predicating πλοῦτος must also symbolize such «poetry» (πλοῦτος means «wealth», not «poetry»).

18. Nisetich, p. 7. There is not a word in the text that the poem is *bought* and that through such a transaction Theron has acquired «salvation from oblivion» and «a permanent place in the memory of mankind». I am, of course, aware of *O. 10*, 88-93; *O. 11*, 4-5; *P. 1*, 92-94; *P. 3*, 114-115 as well as of *I. 2*, 11-12 (even though I am not convinced that here Pindar defends rather than condemns the φιλοκερδῆς Μοῖσα, see also Lesky, p. 194) and *P. 1*, 90. Nevertheless what the Pindaric persona states in other odes about the effects of poetry and about money paid to poets by the recipients need not be considered relevant to the understanding of *O. 2* as long as it does not feature in the text of *O. 2*. Every Pindaric ode has its own orientation and its analogous *forma mentis*, and (unless sufficient reason to the contrary can be provided) the only way to ascertain the correct understanding of an ode is to stay close to the ode's text.

the light of day»¹⁹. This is gratuitous at best. Nisetich takes εὐκλέας ὀιστοῦς (v. 90) to mean «the arrows of glory», but he adds that εὐκλέας is «causative»²⁰, therefore the ὀιστοὶ bestow glory on Theron. But why so? Theron in all respects is one of the most distinguished men in Greece. Why should the «arrows» of Pindar *bestow* on him glory rather than *celebrate* the glory he *already* has? Does not Theron in *O.* 3, 43-44, reach as far as the Pillars of Herakles *by his own excellence*, ἀρεταῖσιν ... οἴκοθεν? But let us assume with Nisetich that εὐκλέας is causative and that εὐκλέας ὀιστοῦς means «arrows that bestow glory». Even so, arrows that bestow glory need not mean arrows that bestow *immortalizing* glory. One may add here that it would be a mistake to use any element of vv. 83-100 to argue that the persona of *O.* 2 shows an arrogance which allows the hearer and reader to project into *O.* 2 the notion of a commissioned Pindar «immortalizing» Theron by the fame he bestows on him through his poetry. In vv. 83 ff. the persona assures the hearer/reader that he speaks under oath (and in the eschatology [v. 66] we are told that the virtue of keeping one's oath is of central importance for achieving *post mortem* the life of the ἐσ(θ)λός -- the persona therefore is supposedly not likely to lie), and that he belongs to the class of those who are wise φῶξ (which is the wisdom that carries weight with the aristocrat). He denies his opponents the φῶξ wisdom (and therefore presents them and their views as unworthy of the esteem of the aristocrat in general), and defends Theron against any detractor on the basis of the validity of the truism (the aristocratic ring of which is obvious) which says that *the inferior man always casts aspersions on the noble man* (therefore the appearance of individuals maligning Theron is only to be expected and should surprise no decent man, no aristocrat in particular). Obviously, the persona is not flexing his muscles in braggadocio as a bestower of immortal fame on Theron, but he effectively presents himself as the most *credible* poet/witness in general compared with others whom he rejects as his inferiors, and by inference as the convincing advocate of Theron's splendid record against the latter's detractors. The persona arrays his credentials in order to maximize his usefulness as a believable witness of Theron's greatness, not in order to brag²¹.

To clarify my position beyond the possibility of misunderstanding, I may add this. The notion that encomiastic poetry offers «immortality» is perfectly Greek. Theognis in his *Elegy*, vv. 237-54, guarantees such «immortality» to Cyrnus, and so essentially does Pindar in, for example, *O.* 10, 91-96, when he says to the boy victor of that ode: «Hagesidamus, whenever a man who has done noble deeds descends to the abode of Hades without the meed of song, he has spent his strength and his breath in vain, and wins but a little pleasure by his toil; whereas you have glory shed upon you by the soft-toned lyre and by the sweet flute, and your fame waxes widely by the favor of the Pierid daughters of Zeus». We must stress,

19. Nisetich, p. 17.

20. Nisetich, p. 17 with *ibid.* note 66.

21. The major difficulties in this passage (vv. 83-100) are: the meaning of (v. 85) ἐς ... τὸ πᾶν, and the reason for (v. 87) γάρυετον (Snell adopts Bergk's conjectural plural γάρυετων [= γαρυόντων/γάρυετωσάν] which may well be a barbarism). The latest attempts to interpret ἐς... τὸ πᾶν will be found in Race and Most. The best I can do is to follow those who (like Lloyd-Jones, p. 257) translate ἐς ... τὸ πᾶν as «in general» (cf. and Slater, s.v. πᾶς 1a, «on the whole»), i.e. «but [since the wise are relatively few] in general my 'arrows' need an interpreter [in order that they may be correctly and fully understood by all]». An attractive explanation of the dual γάρυετον will be found in Lloyd-Jones, p. 258.

however, that, unlike Theognis' and Pindar's verses mentioned above, the text of *O. 2* says nothing about such «immortality», and that Theron is too distinguished a person to be treated by poetry as a Cyrnus or as a mere victor, let alone a boy victor. Even if we had a letter from Pindar to Theron, in which Pindar claimed that he wrote *O. 2* to make Theron «immortal», still we would not be able to argue that this purpose is visible in the ambiance of the Greek text of *O. 2*, but rather that it exists ἐκτὸς τῆς ὠδῆς as a corollary to the truism: *quality encomiastic poetry can «immortalize»*. Nisetich is wrong in placing such «immortality» ἐν τῇ ὠδῇ, let alone one bought with money.

Only when we enter the eschatology, according to Nisetich, do we recognize that now Pindar deals not with immortality through fame but with an actual immortality²². The truth of the matter, however, is that in the text which precedes the eschatology no one who reads Pindar's words without undue liberties can see a Pindar dealing with poetic immortality, and therefore Nisetich's movement from immortality by poetry to actual immortality must come from Nisetich, not from Pindar.

We have already²³ rejected Nisetich's view that the Thetis-Zeus scene suggests immortality through poetry, by pointing out that on the basis of the Greek text Achilles' *mother* can hardly be identified as poetry by the hearers and readers of Pindar, and that thus it is most improbable that Pindar meant such an identification. We shall now argue that the Thetis-Zeus scene does not suggest actual «salvation from death» either²⁴, i.e. the second form of immortality in Nisetich's «movement». Nisetich takes the view that by translating Achilles to the *Isles*, Thetis *saves* Achilles from Hades/death²⁵. Nevertheless, *O. 2* presents an Under-

22. Nisetich, p. 8.

23. See p. 239.

24. Nisetich (p. 17-18) takes the view that by bringing Achilles to the *Isles* Pindar corrects Homer and other poets. According to Nisetich (p. 14) «Pindar has specific, ethical reasons for coming to grips with Homer... The ease with which Homer in the *Odyssey* can consign the greatest hero in the *Iliad* to the abyss of Hades while reserving for Menelaus, a character considerably less heroic, a place on Elysium would not have sat well with Pindar». But alas there is nothing in the text of *O. 2* which speaks about Homer or any other poet concerning the *post mortem* fate of Achilles, let alone about Pindar's discontent with Homer's ethics, or the ethics of any other poet in connection with this fate. And if Pindar is so dedicated to ethics, as Nisetich thinks, regarding the place assigned to Menelaus vis-à-vis that assigned to Achilles, why in *N. 4*, 49 (probably written three years after *O. 2*) does Pindar present Achilles not on the *Isles* or on the *Elysium*, but on *Leuce*, which is no doubt better than Hades, but stands no comparison with either of the two *Paradises*? Nisetich himself (p. 16) couples *Leuce* with Hades: «A poet who has rescued Achilles from the gloom of Hades or the twilight of *Leuce*...» Moreover, in vv. 79-80 all that we see is a μάτρῳ *praying* to Zeus, and Zeus reacting to her prayers, not to her ethical arguments. «Ethical reasons», «the abyss of Hades», and Pindar's «grips with Homer» come from Nisetich, not from the text of *O. 2*.

25. Nisetich, p. 9.

world diametrically opposite to the gloomy Hades of Homer and as a result the concept of Achilles' «salvation» in the context of the Underworld of *O. 2* becomes meaningless. To begin with, there is no reason to suppose that Pindar wished his hearers and readers to understand the Underworld of *O. 2* as a new arrangement which was brought about by Zeus and the other gods *post Troiam captam*, and that previously the Underworld was structured differently and the souls there faired differently. There is, of course, one clear «irregularity» in *O. 2*. Achilles enters the *Isles* without the ἐστρὶς ἑκατέρωθι process —his mother brings him there. We are not told that Cadmus and Peleus too entered without the ἐστρὶς ἑκατέρωθι process. If, like Achilles, they did enter «irregularly», we may suppose that they, too, did so through divine favor —every rule has its exceptions, and, besides, who can criticize the ways of Zeus and the other gods? The point is that for the understanding of *O. 2* there is no reason to suppose that Pindar wants us to bring Hades from the *Odyssey*, append it to the ode, and conclude that when Thetis goes to Zeus in *O. 2* she goes to him to save her son from that Hades and that death. But let us assume that the «irregular» entry of Achilles and of the other two heroes into the *Isles* of *O. 2* must be understood as a product of syncretism, and that here sources which presented different eschatological arrangements are in play. Nevertheless, since Pindar incorporates Achilles and the other two heroes into the eschatology of *O. 2*, they should be understood as much as possible in the economy of the eschatology of *O. 2*. What is then the reason of interpreting *O. 2* on the assumption that Thetis in *O. 2* is salvaging her son from Hades and death? The ἐσ(θ)λοὶ in the Underworld of *O. 2* live in a paradise. True, the *Isles* is a superior paradise, but to prefer the superior paradise can hardly make sense as *salvation* from Hades and death in *O. 2*.

Fairness towards Nisetich invites an excursus here. In his paper he appears to have endorsed Lloyd-Jones' interpretation of the eschatology, and thereby Lloyd-Jones' interpretation of vv. 57-58 as well²⁶. If Lloyd-Jones' interpretation of these verses is acceptable, then Nisetich's introduction of the notion of «salvation» from Hades/death becomes arguable. In what follows I shall contend that the interpretation of vv. 57-58 by Lloyd-Jones is untenable.

According to Lloyd-Jones the meaning of the text from ὅτι to ἔτισαν (vv. 57-58) is that «when men die, they at once pay a penalty when their wits become feeble, as the wits of the dead are commonly thought to be»²⁷. He believes that the

26. Nisetich, p. 3 and passim.

27. Lloyd-Jones, p. 259. Although here Lloyd-Jones translates ἀτύχα «at once», and therefore makes the penalty come *after* death, on p. 254 he says that «the penalty consists in their minds becoming feeble, that is to say, in death». He must then think either of a second death following upon the (v. 57) ἐνθάδε(ε) death, or else of only the ἐνθάδε(ε) death (v. 57), but making this ἐνθάδε(ε) death coincide with the punishment. The concept of a *second* stage of death in dying

reference to this punishment has nothing to do with the «punishment ordained by the judge who in the following sentence is said to judge crimes committed upon earth»²⁸. According to Lloyd-Jones²⁹ the punishment in vv. 57-58 is ordained by Persephone and relates to the killing of Persephone's child Dionysus by the Titans. Humans are treated by her as responsible for the crime, because they partake of the Titans' nature; when the Titans ate Dionysus, Zeus destroyed them with his thunderbolts, and out of the soot of their charred bodies mankind came into existence.

