

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF PERDICCAS II DURING THE ARCHIDAMIAN WAR

In order to understand the very important events which took place in Macedonia during the Peloponnesian War we must keep in mind the political situation of the Macedonian kingdom in the 5th century B.C. and the foreign policy of the king of Macedonia, Perdiccas II, the son of Alexander I, the philhellene¹.

It was really an achievement of Alexander I that the Macedonian kingdom, after the battle of Plataiai (479) and the departure of the Persians from Greece, Macedonia and Thrace, not only obtained unity, but also extended political control over the NW part of Macedonia, that is to say, over the Elimiotans, Orestians, and Lygkestians — the ἐπάνωθεν ἔθνη as Thucydides² calls them — as well as the area beyond the Strymon river.

The failure of Athens to establish herself in the key area of the middle of Strymon valley, where the Edones, a Thracian tribe, dwelt³, was due to the determined opposition of the Macedonian king Alexander I.

The political achievement of this king was the extension of the Macedonian rule over this part of the Strymon valley, which later, with the foundation of Amphipolis there, became for the Athenians the main source for material for building their triremes, for timber and for pitch.⁴

¹ For early Macedonian history see: *Otto Abel, Makedonien vor König Philipp, 1847. Fritz Geyer, Makedonien bis zur Thronbesteigung Philipps II, München und Berlin 1930. 'Ιω. Παπασταύρου, Μακεδονική πολιτική κατά τόν 5ον π. Χ. αἰῶνα, Θεσσαλονίκη 1936.*

² Thucydides (2.99) . . . τῶν γάρ Μακεδόνων εἰσοὶ καὶ Λυγκηνοὶ καὶ Ἐλιμιῶται καὶ ἄλλα ἔθνη ἐπάνωθεν, ἃ ζύμμαχα μὲν ἔστι τούτοις καὶ ὑπήκοα, βασιλείας δ' ἔχει καθ' αὐτά . . .

³ Cf. *J. Papastavrou, Amphipolis, Geschichte und Prosopographie. Klio, Beiheft 1937, p. 9f.*

⁴ The importance of the middle Strymon area for the Athenians is emphasized by Thucydides saying (4.108) . . . ἐχομένης δὲ τῆς Ἀμφιπόλεως (after its capture by Brasidas in the year 423) οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ἐς μέγα δέος κατέσειησαν, ἄλλως τε καὶ ὅτι ἡ πόλις αὐτοῖς ἦν ὠφέλιμος ξύλων τε ναυπηγησίων πομπῇ καὶ χρημάτων προσόδῳ . . .

Plutarch in his life of Cimon (14) relates that Cimon's political enemies accused him of having been bribed by king Alexander I and having therefore refrained from occupying a great part of Macedonia, though he had a good opportunity of invading it. Obviously Plutarch is here speaking of the rich lands of the middle Strymon and of the silvermines there, from which according to Herodotus' Alexander drew each day a talent of silver.

The conditions under which Perdiccas II undertook the government of his kingdom were as follows: on the coast of East Macedonia and round the Thermaic Gulf the Delian League of Athens has already extended its power to include all the cities of Chalcidice and Bottiaia, as well as Methone on the Thermaic Gulf. The island of Thasos, lying opposite the mouth of the Strymon, was at that time firmly under the control of the Athenian empire after an unsuccessful revolt from the Athenian alliance. In this way the Athenian empire had secured control over the northern coast of the Aegean.

But the new king of Macedonia at the beginning of his reign¹ had to face another problem, as regards the internal discipline of his kingdom.

His brothers Alketas and Philipp, who had been appointed by their father before his death as governors of separate districts of the Macedonian kingdom, refused to recognize the sovereignty of their brother, and declared the independence of their own dominion (*ἀρχή*).

It seems that Perdiccas had no difficulty in over-throwing Alketas and re-establishing control over his *ἀρχή*. About this we are not told in detail². But Philipp's revolt was a more serious problem for Perdiccas. Philipp was strong enough to maintain his *ἀρχή*, because he was supported by the Athenians, who had

¹ See 5.17,2. The coinage of Alexander I, *B. V. Head*, *Hist. Num.* pp. 219 f. *Gaebler*, *Münzen von Makedonia II*, plate XXVIII.

² About Perdiccas II see *Vischer*, *Kleine Schriften I Bd. Perdiccas II. König von Makedonien*, p. 239 ff, *Abel* p. 165 ff, *Geyer* p. 50 ff = *RE art. Perdiccas II*, and *Ιω. Παπασταύρου*, *Ἀρχαί τῆς βασιλείας Περδίκκου Β'* = *Ὁ Περδίκκος Β' εἰς τὰς παραμονάς τοῦ Πελοπον. πολέμου, Γέρας Ἀντωνίου Κεραμοπούλλου* (*Αθ.* 1953, *Ἐταιρεία Μακεδ. Σπουδῶν*) p. 133 - 139.