I register the following objections:

1) The life of the ἐσ(θ)λοί, as depicted in *O.* 2, 61-67, is a life enjoyed by fully sentient and conscious souls who are blessed with sunlight³⁰, lightened toil, and the company of the gods, a life free of tears. In the eschatology Pindar concentrates on the *Isles*³¹, and for this reason he speaks briefly of the ἐσ(θ)λοί. But one can perhaps learn more about them as follows. In v. 66 Pindar tells us that

does not seem easily manageable in terms of Greek thought and religion. The other alternative has even Greek syntax against it, for Pindar's text does not allow death and punishment to share the same time; Pindar does not say θνάσκοντες ἔτισαν, to make death and punishment coincide [= present participle and therefore simultaneous action with ἔτισαν], but θανόντων ... ἐνθάδ' αὐτίκα ἔτισαν (see Goodwin, *MT* §§ 139 and 143) which makes clear that Pindar refers first to death on earth and *soon after* it to the penalty (obviously a penalty taking place in the Underworld —ἐνθάδ(ε) easily invites the understanding of ἐκεῖ with αὐτίκα ... ἔτισαν).

28. Lloyd-Jones, p. 259. I take (v. 57) θανόντων as an attributive participle, and as a partitive genitive of which the (v. 57) ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες, the (v. 63) ἐσ(θ)λοί and (v. 68) ὄσοι are the parts. With regard to the time relation between θανόντων and (v. 58) ἔτισαν (I am aware of Altenhoven, p. 14) I spoke in note 27. I take (v. 58) ἐν τᾷδε Διὸς ἀρχῆ = ἐπὶ γῆς (= on earth), of which the opposite is (v. 59) κατὰ γᾶς = ὑπὸ γῆς (under the earth = in the realm of the dead). (v. 57) αὐτίκα (= soon) corresponds to (v. 56) τὸ μέλλον, and (v. 59) ἀλιτρά corresponds to (v. 57) ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες. In the sequence (vv. 57-61) μὲν ... δ' ... δέ I take (v. 61) δέ as *adversativum* to match (v. 57) μὲν, and (v. 58) δ' as *additivum* —the text from (v. 58) τὰ δ' till (v. 60) ἀνάγκη amounts to an explanation of (vv. 56-58) εἰ till ἔτισαν, (v. 58) δ' approximating γάρ (see *LSJ*² s.v. δὲ II 2.a). The words (v. 58) τὰ δ' till (v. 60) ἀνάγκη could appear in parenthesis. See also Carrière, p. 440.

29. Lloyd-Jones, p. 259ff.

30. Apparently, vv. 61-62 mean that the sun is always shining above the ἐσθλοί and that they never experience darkness, see Lloyd-Jones, p. 254-55. If this is true, then here the «gloom» of Hades is completely eliminated. But even if we assume that the ἐσθλοί also experience night after day (cf. Woodbury), we may suppose that they need the night as well for sleep, like men on earth —in this case too «night» has nothing to do with the «gloom» of Hades. For more on the life on the ἐσ(θ)λοί in the Underworld see notes 32 and 58.

31. We shall have to say more on this concentration later, p. 263-64. For reasons of accuracy, one may call vv. 56-83 eschatology proper, to distinguish them from eschatological elements which (in a foreshadowing technique?) have been already introduced in the ode (compare the *exempla* of Semele and Ino, and the statements on death and the afterlife, vv. 22-33).

these ἐσ(θ)λοί are those who kept their oaths, therefore he speaks here about εὐσεβεῖς. Now, on fr. 129 Pindar gives us a more detailed picture of the εὐσεβεῖς³² in the Underworld. For them the sun shines day and night, they are in a region which has meadows of red roses. An area before their city (for the dead here even have a city, as the word προάστιον [v. 3] shows) is covered with incense trees and golden fruit. They delight in various activities, racing on horses, practicing in the gym, playing draughts, and making music on their lyres. Meat or incense burnt on the altars of the gods makes the air aromatic everywhere. This is a life in blooming bliss, in εὐανθής ... ὄλβος as Pindar puts it (v. 7). It is difficult to believe that this εὐανθής ὄλβος is meaninglessly given by the gods to «feeble wits» — «feeble wits» are fit only for gloomy Hades³³.

32. We know from Plutarch that in fr. 129 we are given a description of the life of the εὐσεβεῖς in the Underworld, for Plutarch identifies them as εὐσεβεῖς (in *consol. ad Apollon.* 35, 120c, and in *de latenter vivendo* 7, 1130c). Even if we assume with Solmsen¹, p. 504-5, that fr. 129 refers to the dead who on earth were initiated in the mysteries (cf. fr. 131a) and that their life in the Underworld is happier than the life of the ἐσ(θ)λοί in *O. 2*, still the life of the ἐσ(θ)λοί in *O. 2* is depicted (Solmsen agrees) as superior to the life on earth, it is therefore a paradise, although inferior to the paradise of the *Isles* in *O. 2*. Obviously, it would be preposterous to suppose that the dead are intellectually now more and now less incapacitated depending on whether a soul lives in a first rate or second rate paradise, or not in a paradise, and on whether the soul is the soul of an ἐσ(θ)λός. Clearly, the intellectual qualities of those who enjoy the happy life of fr. 129 and of the ἐσ(θ)λοί in *O. 2* must be the same. But I am not the least certain that there is really any essential difference between the life of fr. 129 and the ἐσ(θ)λοί of *O. 2* in their status as well. It seems to me that Solmsen has mistaken rhetorical emphasis for essence. In fr. 129 the poet obviously has as his purpose to praise the happy life of the εὐσεβεῖς and he goes full speed in this direction. But in *O. 2* Pindar's purpose is to praise the μάκαρες on the *Isles*, and therefore he keeps the life of the ἐσ(θ)λοί (who are also εὐσεβεῖς since they kept their oaths) in a sketchy form. Obviously if we put the life in fr. 129 next to the life of the ἐσ(θ)λοί in *O. 2* there is a superficial difference between them because the rhetorical purpose in those two poems is not the same. Solmsen also makes, I think, too much of «negative» descriptions in the life of the ἐσ(θ)λοί of *O. 2* in order to tone down their happiness in this life. A Greek by *litotes* says not only, for example, πολλοί, but also οὐκ ὀλίγοι (and in fact with οὐκ ὀλίγοι he speaks more emphatically than if he had said only πολλοί). I am therefore by analogy not convinced that when Pindar describes the life of the ἐσ(θ)λοί in *O. 2*, for example, as ἄδακρυς, he means to say *a life without sadness (= tears), but not necessarily of (full) happiness, therefore a neutral life, neither happy, nor unhappy*. I have no doubt that ἄδακρυς means no less than μάλα εὐτυχής. Consider also this. In *O. 2* Pindar has used a «negative» expression of the would-be μάκαρ (even though life on the *Isles* is the life he will praise) when he says «... abstain from all injustice». Pindar can hardly mean that the criterion of entering the *Isles* is not to *be fully involved in justice*, but only *to stay completely away from injustice*. On the contrary, Pindar used *abstention from all injustice* to stress *immersion in complete justice*.

33. The following interesting passage from [Pl.] Axioch. 371c displays the same spirit with that of Pindar's fr. 129 (and may conceivably be used to supplement in spirit the life of the ἐσ(θ)λοί on *O. 2*): δσοις μὲν οὖν ἐν τῷ ζῆν δαίμων ἀγαθὸς ἐπέπνευσεν, εἰς τὸν τῶν εὐσεβῶν

2) With vv. 57-58 understood according to Lloyd-Jones' interpretation, the discussion of *πλοῦτος - ἀρετὰ* which precedes the eschatology becomes irrelevant to the eschatology. For what is the use of descending into the Underworld with a record of *ἀρετὰ* when everyone, good or bad, after death becomes an *imbecile*?

3) According to Lloyd-Jones the weakening of human wits takes place immediately after death (or even while dying)³⁴. Now, in vv. 59 ff. a judge passes sentence, punishing the bad and rewarding the good. If Lloyd-Jones' interpretation is accepted, what else does Persephone's weakening of human wits do except render meaningless the function of this judge who, as it turns out, must punish and reward *imbeciles* —being *imbeciles* they can only vaguely, if at all, be aware of what happens to them. In fact, Persephone's interference produces a downright injustice, because, due to universal imbecility, the bad is practically rewarded by suffering less than he would if he were not an imbecile, and the good punished by enjoying less than he would if he too were not an imbecile.

4) Weakening of the mind is also difficult to visualize in the case of the *ἔστρις*³⁵ *ἐκατέρωθι* process. The *ἐτόλμασαν*, *they dared* or *they endured* (v. 68),

χώρον οἰκίζονται, ἔνθα ἄφθονοι μὲν ὤραι παγκάρπου γονῆς βρούουσιν, πηγαὶ δὲ ὕδάτων καθαρῶν ῥέουσιν, παντοῖοι δὲ λειμῶνες ἄνθεσι ποικίλοις ἐαριζόμενοι, διατριβαὶ δὲ φιλοσόφων καὶ θεάτρα ποιητῶν καὶ κύκλιοι χοροὶ καὶ μουσικὰ ἀκούσματα, συμπόσιά τε εὐμελῆ καὶ εἰλαπίναι αὐτοχορήγητοι, καὶ ἀκήρατος ἀλυπία καὶ ἡδεῖα διαίτα.

34. See p. 247-48 and n. 27.

35. Whether *ἔστρις ἐκατέρωθι* means three lives on the whole ([= T. Mommsen's interpretation] i.e. two on earth and one in the Underworld), or six lives on the whole (i.e. three on earth and three in the Underworld) cannot be determined. see Lloyd-Jones, p. 266-267 and *ibid.* n. 37. I share Lloyd-Jones' view that the first alternative is more attractive. The only difficulty with Mommsen's interpretation (which may not have been felt by Pindar's contemporaries) is that *ἔστρις ἐκατέρωθι* seems to imply the same number on both sides, i.e. *three* lives on earth and *three* lives in the Underworld, rather than *one* life in the Underworld and *two* lives on earth. H. Gundert (teste Hampe, p. 64) punctuates: *ἄσοι δ' ἐτόλμασαν ἔστρις, ἐκατέρωθι μείναντες, ἀπὸ πάμπαν κτλ.*, and takes it to refer to *three* lives on earth and *two* in the Underworld —at the end of the third life on earth the soul may enter the *Isles* (counting begins with the first life on earth). It seems to me that Gundert's punctuation means more naturally *three lives on the whole lived on both sides*, and as such it may be utilized to convey Mommsen's arrangement (*two* lives on earth + *one* life in the Underworld) with greater clarity. Be it as it may, Mommsen's interpretation, with the help of Pindar's fr. 133, places Theron of *O. 2* in this *third* life, thus eligible to travel to the «tower of Cronus» after his death. To take the view that Pindar presents Theron on the verge of his entering the *Isles* makes the eschatology in *O. 2* far more relevant to Theron, than if we suppose that Pindar does not know at what point of the metempsychosis circle Theron is (and Pindar cannot know if the circle consists of either six, or five lives).

If we stay close to the Greek text, reincarnation in *O. 2* is seen to concern only those who are involved in the *ἔστρις ἐκατέρωθι* process. *ἀλέγονται* in v. 78 suggests that for Pindar, composing in 476 B.C., Cadmus is still on the *Isles*, and since Cadmus lived six generations before the *Τρωϊκά*, Pindar must have been thinking of him as a dweller on the *Isles* for close to a millennium

makes clear that those souls *chose* to involve themselves in this process. ἐτόλμασαν would have been meaningless if they were just ordered to try the ἐστρίς ἐκατέρωθι process regardless of their volition —apparently they were given a choice between, say, living the life of the ἐσ(θ)λοὶ in the Underworld, and (re)entering the ἐστρίς ordeal, which, if successfully accomplished, would lead them to the *Isles*, and they chose the latter. Is it meaningful that such a *choice* is offered to imbeciles? Moreover, having chosen the ἐστρίς ordeal, these souls must live their lives throughout the ἐστρίς sequence abstaining from evil *completely*. How can the soul be expected to enter meaningfully upon such a major ethical enterprice when it is intellectually incapacitated³⁶? Surely, to be able to abstain ἐστρίς ἐκατέρωθι from

(by the way, Rhadamanthys, as Cadmus' nephew, is Cadmus' younger contemporary). Under the circumstances it seems that for the inhabitants of the *Isles* there is no reincarnation (unless we suppose that reincarnation takes place after the individual stays there for a thousand or even thousands of years). Obviously, ἀρετὰ reaches the apogee of its glorification if we assume that life on the *Isles* is meant as βίος ἐς αἰεί rather than as life for only a given period of time. The life of the ἐσ(θ)λοὶ may be no different in this regard from the life of the inhabitants of the *Isles*, excepting those who are interested in trying the ἐστρίς ἐκατέρωθι process (if this latter group belongs indeed to the ἐσ(θ)λοὶ). Pindar's fr. 133 speaks of souls «from whom Persephone shall exact the penalty of an (*or* the) old woe», and whom «in the ninth year [after their death?] she once more restores... to the upper sun; and from these come into being august monarchs, and men swift in strength and supreme in wisdom (for the correct interpretation of σθένει κραίπνοι, see Hampe, p. 63); and for all future time, men call them sainted heroes». But perhaps here we have no more than a variation of those who in *O. 2* dare the ἐστρίς ἐκατέρωθι ordeal, rather than a process which terminates the Underworld life of the ἐσ(θ)λοὶ of *O. 2*. Yet, even if we take the view that the reincarnation mentioned in fr. 133 refers to souls corresponding to the ἐσ(θ)λοὶ of *O. 2*, still we could not conclude with any degree of certainty that the ἐσ(θ)λοὶ of *O. 2* must be subject to reincarnation. What Pindar says in one poem he does not necessarily mean in another poem. A Pindaric composition begins with its first word and ends with its last; poems x, y, and z are not three chapters of one treatise, where the content of y supplements that of x, and the content of z that of x and y. As for those who are punished in the Underworld of *O. 2* we cannot say whether the punishment is eternal or not, and if it is not, what happens to them when they cease to be punished. That for Pindar the human soul is immortal we have Plato's unambiguous testimony in *Men. 81^a*. We may then conclude that the sinners in *O. 2*, no less than the souls of the ἐσ(θ)λοὶ there, can «never perish».

36. We do not know whether the εὐσεβεῖς in the Underworld of Pindar's *O. 2* and fr. 129 maintain the memory of their life on earth. If they do not, this must be interpreted as their necessary conditioning for happiness —the soul may feel sad if it is aware that it is separated from spouse, sons, daughters, friends, etc. on earth— rather than as their mental weakness. For the dead to have forgotten what happened in his life on earth need mean no more incapacitation of his intellect, than for the man on earth in reincarnation to have forgotten what happened to him during his previous life in the Underworld. Of course, the possibility remains that in Pindar the shades have memory of their life on earth. It is worth remembering in this regard that in book 24 of the *Odyssey*, vv. 1-204 (which passage must have been composed by a poet other than the one who composed the Νέκυια of the eleventh book of the *Odyssey*), the dead, without tasting any blood, retain a perfect memory of the record of their own lives on earth. For if we take the view

evil *completely* presupposes both strong determination and sharp judgment, determination to resist evil (which is frequently irresistibly attractive), and sharp judgment to distinguish between good and bad (the distinction is by no means always easy). How can an imbecile's determination and judgment suffice here? One may suppose that in its life on earth, when the soul is in a body, the soul regains its mental powers. But what happens when this soul lives in the Underworld (for in the *ἔστρις* sequence the soul must keep clear of evil (v. 69) *ἐκατέρωθι*, i.e. when living on earth in a body and when living in the Underworld without such a body)?

5) Lloyd-Jones' interpretation involves a difficulty concerning the *ordo verborum* of vv. 57-58. He takes *ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες* to construe as *αἱ φρένες ἀπάλαμνοι* sc. *γιγνόμεναι*³⁷, i.e. he takes *ἀπάλαμνοι* as predicate instead of attribute. One would like to see some parallels which make clear that the dynamics of the Greek language allow such a construction in the sequence (vv. 57-58) *θανόντων μὲν ἐνθάδ' αὐτίκ' ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες ποιῶς ἔτισαν*. One would also like to have Lloyd-Jones' commentary on the sequence (vv. 57-61) *μὲν ... δ' ... δὲ* (he keeps silent³⁸ on the role that *μὲν* plays vis-à-vis the two *δ(ἐ)* in the thought sequence of vv. 57-61).

6) Keeping close to the etymology of *ἀπάλαμνος*, Lloyd-Jones insists³⁹ that the word in *O.* 2, 57 must mean «feeble», not «wicked». I see no strong reason to depart from the interpretation «lawless» (and therefore «wicked» as well) given by *LSJ*⁹ s.v. *ἀπάλαμνος* II. *ἀπάλαμνος* (steretic *ἀ* + *παλάμη* (*ῆ*)) indicates a state characterized in one way or another by absence of or deficiency in «*παλάμη*». Now, *παλάμη* is the palm of the hand, i.e., the most effective part of the hand thanks to the fingers. Metaphorically used, *παλάμη* comes easily to mean *art, capability, effectiveness*, i.e. *παλάμη* is easily transferred to the area of *μηχανή/τέχνη*. What the exact meaning of *ἀπάλαμνος* would be in a given instance depends (a) on the noun it qualifies, and (b) on the context. The eschatology divides men into good and bad, rewards the good and punishes the bad. If we assume, as we should, that the *ἔσ(θ)λοὶ* possess the right kind of *φρένες*, and if we confine the *ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες* to those who are the opposite of the *ἔσ(θ)λοὶ*—let me call them *καχοί*—then the combination *ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες* means (to use Attic Greek) *φρένες αἱ μὴ δυνάμεναι παλάμη, δηλονότι τέχνη ἢ μηχανῆ ἢ μαθήματι ἢ κολάσει ἢ ἄλλω τινὶ*

that Amphimedon's soul remembers without drinking blood because his corpse is not yet disposed (just as Elpenor's soul does in *Od.* 11, 51-78), then what of the souls of Achilles and Agamemnon? The corpses of both these heroes were disposed ten years before, and yet their souls possess excellent memory without the drinking of blood.

37. Lloyd-Jones, p. 280.

38. Lloyd-Jones, p. 252-55.

39. Lloyd-Jones, p. 252-54.

τῶν τοιούτων, σωφρονισθῆναι, and by implication φρένες σωφρονισμοῦ μὲν δεόμεναι, σωφρονισθῆναι δὲ οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ δυνάμεναι, therefore κακαὶ φρένες as opposed to ἐσθλαὶ φρένες. The scholiast expresses basically the same understanding when in *O.* 2, 57 he renders ἀπάλαμνοι as βίαιοι and when, commenting on *O.* 1, 59 ἀπάλαμνον βίον, he explains it as πρὸς ὃν οὐκ ἔστι παλαμήσασθαι, περι οὐ οὐδεὶς δύναται χεῖρα αὐτῷ ἐπαγαγεῖν βοηθόν. But let us assume that ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες must mean what Lloyd-Jones says, «feeble minds». Still his interpretation is not necessarily correct. We may reasonably suppose that these minds are «feeble» on earth as well, in the sense that on earth as under the earth they do not have the qualities which allow one to avoid evil and embrace ἀρετά. They are «feeble» as compared with the robust minds of those who can distinguish between evil and ἀρετά and embrace ἀρετά. Therefore, «feeble minds» need not refer to minds whose intellectual efficiency was higher on earth but then *lowered* by Persephone in death.

7) Persephone is not visible in the Greek text. If Pindar wanted her to be so prominent in the eschatology as Lloyd-Jones, one wonders why Pindar preferred to hide her —we can only *assume* her existence in τιμίους θεῶν (vv. 65-66).

If the above arguments against Lloyd-Jones are valid, then Nisetich cannot explain his notion of «salvation» on the basis of the eschatology of *O.* 2. As already remarked⁴⁰, preferring the higher over the lower paradise can hardly be explained in terms of «salvation» from Hades/death (of course, Achilles could not possibly go to the ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες sinners and to the «Hades» that presumably⁴¹ surrounds them). This finally I wish to add: Nisetich's notion of Achilles taken by his mother to the *Isles* to be «saved» from Hades puts the emphasis on *Hades* and undermines the importance of the *Isles* —any place that saves Achilles from Hades will do, the place need not be the highest paradise. Yet this emphasis on Hades is in total violation of both the content and the form of *O.* 2.