³ Of Alketas and his dominion we hear from Plato (*Gorg.* p. 471 a. b) ... *ὡς ἀποδώσων τὴν ἀρχὴν ἣν Περδίκκος αὐτὸν ἀφείλετο.*

never been in favour of a strong Macedonia as neighbour to their northern allies. They knew of course the designs of Macedonian policy to extend the rule of the Macedonian kingdom over the Strymon area, a territory of vital importance for Athens.

Perdiccas was wise enough to understand the political interest of his kingdom in such a critical situation as that which he was facing at the time he formed a friendship with Athens. Thucydides speaks clearly of a *ξυμμαχία καὶ φιλία*¹ of Perdiccas with Athens. What was the character of this *ξυμμαχία καὶ φιλία* we are not told. It seems to me that it was an agreement between Athens and Perdiccas based upon the principle «μη βλάπτειν ἀλλήλους», not to injure one another. But Perdiccas changed his policy towards Athens and became her enemy, because the Athenians had made an alliance with his brother Philipp and with Derdas, the prince of the Elimeans, who made common cause against him². Later, when Philipp the father of Alexander the Great ascended the throne of Macedon, the Athenians displayed the same attitude towards the Macedonians, by helping Argaios, a rival of Philipp, who had claim to the throne³.

Philipp bought the alliance with Athens by allowing the Athenians for his part to be active in his neighborhood, and by supporting them in establishing the colony of Amphipolis. Because

¹ See 1. 57, 2.

² 1, 57, 2: ἐπεπολέμωτο ξύμμαχος πρότερον καὶ φίλος ὢν. ἐπολεμώθη δέ, ὅτι Φιλίππῳ τῷ ἑαυτοῦ ἀδελφῷ καὶ Δέρδῳ κοινῇ πρὸς αὐτὸν ἐναντιουμένοις οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι ξυμμαχίαν ἐποίησαντο.

³ Diodorus 16. 2, 6... Ἀθηναῖοι πρὸς Φίλιππον ἀλλοτριῶς κατήγον ἐπὶ τὴν βασιλείαν Ἀργαίων καὶ στρατηγὸν ἀπεισάλλκουσαν Μαντίαν... Of the treaty of Philipp, the brother of Perdiccas, with Athens we have some relics of an inscription on a very damaged stone which has been published at first by Bauer, see *I. Παπασταύρου, Σχέσεις Μακεδόνων καὶ Ἀθηναίων κατὰ τὸν 5ον π.Χ. αἰῶνα, Προσφορά εἰς Σ. Κυριακίθην (Θεσσαλονίκη 1953. Ἑλληνικά, Παράρτημα 4)* pp. 525-531. A new restoration of this inscription I suggest here as follows: Θεοί | χουνθέεας Ἀθηναίων καὶ Φιλίπ | πο κατὰ τάθε εἶναι Ἀθηναίος μὲν | μὲ βλά | πτεν τῆγ γῆν Φιλίππο αὐτ | ἔν θ' ἔχεν φ(ι)λλος Ἀθηναίος καὶ τ | οἷς χουμμάχοις. καὶ εἰάν τις ἢυ | ποπέμπει λειστὰς μὲ | ὑποδέχεσθαι μεθ' αὐτός λείψεσθαι μεθ' | ἐ | χουμπορεύεσθαι μετὰ τῶν πολ | εμίον ἐπ' Ἀθηναίος μεθ' ἐπὶ τὸς χ | ουμμάχος τῶν Ἀθηναίων, μεθ' ἐ | χρο | ἔματα παρέχεν τοῖς πολέμοις μεθ' ἐς τὰ τείχη ὑποδέχεσθαι φ | ρορὰν τινα παρὰ τῶν πολέμων. I am sorry I disagree with Prof. Meritt rejecting the reading Φιλίππος and trying to show that these letters have nothing to do with the alliance of Athens with Philipp (cf. *AJPh.* 75 [1954] 359).

of this treaty between Athens and Philipp, which was strengthened by an alliance with Derdas of Elimeia as well as by the establishment of Athens in the Strymon valley with the foundation of Amphipolis, Perdiccas invaded the dominion of Philipp and expelled him. The Athenians faced with this *coup d'état* by Perdiccas were obliged to send Philipp the military help stipulated by their alliance with him. Therefore the passage in Thucydides (1.57,4) is comprehensible, when he says: . . . *δεδιώς τε ἔπρασσεν* (Perdiccas) *ἔς τε τὴν Λακεδαιμόνα πέμπων ὅπως πόλεμος γένηται αὐτοῖς πρὸς Πελοποννησίους καὶ τοὺς Κορινθίους προσεποιεῖτο τῆς Ποτειδαίας ἕνεκα ἀποσιτάσεως*. If we bear in mind that the foundation of Amphipolis took place in the year 437-6, we must place at that time the treaty between Philipp and Athens, and the change of Perdiccas attitude towards the Athenians¹.