So far I have challenged Nisetich's «actual immortality» in terms of his interpreting it as «salvation». Now, in a corollary fashion, I shall oppose his «actual immortality» as such in his «movement from poetic to actual immortality». The idea that Thetis, or Zeus, or divinity in general can be interested in Achilles' entry into the *Isles* out of concern for Achilles' «actual immortality» is clearly out of tune with the intellectual-religious orientation of the eschatology. Here Pindar does not speak of two immortalities which differ either quantitatively or qualitative-

40. See p. 246-47.

41. We may reasonably assume that the punishment of the ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες kind of souls takes place not in the region where the ἐσ(θ)λοὶ live but elsewhere, in an environment of horror and darkness, such as the one described in Pindar's fr. 130, «From the other side sluggish streams of darksome night belch forth a boundless gloom».

ly, i.e. of one immortality in the paradise of the Underworld and of another immortality in the paradise on the *Isles*. It would be difficult to postulate either that (a) the soul on the *Isles* is *more* immortal than the soul in the Underworld (= quantitative difference in immortality), or (b) that the immortality experienced on the *Isles* is an immortality of soul-in-its-body, and as such superior to the immortality experienced in the Underworld, the latter being only an immortality of the soul (= qualitative difference in immortality). The thought of a quantitative difference is absurd —there can be no degrees of immortality, one is either mortal or immortal, there is not any *tertium quid* in between. Let us then explore the possibility of a qualitative difference. It is first advisable to pay attention to the following facts: (1) From Homer onward, the Greeks consistently speak of Achilles as killed in action on the Troad (above all, see Pindar himself in *P.* 3, 100-103; *Pae.* 6, 98-99; *I.* 8, 55a-58). (2) *O.* 2 celebrates *metempsychosis* which can only minimize the importance of the body, if not even reject the body altogether (see notes 3 and 73). (3) In *O.* 2 the whole eschatological discussion springs from the concept (vv. 30-33) that there is life *after death*, rather than that a mortal can achieve immortality *circumventing death* by translation (as Menelaus will circumvent death through divine favor in Homer's *Odyssey* 4, 561-69). Under the circumstances it is strange to suppose that in the eschatology Pindar would have chosen to give importance to the body and to present Thetis, or Zeus, or divinity in general as more interested in the immortality of Achilles' soul-in-its-body rather than in the immortality of his soul-without-its-body. Even if Pindar had had to bring Achilles to the *Isles* as soul-in-its-body, the obvious choice for him would have been to *mute* it, so as not to give the impression that the gods differentiate between the two Paradises by favoring an immortal body over a mortal one. Nisetich's view that Achilles' entry into the *Isles* relates to a concern about his «actual (= physical) immortality» on the part of Thetis, Zeus, or divinity in general, is inherently incongruous.

In conclusion: Nisetich's interpretation of *O.* 2 as a movement from poetic to actual immortality, including the Thetis-Zeus scene as a recapitulation of this movement, is untenable on all counts.

One may now examine Nisetich's view regarding the source from which Pindar took his inspiration for the Thetis-Zeus scene in *O.* 2. This is necessary in order that one may decide whether Nisetich's suggestion is more convincing than Solmsen's suggestion (and therefore whether in this regard Nisetich succeeds in refuting Solmsen, who, as we have seen⁴², makes the first book of Homer's *Iliad* the source of Pindar's scene).

Nisetich opts for the *Aithiopsis* of Arctinus as the source⁴³. He observes that⁴⁴ in his epinician

42. See p. 238-39.

43. Nisetich, p. 10-11.

44. Nisetich, p. 10-11.

odes Pindar refers to Memnon six times (five times in connection with the duel between Memnon and Achilles). Of these six times only once, at *O.* 2, 83, does Pindar identify Memnon with the periphrasis 'Αοῦς τε παῖδ' Αἰθίοπα. Nisetich adds that the mention of Eos by name «is not less remarkable than the omission of her son's: in only one of the four other passages in which Pindar touches on this event does he see fit to name her». And so, Nisetich concludes that⁴⁵ with this unique periphrasis, 'Αοῦς τε παῖδ' Αἰθίοπα, as if by a signal, Pindar suggests that his hearer/reader go to the Αἰθιοπίς, to find the source from which he, Pindar, received the inspiration for his Thetis-Zeus scene.

The *Aithiopsis* has not come down to us, but from Proclus' summary of the poem⁴⁶ we know that in it Eos obtained immortality from Zeus for her son Memnon. And so, Nisetich concludes⁴⁷: «lines 79-80 of *Olympian 2* transfer to Thetis the act of salvation performed originally by Eos»⁴⁸.

All this strikes one as very unlikely indeed. Were the hearers/readers of *O.* 2 aware of how many times and in what detail Pindar used Memnon in his odes so as to stop and inquire why Pindar in *O.* 2 used the «unique» 'Αοῦς τε παῖδ' Αἰθίοπα⁴⁹? And even if they were aware, the ratio 5 or 4: 1 for the omission of the name of Μέμνων, and 3: 1 for the introduction of the name of Eos are not necessarily striking —in usage 20% and 25% need not invite curiosity. Let us now visit the sequence of vv. 81-83. Here Achilles in combat kills three formidable opponents. The first is Hector, whom Pindar compliments as «invincible, unyielding column of Troy». The second is referred to only by name, Cynus, but we may reasonably suppose that the very name Cynus (= Swan) suggests something unnatural and odd, and this is enough to impart to Cynus the quality of the dangerous opponent (even for those hearers/readers who had not read the *Cypria*, where the duel between Achilles and Cynus was narrated). Then comes the mention of Αἰθίοψ, whom Pindar binds with Cynus in an ἀπό κοινοῦ construction —Κύνων τε θανάτω πόρεν, 'Αοῦς τε παῖδ' Αἰθίοπα [sc. θανάτω πόρεν]. The name Αἰθίοψ in the esthetic field of *O.* 2 indicates the *African*, who, one may reasonably suppose, for the Greek represents the *savage*. As for the information that this Αἰθίοψ is the son of Eos, it may have been given for clarity. The Greeks knew

45. Nisetich, p. 11.

46. See conveniently the Hesiod volume of the Loeb series.

47. Nisetich, p. 11.

48. Proclus produced his summary on the basis of what he could collect from *mythographers* rather than from the text of the *Aithiopsis*, which did not exist in his day (whether this Proclus is the grammarian of the 2nd cent. A.D., or the Neoplatonist of the 5th cent. A.D. cannot be decided, see Lesky, p. 81). Proclus' testimony then does not mean that what is not mentioned in his summary did not exist in the *Aithiopsis*, but that it did not exist in the mythographers he consulted. It is unlikely, I think, that ὁ ἄριστος 'Αχαιῶν dies in the *Aithiopsis* and Arctinus does not make Thetis, the caring mother of the *Iliad*, go to Zeus to speak with him about the future of her son *post mortem*, but rather Eos only goes to him to secure her own son's future posthumously. If we suppose that in the *Aithiopsis* Thetis talked with Zeus about her son's future *post mortem*, then if we are to choose between *Iliad*'s book *one* and the *Aithiopsis* as the source for Pindar's Thetis-Zeus scene in *O.* 2, the obvious choice is the *Aithiopsis*. The difficulty with Nisetich's reasoning begins when he sets out to show that Pindar transfers to Thetis the act performed by Eos in the *Aithiopsis*, see Nisetich, p. 11. At any rate, the view that the Thetis - Achilles scene in *O.* 2, 79-80, is modelled on the Eos - Memnon scene of the *Aithiopsis* was proposed in Newman, p. 175 n. 27, before Nisetich.

49. I may add that there is nothing per se remarkable in identifying Memnon as 'Αοῦς τε παῖδ' Αἰθίοπα, seeing that Homer in *O.* 2, 188 (as Nisetich knows, note 38) refers to Memnon as 'Ηοῦς ... φαινηῆς ἀγλαδὸς υἱός.

Memnon, the king of Aithiopia, not as a black man but as a white man, son of Eos and the Trojan Tithonus, and so Αἰθίοπα (which normally means *black man*, native of Aithiopia) without any further qualification was likely to be obscure. The addition of «son of Eos» makes the identification of Αἰθίοπα as Memnon unmistakable. Of course, Pindar might have introduced Eos for other reasons as well, such as poetic proliferation, variation, metrical convenience and whatever else. There is no reason why Pindar would have expected his hearer/reader to pay special attention to Αἰθίοπα, i.e. to Achilles' third ἀριστεία, rather than to Ἐκτορ(α), i.e. to Achilles' first ἀριστεία (which first ἀριστεία is also verbally stressed more than the other two through the words Τροίας ἄμαχον, ἀστραβῆ κίονα), or even to Κύνων, i.e. to Achilles' second ἀριστεία (which might attract attention by the fact that it violates time sequence — Achilles killed Cynus long before he killed Hector).

But let one assume with Nisetich that Pindar expected that the poet's hearers and readers would not stop with Hector, or with Cynus, but with Aithiops, and that they would understand that with the word Αἰθίοπα Pindar signaled to them to go to the *Aithiopsis*. Yet go to the *Aithiopsis* for what purpose? The obvious choice would be to go there for the battle scene between Achilles and Memnon, rather than for *finding the setting which inspired the Thetis-Zeus scene in O. 2*. Notice that the sequence (vv. 81-3) Hector-Cynus-Aithiops comes after a semicolon, and begins the last triad in celebration of Achilles with his three major ἀριστεῖαι. If the words Ἄοῦς τε παῖδ' Αἰθίοπα are to be understood as pointing to the *Aithiopsis*, they are far more likely to be taken to point to the battle between Memnon and Achilles in the *Aithiopsis*, as suggested by vv. 81-83, δς — Αἰθίοπα (all the more so, since Αἰθίοπα is *preceded* by the two other ἀριστεῖαι), than to be taken to point to the Eos-Zeus scene in the *Aithiopsis*, as suggested by vv. 79-80 Ἀχιλλέα—μάτηρ. The conclusion to be drawn is that Nisetich's view at best labors under extreme improbabilities⁵⁰.

Nisetich finds other elements in vv. 79-83 which he thinks corroborate his view that with Ἄοῦς τε παῖδ' Αἰθίοπα (v. 83) Pindar sends his hearers and readers to the *Aithiopsis*. He finds, for example⁵¹, «a curious symmetry» in the fact that in v. 79 Achilles is named but not Thetis, while in v. 83 Eos is mentioned but not Memnon. According to Nisetich⁵² «Pindar has a typical scene in mind». And so, by virtue of this «curious symmetry» Nisetich encourages his reader⁵³ to suspect the ghost of the *Aithiopsis* behind Pindar's text from Ἄοῦς τε παῖδ' Αἰθίοπα back to μάτηρ, and since μάτηρ is subject to ἔνεικ', all the way back to ἔνεικ', and of course to the object of ἔνεικ', i.e. Ἀχιλλέα.

But Nisetich creates «symmetries» suppressing elements which bespeak «asymmetries» — he sees selectively only what he wishes to see rather than what is in evidence to be seen. Vv. 79-80 read Ἀχιλλέα τ' ἔνεικ', ἐπεὶ Ζηῆτος ἦτορ λιταῖς ἔπεισε, μάτηρ. Notice first the dynamic insertion of the temporal clause which separates Ἀχιλλέα τ' ἔνεικε from μάτηρ, vis-à-vis the tame (v. 83) Ἄοῦς τε παῖδ' Αἰθίοπα, and in addition notice that μάτηρ is nominative subject

50. Nisetich himself (note 56) in another connection grants that v. 81 is detached from v. 80. My only disagreement with him comes when he argues the detachment by pointing to μάτηρ with which v. 80 ends and to δς with which v. 81 begins and concluding that the two verses separate because «a clash of grammatical genders» takes place between the feminine μάτηρ and the masculine δς. But why should a feminine noun clash with the masculine relative pronoun rather than form a happy «pair», and in any case, how can they possibly clash if they are separated by a semicolon?

51. Nisetich, p. 11.

52. Nisetich, p. 11.

53. Nisetich, p. 11.

while Ἄοῦς is possessive genitive, that after μάτηρ (v. 80) there is a semicolon, and that the next word (= δς, v. 81) begins a new triad. Nisetich disregards all these «asymmetries» to project «a curious symmetry». If Pindar had wished us to pay attention to this «curious symmetry» he would not have obscured it the way he does with his *ordo verborum*, syntax, punctuation, and metrics. In the same spirit Nisetich sees a «symmetry» in vv. 79-80⁵⁴. According to him «word order in particular marks the importance of the moment. Two nouns bracket the lines, with the object of the main clause (Ἄχιλλέα) placed first, the subject (μάτηρ) last, so that both are emphatic. Between them fall two verbs, one belonging to the main, the other to an enclosed subordinate clause, giving the impression of a chiasmus between the two parts of the sentence. Zeus, on whom everything depends, occupies the central position: four words precede and four words follow the mention of his name». But Nisetich disregards the fact that the «symmetry» disappears if we search for it in single verses, for v. 79 ends with ἦτορ (not with μάτηρ), and v. 80 begins with λιταῖς (not with Ἄχιλλέα). Moreover, in v. 80 the mechanics of construction demands that μάτηρ is the last word (it could not be either the first or the second); what assurance then do we have that Pindar places μάτηρ at the end of v. 80 to create Nisetich's «symmetry»? No assurance at all is the right answer. As to Nisetich's observation that four words precede and four follow Ζηῆος, he disregards the fact that while ἦτορ, λιταῖς, ἔπεισε (vv. 79-80) and μάτηρ are four substantial words, τ' is almost meaningless and can hardly count as a word matching a noun or a verb, and that Ζηῆος if seen in its verse (v. 79) is preceded by three words (or by four if we count τ' as a word) but followed by only one word (ἦτορ), and that if we pay attention to construction (note the comma after [v. 79] ἔνεα'), Zeus is preceded by only one word, i.e. ἐπεὶ, and in its verse is followed «symmetrically»(!) by one word, i.e. ἦτορ⁵⁵.

It is time now to return to Solmsen, and examine more closely his suggestion that in the Thetis-Zeus scene of *O. 2* Pindar utilized a «motif» and a «motivation» from Homer. One can first argue that Solmsen's «motivation» does not make good sense in the text of *O. 2*. For any Greek Achilles is *saturated* with honor, whether one thinks of him as still alive on the Troad, or on the Elysian Plain, or on Leuce, or on the *Isles*, or wherever else. If Thetis (vv. 79-80) directs her λιταῖ to Zeus asking that he allow her to take Achilles to the *Isles* in order for him to be further honored, and if Zeus' heart is convinced by such λιταῖ, then all that Pindar achieves is a *frigidity* produced by an obsession with honor. One must stress that Pindar attributes no special honor to Achilles among the inhabitants of the *Isles*; he does not place him in charge of anything there, nor does he make either the μάκαρες or the gods of the *Isles* take any special note of his presence there. Moreover, the fact

54. Nisetich, p. 12.

55. But let us assume that Pindar aimed at such «symmetries». Let us assume, for example, that Pindar demonstrably aims at creating Nisetich's «curious symmetry» when he names Achilles but not Thetis in v. 79 and, conversely, Eos but not Memnon in v. 83. Could that «symmetry» mean only that Pindar plays artistically with two «pairs», each consisting of a goddess mother and a hero son? Why must the «curious symmetry» convey the message that Pindar's Thetis-Zeus scene derives from the Eos-Zeus scene in the *Aithiopsis*? We see, then, that Nisetich's «symmetries», no matter how sympathetically we are prepared to treat them, amount to *καπνοῦ σκιά*.

that Pindar makes him enter the *Isles* through the help of his mother, while others have been entering there on their own record alone upon successful completion of their ἔστρῖς ἐκατέρωθι ethical ordeal, makes one entirely unreceptive to the idea that Pindar had in mind what Solmsen has in mind, a place of *honor* for Achilles among the dead. Clearly honor and dishonor here and in the eschatology as a whole is not the issue.

What then is Thetis asking Zeus for her son? Achilles in his short life lacked to a large degree only one thing: *happiness*. Thetis wishes to obtain for her son the best of what he has been lacking. After all, Μακάρων νῆσοι means the *Isles of the Happy ones* (μάκαρ and its cognates in Greek indicate *happiness*, not honor). Moreover, Pindar's description of those *Isles* bespeaks *happiness*, not honor: «ocean-breezes blow all over», «flowers of gold are blazing», the inhabitants are using those flowers to «entwine their hands and to make crowns [for their heads]», and all this in the company of such venerable gods as Cronus and Rhea, of wise Rhadamanthys and of a group of highly interesting fellow-inhabitants —happiness in a environment of peace, beauty, festivity, security, and the best of company. Entry into the *Isles* (as well as into the paradise of the Underworld) constitutes, of course, not a dishonor. The question, however, is whether the *Isles* (as well as the paradise of the Underworld) in the text of *O. 2* point to happiness, or to honor, or to both. Obviously, honor is completely muted, and happiness forcefully projected.

But that Thetis is concerned with her son's *happiness* is also suggested to the hearer/reader of the ode by the fact that the motif of unhappiness and happiness plays a major part in this ode⁵⁶.

Let us then see briefly how the motif emerges in this ode and how it runs through it. In vv. 15-17 we read: «Not even Time, the father of all, could undo (the end of) things that have been accomplished», and we are further told that this is true whether with things «just», or with things «unjust», that is to say, this is universally true. Obviously, of *things done*, we would have liked to undo those which cause unhappiness for us, but we cannot, for as Pindar's gnome has it, *things done cannot be undone*. Is there then any partial remedy, since there is not a complete remedy? There is, Pindar says (vv. 18-22). If, thanks to favorable fortune, in one's existence things unhappy are followed by things happy, then one may enjoy the happiness which these happy things offer, and leave unhappiness behind. Of course, Pindar speaking of happiness is interested

56. That the motif of happiness and unhappiness appears frequently in Pindar's poetry and is conventional in character should not lead us to conclude that its presence in *O. 2* was meant to be less significant for the meaning and the esthetics of *O. 2* than it would have been if it had existed only in *O. 2*. Modern fascination with the unconventional, the new and the innovative, is not typical of Greek poetry. There, to have in a poem words, expressions, and motifs of a conventional ring was considered an embellishment of the poem, old jewels, so to speak, in a new setting. What has been said of the motif of happiness and unhappiness holds also true for all elements in *O. 2* that can be styled as conventional. That the motif of happiness and unhappiness is conventional does not detract from its importance in *O. 2*; rather, it stresses this importance.

in *noble* happiness (for only such happiness befits Theron, and, in general, Pindar's aristocratic clientele), and so one has no difficulty in understanding why Pindar writes (v. 19) «ἐσθλῶν ... ὑπὸ χαρμάτων» rather than simply «ὑπὸ χαρμάτων».

Pindar dwells first on πότμος (v. 18) and θεοῦ Μοῖρα (v. 21) in connection with «happy things» following upon «unhappy things». Here divine decision comes in the forefront, and the will of man stays dimly in the background.

The examples (vv. 25-30) of Semele and Ino demonstrate the transition from an unhappy condition in life on earth to a happy condition in life after death thanks to divine decision, and with these examples comes the reflection (vv. 30-33) that human existence extends beyond the grave. Working further with the unhappiness and happiness motif, but now in connection with life on earth, Pindar tells us (vv. 33-34) that the sequence is by no means always from unhappiness to happiness, for, as he puts it, «different currents at different times come to men bringing joys and toils» —these are the currents of Fate.

And here Pindar, utilizing Theron's Theban ancestors of the remote past, offers an example (vv. 38-45) where Fate is seen to strike a family with continuous unhappiness, from grandfather all the way down to grandchildren, before allowing happiness to return with a great-grandchild: Laius was killed by his son Oedipus, the Erinys in order to punish Oedipus drove his sons, Eteocles and Polynices, to kill one another, until finally Thersander, the son of the killed Polynices, prospers and, we may suppose, with him prosperity returns to the race down to Theron without notable mishaps.

In due course, Pindar will also bring the motif of unhappiness and happiness to the athletic games (to make the motif closely relevant to the ode which is epinician), so as to tell his hearers and readers (vv. 51-52), as we have already seen⁵⁷, that *to win the victory in the contest gives release from hardship* —one has no difficulty understanding that with this release happiness also comes to the victor. It would be unwise to suggest that Pindar dissociates the athlete's victory from Μοῖρα/πότμος and from the will of the gods, and yet one should acknowledge that here the will of the individual has advanced to the forefront, and Μοῖρα/πότμος and the gods have withdrawn considerably to the background —the stress is on the athlete's *conscientious* contribution to his success and to the happiness ensuing therefrom, for he has toiled, and made many sacrifices (unhappy things in themselves) for this victory and for all good that ensues from it.

Unhappiness and happiness, the latter on two levels, run also through the eschatology (but here as concepts rather than as a motif). We meet with an inexorable judge, τις (v. 59), who passes judgment on the dead on the basis of their record in life. He sends those with the «ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες» kind of record to a punishment so severe that a bystander could not have the courage to watch it (clearly here again we have pain and unhappiness, not dishonor), while he rewards⁵⁸ with a life of happiness the group of those with a distinguished record, the so-called

57. See p. 240.

58. The text presents the judge (v. 59 τις) passing judgment only on the lawless spirits, but one expects as only logical that the judge has also been passing sentence on the ἐσ(θ)λοὶ —the process must be that every spirit appears in front of this judge, and that he, according to the spirit's record, assigns the spirit to one of the two groups among the dead. Speaking about happiness in the life of the ἐσ(θ)λοὶ the following points may be helpful in evaluating it. That the ἐσ(θ)λοὶ enjoy in death a life under sunlight (v. 62) makes it clear from the start that this life is basically a life of the Elysian Plain or Isles of the Blessed type (see Solmsen¹, p. 504 and *ibid.* note 2). The «honored gods» (vv. 65-6) with whom they associate must also live under this sunlight, and therefore are gods of joy and happiness rather than the gods of «gloomy» death. A comparison

ἔσ(θ)λοὶ (obviously happiness, not honor⁵⁹, is the case here, especially since these ἔσ(θ)λοὶ are contrasted with the unhappiness of the ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες group). Then the group of the highest happiness is introduced, the one which dwells on the *Isles* having arrived there through the ἔσπρις ἐκατέρωθεν process (or, in the case of Achilles, and probably of Cadmus and Peleus as well, through divine intervention), and of which we spoke above⁶⁰ at some length. Indeed, happiness is allowed to continue after the eschatology as well, and now this happiness will echo in *diapason* as Pindar states (vv. 98-100) that the *joys* which Theron has bestowed on others are *as numberless as the sand*.