As we have already said, Philipp, the brother of Perdiccas, supported by Athens, tried to secure his independence from Perdiccas. At the same time, Arrabaios of Lyncestis, as we shall see, was among at subduing the other princes of upper Macedonia and uniting all that part of the country under his rule.

Perdiccas faced all these problems with a remarkable policy. He made an alliance² with the cities of Chalcidice, as

¹ The authors of the ATL, III p. 313 and Note 61, have placed at that time a document on a very damaged stone we possess, part of which they have restored in a new shape. In this inscription appear the names of Derdas, Alcetas and Arrabaios among the other delegates. The authors of the ATL complete in the l. 52 also the name Φιλίππος Ἀλεξάνδρου. The inscription is a *ἑομμάχια* between Athens and Perdiccas which the modern scholars since *Kirchhoff* (Inscr. Att. I N^o 42. 43 = Abh. Berl. Akad. 1861 p. 598 f. = IG I² 71 = SEG XI 86) have placed in the year 423-2 compering it with the passage of Thucydides (4. 132) speaking of an understanding of Perdiccas with the Athenian generals, which the same author characterizes as *δημολογία* made with the Athenians «*διὰ τὴν τοῦ Βρασίδου ἔχθραν*». I don't think Perdiccas could come in an understanding at that time with his brother Philipp and the other princes of upper Macedonia, because all were then against the effort of Perdiccas to reestablish the good order in the Macedonian kingdom, which has been disturbed after the death of Alexander I.

² The *ἑομμάχια* of Perdiccas with the Chalcidians emerges as a *terminus post quem* from an ensuing passage of Thucydides (1. 62, 2) who narratives that the allies (Poteidaiaus and the Peloponnesians) had chosen Aristeus general of all the infantry, and of the cavalry Perdiccas; *ἀπέστη γὰρ εὐθὺς* (Perdiccas after his understanding with the Athe-

with those of Bottiaia, and induced them to abandon and demolish their towns on the seacost, and to settle inland at Olynthos, making that city alone a strong fortress. He also gave them a part of his territory in Mygdonia round the lake Bolbe, as a place to settle as long as the war against the Athenians should last.

This ἀνοικισμός of Olynthos, the starting point of the Chalcidean League which first developed in a serious way later in the 4th century, is the most important political consequence at this time of the skillful policy of Perdiccas, and it had a very important effect bearing upon the fate of the Peloponnesian War.

The result of the political activity of Perdiccas was the revolt of Potidaia, and of Chalcidian and Bottiaian cities, from the Athenian ξυμμαχία. So the Athenian empire at the beginning of the war had to face a new front in the northern region of its alliance, the strength of which we can understand from the passage in Thucydides (1.59), informing us that «the first forces sent by the Athenians against the rebellious areas, consisting of 30 warships and thousand hoplites under Archestratos' leadership, were not strong enough . . . to act against the rebels as well as against Perdiccas»¹.

With this defection of the Chalcidian cities, which is the spark which set alight the Peloponnesian War, closes and the first phase in the policy of Perdiccas, who was therefore, as we see, an important factor contributing to the outbreak of that tragic conflict between the two great powers in Southern Greece.

To this provocation on the part of Perdiccas, the Athenian Government replied by sending warships and hoplites. The Corinthians to support the Poteidaean dispatched troops to that city amounting to sixteen hundred hoplites and four hundred light armed in all, under the command of Aristeus, a close friend of the Poteidaean. Thus in the preliminary episodes of the Peloponnesian War we are told that there were operating in this area 3000 Athenian hoplites, in addition to other forces of their allies and a force of 600 Macedonian cavalry under Philipp, brother of Perdiccas and Pausanias, as well as 70 warships.

On the other side, apart from the Chalcidian and Bottiaean

nian generals, which Thucydides characterises as «ἐξόμβροιν καὶ ξυμμαχίαν ἀναγκαίαν» and which has lasted very short time) πάλιν τῶν Ἀθηναίων καὶ ξυνεμάχει τοῖς Ποτειδαίαισι.