If I have shown that in *O. 2* Thetis asks Zeus for happiness for her son rather than additional honor for him, Solmsen's Homeric «motivation» collapses, and all that remains in his support is the Homeric «motif», i.e. Thetis in *O. 2* goes to Zeus to request a favor for her son, namely *happiness* on the *Isles*, just as Thetis in the *Iliad* goes to Zeus to request a favor for her son, namely *honor*.

Before going any further arguing against Solmsen's thesis, let us ask a question. Could Pindar have made Thetis go to Zeus to ask for a favor without any reference to the *Iliad*, or any other literary source, but only on the prompting of the elements comprised in the ode? He could. From the start of the poem Pindar made Zeus the *laudandus* god, for he explicitly tells us that in *O. 2* he chose (vv. 1-7) to praise *Zeus among the gods*, Herakles among the heroes, and Theron among men. Thetis is a mother who is obviously prepared to do all she can to obtain her son's happiness. Zeus is the greatest of gods, the *deus laudandus* of this ode, in control of what takes place on the *Isles* not only through the Διὸς ὁδὸς (v. 70), which we may reasonably suppose is the only road to the *Isles*, but also through the influence he is likely to exercise on his father Cronus, mother Rhea, and son Rhadamanthys. In addition, Thetis, we may presume in terms of mythology, expects Zeus to do all he can to grant her petition, for not only was she once considered by him to be his

is made (vv. 62-5) between life on earth and this life. Life on earth, in order for its value to be minimized, is depicted from the point of view of the masses (rather than from the aristocrat's point of view), who work hardest and never gain enough to satisfy their basic needs, as compared to this Underworld life where one works only a little and, apparently, has all his heart desires: *they enjoy a life of lightened toil, not vexing the soil with the strength of their hands, no, nor the water of the sea* [as commoners do, digging the earth or plying the oars] *to gain a scanty livelihood*. And then we are told that this agreeable *post mortem* life in the company of the aforementioned «honored gods» is (v. 66) «free of tears» (see note 32), and so clearly a life of happiness.

59. Solmsen (n. 7) translates vv. 65-6 τιμίους θεῶν as «honored by the gods» and takes those honored to be «those who after one blameless life are rewarded by a very pleasant kind of existence which yet falls short of the ultimate bliss». As Farnell (*O. 2*, 65-66) has shown, such a translation, which goes back to Boeckh, violates the Greek language. τιμοὶ θεῶν [with θεῶν as *partitivus*] must mean «those of the gods who are specially honorable», i.e. gods of the Underworld. See also Lloyd-Jones, p. 255. The point is important, for the concept of the dead as «honored» (around which concept Solmsen's thesis revolves) does not exist in the eschatology.

60. See p. 258.

bride, but she also had offered him important services at difficult points of his career. For all these reasons Thetis (and Pindar behind her) decides to go to Zeus rather than to Cronus, or Rhea, or Rhadamanthys, for Thetis obviously expects more from him than from them. Solmsen would retort: but what of the tremendous authority of Homer, who in the *Odyssey* presents Achilles in Hades, and of Pindar's hearers/readers, who were to be surprised at Pindar's novelty, at his placing Achilles on the *Isles*? Let us answer the question.

One may first observe that a Homeric «motif» (which is all that remains to support Solmsen, since we have refuted his Homeric «motivation») is hardly adequate to either combat Homeric authority or take Pindar's hearers/readers out of their surprise. Why, then, should Pindar care for such a «motif»? If Pindar is unhomeric, as indeed he is, in bringing Achilles to the *Isles*, the essence of this unhomeric action is not going to become less unhomeric just by being joined to a Homeric «motif». Moreover, this blend of unhomeric with Homeric in the manner Solmsen perceives it is only a rhetorical trick, a *jeu d'esprit*, which fits neither the ethos of *O. 2* as a whole, nor the ethos of the eschatology.

But let us now consider whether there is sufficient reason to suppose that Pindar was likely to expect his hearers/readers to become surprised by his taking Achilles to the *Isles*.

Others, before Pindar, had treated Achilles in unhomeric fashion⁶¹. From Sch. Ap. Rh. 4, 814-15⁶² we know that Ibycus had said that Achilles having arrived at the Elysian Plain married Medea, and that later Simonides (Pindar's contemporary) repeated the story — the Elysian Plain and the *Isles* are the two pagan paradises, the

61. Nisetich is aware of this evidence, but he does not draw from it the logical argument against Solmsen.

62. ὅτι δὲ Ἀχιλλεύς εἰς τὸ Ἥλύσιον πεδῖον παραγενόμενος ἔγημε Μήδειαν πρῶτος Ἰβυκος εἴρηκε, μεθ' ἐν Σιμωνίδης (see *PMG*, p. 151, fr. 291). I may here add that if in Hesiod's *Works and Days* we delete v. 166 with Solmsen (as probably we should), then Achilles, as one of the heroes killed in Troy, enters the *Isles* as early as Hesiod. Solmsen, p. 22, is inclined to believe that Hesiod did not know of any separation of the soul from the body at death. He must then suppose that in Hesiod the *killed* heroes reached the *Isles* «resurrected» (the *Isles* are not in the Underworld, but on earth). But would not such a massive resurrection (= ἀνάστασις νεκρῶν) for archaic Greece be an oddity? It is then more likely, I think, that Hesiod, speaking compressedly, has here and elsewhere chosen not to differentiate between soul and body, rather than that he was unaware of separation of soul from body at death. With v. 166 deleted, we may reasonably conclude that Hesiod presents the *dead* heroes living on the *Isles* as souls (these heroes could have entered the *Isles* as souls-in-their-bodies only if they had *not* been killed, just as in Homer's *Odyssey* 4, 561-69, Menelaus is destined to enter the Elysian Plain as soul-in-its-body [= as ἄνθρωπος Menelaus] upon escaping the experience of dying to which a mortal *qua* mortal is normally subject). That the *Isles* in poetry and *heroization* (the latter involving graves of heroes and chthonic cult) in the city's religion need not conflict, I shall explain on p. 268-69.

very opposite of Homer's gloomy Hades. We also know from Proclus⁶³ that in the seventh century Arctinus in the *Aithiopsis* presented Thetis stealing the corpse of Achilles from its pyre in Troy and taking it to the isle of Leuce. This incident in the *Aithiopsis* is in sharp disagreement with the *Odyssey* (24, 36-79), where the body of Achilles is cremated in Troy, and his bones mixed with the bones of Patroclus in a gold container. Now, Arctinus could hardly have Thetis steal the body of Achilles and take it to Leuce only to bury it there while the soul of Achilles was to go to Hades. The likelihood is that she carried the corpse of Achilles to Leuce because the soul of Achilles already was or was soon to be there. This is supported by E., *I.T.* 431-38, and by later tradition which speaks of Leuce as the island haunted by Achilles. Maximus Tyrius (2nd cent. A.D.), for example, says the following of Leuce and Achilles ([even though he does not use the name Leuce] Hob. IX, vii c-i = p. 109.11-110-3): *Achilles dwells on an island; there, opposite Ister in the Pontic sea, we find a temple and altars of Achilles. Now, no one would willingly approach this place except to offer sacrifice, and as soon as he has done so he boards his ship. On this island sailors have often seen a young man with yellow hair leaping about in arms —arms made of gold. Others, who have not seen him, have heard him chanting the song of victory. And still others have both seen and heard him. In fact, someone once fell asleep accidentally on this island; Achilles awoke him, led him into his tent, and entertained him sumptuously. Patroclus poured the wine, Achilles played the cithara, and the man said that Thetis also was there, and a company of other daemons.* Maximus being an author of the Second Sophistic with eyes constantly turned to classical antiquity is likely to give here as old a sketch of Leuce and Achilles on it as any savant of the second cent. A.D. could, and conceivably a sketch not in any basic conflict with the *Aithiopsis*.

There is no reason to suppose that the unhomeric fashion with which Ibycus and Arctinus treated Achilles raised the brows of their hearers/readers. Nor is there reason to suppose that in 476 B.C. unhomeric treatment of Achilles on the part of Pindar was likely to pose a problem with Pindar's hearers/readers, seeing that Simonides too, in unhomeric fashion, unites Achilles and Medea in marriage on the *Elysium*. Above all, in the famous scolion of Harmodius and Aristogiton, of which the terminus ante quem is the year 425 B.C. (the year of the production of Aristophanes' *Acharnians* [see v. 979 of the comedy]) and the terminus post quem the year 511/510 B.C. (the year of Hippias' expulsion from Athens)⁶⁴, Harmodius is celebrated as having escaped death and as being on the *Isles* together with fast *Achilles*, and Diomedes, the son of Tydeus⁶⁵. The Athenians, for whom this scolion

63. See note 46.

64. According to Bowra, p. 395, the scolion may well date from about 510 or 477 B.C.

65. φίλταθ' Ἀρμόδι', οὐ τί πω τέθνηκας, / νήσοις δ' ἐν μακάρων σέ φασιν εἶναι, / ἵνα περ ποδώκης Ἀχιλεὺς / Τυδεΐδην τέ φασι τὸν ἐσθλὸν Διομήδεα (see *PMG*, p. 475, fr. 894).

became a kind of national anthem, obviously were not surprised by the appearance of Achilles on the *Isles*, and there is hardly anything to make one suppose that the writer introduced Achilles to the *Isles* in imitation of Pindar's *O. 2*, or that the Athenians accepted the «oddity» of Achilles on the *Isles* because Pindar in *O. 2* had Achilles on the *Isles* (there is not even any assurance that the scolion was written after 476 B.C. and not earlier). Even if, following the extant evidence, one assumes that Pindar in *O. 2* was indeed the first to have introduced Achilles to the *Isles*, there is no reason to believe that the poet's audience would have been surprised at the introduction (accustomed as they were to unhomeric treatments of Achilles since the 7th century) and that Pindar would have felt it necessary to apply rhetorical tricks in order to make his unhomeric treatment of Achilles appear less unhomeric —after all why should one suppose that Pindar was concerned for his unhomeric Achilles in this eschatology, when the eschatology as a whole is unhomeric and Pindar shows no concern for it? The conclusion is that even if the introduction of Achilles to the *Isles* is Pindar's innovation (for which one can entertain doubts)⁶⁶, there is no strong reason to suppose that the Thetis-Zeus scene is meant to take us to the *Iliad*. Even if it could be shown that it is meant to take us to the *Iliad*, it is highly unlikely that it was introduced as a Homeric «motif» to combat Homeric authority, rather than simply as an Homeric *ornament*.

It is time now to pass to a major question: What is the function of Achilles in *O. 2*? To answer correctly we may first review the eschatology as a whole. We have seen that here we meet with three groups in the sequence: (a) those punished (= ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες) in the Underworld, (b) those rewarded (ἔσθλοί) in the Underworld, and (c) the μάκαρες on the *Isles*⁶⁷. With the exception of Διὸς (v. 58), the text which presents groups (a) and (b) contains no proper names; even the

66. If we assume that the Harmodius scolion is posterior to 476 B.C., then «extant evidence» makes *O. 2* the earliest occurrence of Achilles on the *Isles* (however, see also note 62). But such evidence can hardly assure us that Achilles had not already reached the *Isles*, say, a hundred or more years before 476 B.C. —we know so little of what written and oral views existed among the Greeks from ca. 700 B.C. to 476 B.C. about the otherworldly adventures of Achilles. It may be of significance that neither the Pindaric Scholia nor any other source tells us that Pindar was the first to bring Achilles to the *Isles*, and that Achilles on the *Isles* appears in the Harmodius scolion (see note 64). The argument that Pindar is (or is likely to be) the first to have brought Achilles to the *Isles*, because *to the extent we know O. 2* constitutes the earliest mention of Achilles on the *Isles*, is an argument as flimsy as any based on an *e silentio* evidence can be.

67. In *O. 2*, 61-67, we are probably witnessing the *post mortem* life of the ἔσθλοί in the Elysian Plain, even though the place is not identified. Whether these two Paradises (the Elysian Plain is found first in Homer, *Od. 4*, 561-69, the *Isles* first in Hesiod, *Op.* 167-73) were originally one paradise cannot be decided. At any rate, The Elysian Plain in Homer is on the earth, and later located under the earth (see conveniently *OCD* s.v. After-Life) but retaining its original sunshine.

judge (v. 59 τις) and the gods (vv. 65-66) in this section of the poem remain wrapped in anonymity. But when we go further in the text than those two groups things change radically in this regard. We hear of Διὸς ὁδόν (v. 70), of Κρόνου τύρσιν (v. 70), of Ῥαδάμανθους (v. 75), of πατήρ ... μέγας ([we may consider πατήρ μέγας an ἐπίκλησιν, and therefore a quasi proper name] = Κρόνος) (v. 76), of Ῥέα (v. 77), and then of Πηλεὺς (v. 78), Κάδμος (v. 78) and Ἀχιλλεὺς (v. 79). It becomes clear that Pindar has moved from anonymity to distinct personalities, and from a sketch to a full-colored picture. If to this qualitative difference between group (c) and groups (a) and (b) we add that there is also a comparable *quantitative* difference in that groups (a) and (b) together occupy 11 verses while group (c) by itself occupies 13, or even 16 verses, we can hardly fail to recognize that Pindar in this eschatology is *especially* interested in group (c). Obviously, Peleus, Cadmus, and Achilles are introduced as exempla of the μάκαρες, exempla culled from the prestigious, heroic age.

As already remarked⁶⁸, Achilles is saturated with honor, and his appearance on the *Isles* takes place in order that he may finally achieve the happiness which he has lacked in his life. He is not honored by being on the *Isles*, for none would doubt that he is ὁ ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν regardless of where he is, but rather his presence there bestows honor on the *Isles*. And so Achilles is chosen to close the eschatology just as a mighty forte closes a crescendo — the entire eschatology forming a crescendo. To utilize a modern concept, Achilles *advertises* the *Isles*, constituting their major attraction.

A crucial question now arises: what is the relation between Achilles and Theron? Pindar here is not explicit, and there is no guarantee that a relation was even meant. On the other hand it is strange to suppose that Pindar devoted about 25% of the poem to this eschatology (not counting the eschatological elements preceding the eschatology proper, see note 31), but that Achilles, who constitutes the *forte* with which the eschatology closes is of no relevance, indeed, of no major relevance to Theron. Moreover, there are good reasons to visualize why Pindar avoided being explicit. In a poem dedicated to Theron as Olympic victor specific reference to his death would have constituted inauspicious material. Further, it may have seemed to Pindar inappropriate, a downright flattery, to state explicitly that a place on the *Isles* is reserved for Theron. Pindar therefore decided to be delicately suggestive here rather than explicit. It seems that he does so (a) by placing Achilles on the *Isles* and emphasizing his presence there (b) by what he says about Theron throughout the poem, and especially in vv. 92-95 (c) by expecting that his audience will bring Achilles and Theron together through the widely known

68. See p. 257-58.

proverb «*similar approaches similar*»⁶⁹. It has already been suggested that Achilles closes the description of the *Isles* as the highest point of Pindar's praise of the *Isles* —it is the place where ὁ ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν dwells⁷⁰. If Achilles is the ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν (he who vanquished Hector, Cycnus, and Memnon), Theron in Pindar's estimate is the ἄριστος Ἑλλήνων (or even ἀνθρώπων⁷¹) in the last hundred years⁷². We may then make the connection between the two ἄριστοι and conclude at the suggestion of the proverb ὁμοιος ὁμοίῳ ἀεὶ πελάζει: as Achilles honors the *Isles*, so Theron too one day will honor the *Isles* with his presence there. And, of course, as Achilles found there the absolute happiness which the *Isles* offer their inhabitants, so will Theron.

At the time Achilles lived, accomplishments in war counted as the major aristocratic ἀρετά, and Achilles became the ἄριστος of his time by vanquishing in battle Hector, Cycnus, and Memnon, the most formidable warriors. But in the days that Theron lives, the ἄριστος Ἑλλήνων is distinguished in a more civilized and sophisticated ἀριστεία, one performed in the ambiance of the πόλις and not less in peace than in war, an ἀριστεία which consists even more in helping friends than in

69. See, for example, Hom. *Od.* 17, 218; Pl. *Smp.* 195b; Pl. *Grg.* 510b; Arist. *Eth.* 9,3,3 and 8,1,6; Cic. *De senect.* 3,7, al. The suggestion in Gianotti, p. 50, that Theron, being a mortal, cannot be allowed to reach the *Isles* since no mortal can go beyond «le colonne d'Eracle», will not convince many. (vv. 68-70) ὅσοι δ'... ἐτόλμασαν ... ἔπειλαν is a statement of fact, and ὅσοι must refer to mortals in general, for so far Pindar has been talking about such mortals: *but as many as dared ... accomplished*. If mortals have reached the *Isles* through the ἐστρίς ἐκατέρωθι process, I see no reason why Theron cannot achieve the same results by the same process. True, in *O.* 3, 43-44, as Gianotti points out, Theron by his deeds of excellence can reach no further than «the Pillars of Heracles», but (a) *O.* 3 is not *O.* 2, and (b) that in *O.* 3 Theron reaches no further than «the Pillars of Heracles» when *alive* need not imply that Theron in *O.* 2 cannot reach the *Isles* in *death* —the ὄρα of life's realm can hardly coincide with the ὄρα of death's realm. Above all the ἐστρίς ἐκατέρωθι process does not apply to Achilles, and it is very doubtful at best that it applies to Peleus and Cadmus. To whom then does it apply (for surely Pindar must have introduced the ἐστρίς ἐκατέρωθι process for its applicability rather than inapplicability)? Obviously, it applies to individuals like Theron.

70. Pindar does not call Achilles the ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν (cf. Hom. *Il.* 1, 244), but the treatment he gives to Achilles in vv. 79-83 (especially if compared to the jejune treatment that he has given to Peleus and Cadmus) makes it reasonably certain that here Pindar presents Achilles at the blaze of his epic might (lumping together the *Iliad*, the *Cypria*, and the *Aithiopsis*), and therefore as the ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν.

71. Since πόλιν (v. 93) does not necessarily exclude the cities of non-Greeks, one may say that Theron is ὁ ἄριστος ἀνθρώπων rather than only ὁ ἄριστος Ἑλλήνων.

72. Again, Pindar has not used the expression ὁ ἄριστος Ἑλλήνων for Theron, but one believes that it is a legitimate brief summary of the words (vv. 92-95 + vv. 98-100) «*I shall declare ... that for these hundred years, no city has given birth to a man more magnificent in heart, more ungrudging in hand than Theron ...; as sand can never be numbered, and who could ever count up all the joys he has given to others?*».

killing enemies —criteria have changed, but in essence the old and the modern ἀρετὰ and ἀριστεία remain the same.

If one supposes that Theron, like Achilles, was an unhappy man⁷³, then the two could come even closer to each other in *O.* 2. Even if Theron was not particularly unhappy, Pindar conceivably could dramatize him as unhappy in this ode. True, Pindar does not say that Theron was an unhappy man, and yet in this poem which is concerned so much with how one can leave behind the difficulties and the unhappiness of a world where things done cannot be undone, a poem which

73. Lesky (p. 193) sees *O.* 2 as concerned less with Theron's victory and more with consoling Theron («in sickness and cares»). Many others, too, have understood *O.* 2 as a *consolatio* to Theron; see, for example, Finley, p. 59, Perosa, p. 27ff., Impellizzeri, p. 105ff., Lavagnini, p. 14, Wilamowitz, p. 246, Schadewaldt, p. 334-335. Nisetich, p. 3-4, minimizes or even rejects *consolatio* in *O.* 2 with the argument that «the eschatology in *O.* 2 has a triumphal feeling about it that is appropriate for a victory ode». And yet, if from *O.* 2 we had only vv. 56-83 left, I wonder whether Nisetich would have concluded that these verses were part of an epinician rather than of a θρῆνος. One thing is clear enough, that in *O.* 2 Pindar has reversed the Homeric values of life on earth vis-à-vis life after death. In *O.* 2 the life of the ἐσ(θ)λοὶ in the Underworld is pronounced more attractive than the life on earth. This life not only satisfies *hedonistic* expectations more than life on earth, but also justice —crooks prosper on earth but not in the Underworld. The *consolatio* here becomes a panegyric on *post mortem* happiness which materializes in the life of the ἐσ(θ)λοὶ in the Underworld, and reaches its highest point on the *Isles* of the μάχαρες. Through the concept of metempsychosis the value of the body has inevitably declined (it has become a replaceable χιτῶν —Empedocles, fr. 126, presents Nature (?) clothing the soul in the «alien tunic of flesh», σαρκῶν ἀλλογνῶτι ... χιτῶνι) and this allows the soul, in full self-sufficiency, ἅπαντα μεθ' ἑαυτῆς ἔχειν, whether the soul is in the body, which now tends to be considered a nuisance to the soul, or without the body. Of those believing in reincarnation, none is likely to be concerned any more with whether «translation» to a paradise involves translation of the body as well. In fact, one feels that the body is an impediment to the soul's happiness, and as such its «translation» is ill-advised —let it better rot in its grave! The persona of *O.* 2 seems to speak in this metaphysical (Orphic/Pythagorean/mystic) orientation. Whether this was also the orientation of Pindar we do not know. I am inclined to believe that, in writing the eschatology, Pindar did not wish to identify it as exclusively Pythagorean, or Orphic, or Eleusinian, for I see no evidence in the ode leading to such a narrow identification. If a label is to be attached on the eschatology of *O.* 2, I would prefer the label «panhellenic». Demand, p. 347 ff., relying on Cretan-Rhodian cultic elements in Acragas, encourages her reader to see such elements in *O.* 2 as well. Thus not only does she project Zeus Atabyrios and Athena Lindia in *O.* 2, but she even maintains that transmigration of souls in the eschatology of the ode derives from such cultic elements rather than from Pythagorean-Orphic sources. All I can say is that I find no evidence in *O.* 2, as written by Pindar, which supports Demand's «Cretan-Rhodian» hypothesis. Bowra, p. 121, supposes that in the eschatology of *O.* 2 Pindar makes poetry out of Theron's personal beliefs on life after death. This may be correct (at least we can be reasonably certain that Pindar was not likely to write an eschatology in opposition to Theron's views), but it does not necessarily support Demand. I see no good reason to infer that Pindar in making poetry out of such personal beliefs was interested in keeping them distinctly Theronian and Sicilian rather than in giving them a panhellenic breadth, which still could accommodate Theron and Sicily comfortably, but not exclusively.

takes us to the Underworld and then to the *Isles*, it is not difficult to perceive a melancholy Theron behind the prima facie «happy» victor. This will make the poem more human, more comprehensive, and more beautiful. Nevertheless, there is no need to bring Theron and Achilles so close to each other. It is sufficient to point to the relation between the two as only ἄριστοι. In other respects we may let Theron be Theron, and Achilles be Achilles⁷⁴.