¹ Cf. Papastavrou, Γέρας Κερκμοπόλλου p. 136 f.

forces, we are informed that there were operating at that time 1600 Lacedaemonian hoplites, with 400 light armed and cavalry reinforced by 200 armed horsemen under Perdiccas. But the most important diplomatic enterprise of Athens on this northern front was the alliance with the Odrysian king Sitalkes in the first year of the war¹. This alliance was negotiated by Nymphodoros, a native of Abdera and a man with great influence over Sitalkes, who had married his sister. This man, whom the Athenians made their πρόξενος, came to Athens and got his son Sadocus enrolled as an Athenian citizen. He also undertook to end the war in Chalcidice, promising that he would persuade Sitalkes to send the Athenians an army of Thracian horsemen as targeteers.

The new political situation in Thrace, created by the *ἑυμμεχία* of Athens with Sitalkes, was countered by Perdiccas with skillful diplomacy.

Thucydides (2.29) tells us *ἔννεβίβασε δὲ* (Nymphodoros) *καὶ τὸν Περδίκκαν τοῖς Ἀθηναίοις καὶ Θέρμην αὐτῷ ἔπεισεν ἀποδοῦναι*: «he reconciled Perdiccas with the Athenians and persuaded them to restore Therme, which the Athenian troops took the year before». It seems that Perdiccas being hard pressed at the outset of the war, came to terms with Sitalkes on the following conditions: Sitalkes promised to reconcile Perdiccas with the Athenians and not to place his brother Philipp, who was his enemy, on the Macedonian throne². Perdiccas on his side gave Sitalkes certain promises which Thucydides does not record.

The scholiast on Thucydides speaks of a large amount of money having been promised to Sitalkes by king Perdiccas but I believe that the *ὑποσχέσεις* given to Sitalkes by the Macedonian king at that time have to do with the reestablishment of Phillip in his former ἀρχή (dominion). Only on this condition, as I believe, was Athens on her side, willing to accept Perdiccas as an ally and restore Therme to him.

The political conditions thus created in the North were very well favourable to the Athenian government, which tried to profit by them. Apart from their *ἑυμμεχία* with Sitalkes they made an alliance with Perdiccas as well as with Derdas and Arrabaios. We wish to stress the entrance to this alliance of Arrabaios, the most dangerous enemy of Perdiccas.

¹ Thuc. 2. 29, 4.

² Thuc. 2. 95, 2.

The document we possess, part of which has been skillfully restored by the authors of the ATL, I think must be referred to this time, that is to say the second year of the war (431 - 30). We mentioned above the reasons why we cannot assign this inscription to the year 436 as the authors of the ATL have done.

But the other date suggested, the year 423, based upon the passage in Thucydides (4. 132), is not convincing either for the following reasons: first, Arrabaios could not have been included in any *ἑσπέρια* with Perdikkas at that time, because of his open enmity for him. We are informed (Thuc. 4. 83) that in the year 423 Brasidas and Perdikkas joined their forces and made a second expedition to Lynceus against Arrabaios and after that date we are not informed of any reason for a change on the part of Perdikkas policy towards Arrabaios, who continued to represent a menace for Perdikkas' plans.

The other reason is that of which Thucydides (4. 132) informs us. The author speaks of an *ἑσπέρια*, an understanding to which Perdikkas came at that time (423) with the Athenian generals in Macedonia, and not of a *ἑσπέρια*, i. e. alliance. The change then in the policy of Perdikkas towards Athens is due to the fact that Brasidas for the second time retreated from Lyncestis and abandoned Perdikkas, who from that time onwards regarded Brasidas as a foe.

To get a better understanding of the political situation, created in Macedonia at that time, we must explain the Athenian policy towards the Macedonian kingdom after the formation of the Chalcidian League through Perdikkas.

After their unsuccessful support of Philippos, Arrabaios, the king of Lyncestis, was the only person with whom the Athenians could come to an understanding in order to create a counterpoise in Macedonia towards the Chalcidian Macedonian League. Arrabaios was the strongest king in upper Macedonia and his ultimate aim was to dominate the whole of that region. Athens would have been eager to support such a movement in order to neutralize the strength of the Chalcidian Macedonian alliance.

In the treaty between Athens and Perdikkas mentioned above (p. 258) we read that Arrabaios has been accepted into the *ἑσπέρια* on equal terms (cf. I. 48 .. *ὑπάρχεν δὲ χρῆσιν ἑμπορίου Ἀρραβαῖοι καὶ τοῖς ἑσπέριας ἡπέρο ἄν καὶ Περδίκκαι καὶ τοῖς ἑσπέριας...*) with Perdikkas and the other allies. If the restoration in reading... Φίλιππος Ἀλεξάνδρου is right, as in my opinion may be,

indicating that he too was among those who signed the alliance, this is one more very good reason why the document before must be referred to that time, that is to say to the second year of the war.