Thummer⁷⁵ has argued that the appearance of Cadmus on the *Isles* invites Theron there, namely that just as Peleus pairs with Achilles, so Cadmus pairs with Theron. The parallelism seems forced: Peleus is Achilles' father, while Cadmus is Theron's remotest ancestor in Thebes. Moreover, Pindar (vv. 43-47) dwells on praising Thersander (in whom Thebes and Argos join) as Theron's ancestor rather than Cadmus. Consider also this. A relation between Cadmus and Theron will obscure the relation between Theron and Achilles, and conversely. Therefore, we should choose to pair Theron either with Cadmus, or with Achilles, not with both. Since in vv. 78-83 Pindar has stressed Achilles so much over Cadmus, it is highly unlikely that Pindar wanted us to understand Cadmus rather than Achilles as

74. The similarities between Achilles and Theron propounded by Nisetich (p. 14-15) do not surface easily in the Greek text. He writes: «divine favor and triumphant deeds distinguish him (= Achilles), as they distinguish any victor». But regarding the entrance of Achilles to the *Isles*, where divine favor on the part of Zeus (see note 7) is indisputable, the favor can be seen as only indirectly relating to Achilles since the text reads: «*Achilles was borne thither by his mother, when, by her prayers, she had convinced the heart of Zeus*». If Pindar was interested in presenting Achilles' entry into the *Isles* as Achilles' victory accompanied by the favor of Zeus, it is clear that he would not have written vv. 79-80 the way he did. It is in reality not Achilles but his mother who wins and is favored by Zeus here regardless of whether Achilles deserved to be favored and victorious on his own. According to Nisetich (p. 15) Theron «like Achilles ... has been victorious over barbarians in battle, and Pindar has alluded to this at line 6». True, Achilles is explicitly praised as the vanquisher of Hector, Cycnus, and Memnon. But Theron, throughout the poem, is praised for his δεικαιοσύνη, and his εὐεργεσία. Nisetich extracts the warrior Theron from ἔρεισμα Ἰακράγαντος (v. 6), to which we may also add ἄωτον ὀρθόπολιν (v. 7). But Acragas, like every city, has problems in both war and peace, and obviously Theron as ἔρεισμα Ἰακράγαντος and as ἄωτος ὀρθόπολις is simply the *prop/pillar of Acragas* and *the choicest upholder of the city* in all times and occasions. To make vv. 6-7 focus on Theron's victory against the Carthaginians in 480 B.C. (which by the way was more Gelon's victory, see Nisetich, 4 and ibid. note 15) is to rewrite vv. 6-7 arbitrarily. Nisetich (p. 15) continues with another similarity: «Achilles was the great-grandson of Zeus ... The blood of Zeus flows in Theron's veins also». It is true that Pindar takes Theron's lineage back to Laius (v. 38), but no further; nor has he made any connection between Theron's lineage and Zeus anywhere in the ode. Nor has he anywhere in the ode alluded to Zeus as ancestor of Achilles. In fact Pindar has not given the lineage of Achilles beyond speaking of his mother, without mentioning her by name, and introducing the name of Peleus, without mentioning him as his father. This hardly shows an interest in tracing Achilles' lineage back to Zeus.

75. Thummer, p. 127. See also Nisetich, n. 60.

Theron's counterpart. But, then, why is Cadmus mentioned? Pindar is a Theban, and Cadmus is the Theban γενάρχης. By introducing Cadmus to the *Isles* Pindar, pays a compliment to Thebes. The compliment is in good taste since Theron has also been celebrated as «Theban»⁷⁶, and therefore the compliment reflects not only on the Theban Pindar, but also on the «Theban» Theron. As it is well known, Cadmus is joined again with Peleus in *Pythian* 3, 87-88.

Theron died in 472 (four years after the composition of *O. 2*). From Diodorus (11,53.2) we know that he was granted hero honors in Acragas; similar *post mortem* honors had been granted to Gelon in 478 (see Diodorus 11,38.5) by the Syracusans. If we postulate that in *O. 2* Pindar suggests that Theron will be admitted to the *Isles* after his death (whether it is Achilles who invites him there, or Cadmus, or Peleus, or even Cadmus, Peleus, and Achilles in unison), then the question to be asked is whether with *O. 2* Pindar could suggest to the Acragantines *heroization* of Theron in Acragas, although in the poem he was projecting Theron to the *Isles*. Nisetich⁷⁷ answers the question in the negative. He argues that the *Isles* and the Elysian Plain are «purely poetic creations» having nothing to do with the cult of local heroization. His objection, however, seems tenuous. A poem is experienced in a society, and the poem's content reverberates in the realities of society. The persona of *O. 2* sends Theron to the *Isles*, for there poetry sends the exceptional individuals. What will Acragas (the city is cited by name in vv. 6, and 91), Theron's own city, do with Theron is the pragmatic question. And the answer suggested to those who can relate poetic idealism to practical reality is: pronounce Theron a hero after death as cities do in the case of their exceptional sons. *Isles* in poetry and *heroization* in the city are not in conflict. The Athenian, for example, sacrifices to Harmodius as hero, but he also sings: φίλταθ' Ἀρμόδι' οὐ τι πω τέθνηκας, νήσοις δ' ἐν μακάρων σέ φασιν εἶναι ... In view of Gelon's heroization in 478, *O. 2* in 476 could easily suggest to the Acragantines heroization for Theron.

76. Theron is of course an Ἀκραγαντῖνος, but as a descendent of Thersander, son of Polynices, he is also a Theban. It is likely that Pindar dwelt on the Theban ancestry of Theron (vv. 38-47) because he was himself a Theban and wished to warm the atmosphere of *O. 2* with the concept (perhaps even conceit?) of Theron as a «compatriot». The reason for which in v. 45 Pindar calls Thersander Ἀδραστιδᾶν θάλας ἀρωγὸν δόμοις, thus pointing to his Argive ancestry on his mother's side, is probably his interest in freeing Theron through him from the inauspicious impact of the house of the Labdacidae rather than because he wished to de-emphasize Thersander and Theron as Thebans. We should take note that in v. 43 Pindar has named Thersander's father —λείφθη δὲ Θέρσανδρος ἐριπέντι Πολυνεΐκει—, and that in the preceding lines he has taken Thersander's ancestors step by step back to his great-grandfather Laius.

77. See Nisetich, p. 16 and n. 62. I must report, however, that if what Nisetich attributes to Boeckh (Nisetich, p. 16) is indeed Boeckh's view, this view certainly does not come out of Boeckh, p. 121-22, where Nisetich refers his reader.

And this suggestion adds to the value of the poem, making it more comprehensive, more functional, more attuned to the historical realities of 476 B.C. Greece.

We shall close with a panoramic view of *O. 2*. Fitzgerald⁷⁸ finds that *O. 2* treats «the problems of temporality». Time (which in v. 17 is celebrated as Χρόνος ὁ πάντων πατήρ), temporality, changeability, the polarity between the ephemeral and the abiding, and the influence of the gods (including that of inexorable Fate) on human life are indeed important elements in the ode, but, so far as I can see, the ode basically constitutes a solemnization and celebration of ἀρετὰ on a grandiose scale. With Theron's ἀρετὰ as his point of reference (Theron and his ἀρετὰ occupying the first and last part of the poem in ring composition), the poet expands from the particular to the general to orchestrate an ἐγκώμιον of the virtuous aristocrat at large, and to do so both in empirical, earthly terms, and in transcendental, mystical terms. The major emphasis is on the transcendental, mystical terms, i.e. on the eschatology, and more particularly on the *Isles*, which are presented as the glorious award to the highest manifestation of ἀρετὰ⁷⁹. I may add that Pindar seems to present the eschatology as a *quasi revelation*, on his part to the world. If this is accepted, I would like to suggest that Pindar's motive for this is to eliminate suspicion that Theron (and the aristocrat at large) cultivates virtue with thoughts of «gain». With such an elimination Pindar presents Theron as having been virtuous for the sake of virtue (as if Theron and the aristocrat in general are unaware of what virtue brings to the virtuous post-mortem, and now learn it from *O. 2*)⁸⁰.

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GEORGE L. KONIARIS

78. Fitzgerald, p. 49 ff.; see and van Leeuwen, p. 297.

79. Van Leeuwen, vol. 1, p. 300, puts the climax of the ode not in the eschatology, but in the last epode, especially in vv. 98-100 where Theron is lavishly praised. Van Leeuwen can be right only if we take the view that the eschatology is *irrelevant* to Theron. For if the eschatology is relevant to Theron and Pindar suggests a place for Theron on the *Isles*, then any emphasis put on vv. 98-100 is absorbed by the eschatology, and Theron's (v. 99) countless χάριματ' are celebrated not as the final purpose, but as the *means* to the final purpose (the final purpose being a life of Theron on the *Isles*). Is the eschatology irrelevant or relevant to Theron? To the extent I can see, *O. 2* with its eschatology irrelevant to Theron becomes a poem inferior in every respect to *O. 2* with its eschatology relevant to Theron, and there is no good reason to suppose that Pindar wanted *O. 2* to be the inferior poem. I conclude that the eschatology placed in the middle of the ode functions as its κέντρον βάρους and its climax, and that, by comparison, vv. 98-100 are ἐν λύσει and ἐν ὑφέσει.

80. I wish to express my warmest thanks to the distinguished editor, professor N. C. Conomis, for constructive criticism and great kindness. For any shortcomings of this article only its author should be held responsible.