Perdiccas was clever enough to understand the special meaning of this alliance and the real aims of the Athenian policy on the northern front of the war, and he tried with energy to oppose the designs of Athens in the north.

His first task was to neutralize the threat to his country from the eastern side, that is the Odrysian king Sitalkes, who in the beginning of the winter made war upon Perdiccas and the Thracian Chalcidians as Thucydides (2, 95) says: *δύο ὑποσχέσεις τὴν μὲν βουλόμενος ἀναπαύξαι, τὴν δὲ αὐτὸς ἀποδοῦναι...* «Here were two promises, of which he wished to perform one, and exact fulfilment had been made to him by Perdiccas, when hard pressed at the beginning of the war he wanted Sitalkes to reconcile him to the Athenians... But Perdiccas did not keep his word. The other promise, which Sitalkes himself had made to the Athenians ... that he would put an end to the Chalcidian war».

Sitalkes having mustered at Doberus made ready to descend over the heights into the plains of Macedonia¹. The attack of Sitalkes in Macedonia was not decisive thanks to the skillful activity of the Macedonian cavalry, reinforced by horsemen from the allies of Perdiccas in upper Macedonia. And now the question answers as to who were the *ζῶνθεν ξύμμαχοι*?

Vischer² informs us «unter diesen Bundesgenossen haben wir uns ohne Zweifel besonders die Elimioten und Lynkesten zu denken, welche sonach damals die Oberhoheit der untern Makedonier anerkannt hätten». But Geyer³ thinks of the Lyncestian and Orestian cavalry and I think he is right, because at the next summer (429) we meet a thousand Orestians acting together with a thousand Macedonians sent by Perdiccas without the Athenians' knowledge in order to help the Sparta troops in Acarnania.

It seems that both kings, Derdas of Elimeia and Antiochus of Orestis, when they understood the designs of Arrabaios—that is to say, the extension of his rule over both of these districts of upper Macedonia, to Elimeia and Orestis—came to terms with Perdiccas and that they recognized his leadership. This was the first rift secretly opened in the alliance between Perdiccas and Athens.

¹ Thuc. 2. 99.

² Kleine Schriften I Bd. p. 260.

³ Makedonien p. 63.

The further achievement of Perdikkas was the neutralization of the danger from the side of Sitalkes. According to Thucydides¹ Sitalkes, because his army was without food and was suffering from the winter, was persuaded by his nephew Seuthes to return home ... «and Perdikkas had secretly gained over Seuthes, promising to give him his sister in marriage with a dowry. So Sitalkes returned home in haste and Perdikkas in fulfillment of his promise gave his sister Stratonice in marriage to Seuthes». Thus the expedition of Sitalkes ended in failure owing to the skillful policy of Perdikkas.

But the Macedonian king had to face other very serious problems. In the beginning of the year 429 Poteidaia surrendered. Four years afterwards Sphacteria on the southern front of the war also surrendered to the Athenian troops, and the peace party in Sparta became strong enough to come to terms with Athens. On the other side after the victory of Athens the cities revolting from her in Chalcidice were anticipating with dread the punishment in store for them, and the Lyncestian king was in a stronger position now than before.

The unsuccessful policy of the Athenian government, which refused to come to terms with the Lacedaimonians, who sent envoys to Athens for peace, created for Perdikkas an escape from the desperate situation in which he found himself at that time.

Thucydides (4. 82) emphatically states that the Athenians, believing that Perdikkas had instigated of the expedition of Brasidas to Thrace, declared him an enemy. I believe this point of Thucydides *ρομίσαντες (Περδίκκων) αἴτιον εἶναι τῆς παρόδου* has not been given enough emphasis by modern historians, who have seen in the expedition of Brasidas an important strategic development owing everything to his genius, both as a strategist and as a politician.

I think that at that time, the victory of Athens in Sphacteria, Sparta found herself in a very difficult position, since the Athenians had threatened the Spartans, that if they sent troops again to maraud Attica they would bring out the captives from Sphacteria and put them to death.

¹ Thuc. 2. 101. The passage of Diod. (12. 50) *Σιτάλης πρὸς Περδίκκων διαλωσάμενος ἐπιγαμίας ἐποιήσατο* I think must be a parallel information which has been drawn by Ephoros from Thucydides. What Geyer (p. 62... Vielleicht hat auch Perdikkas eine odrysische Prinzessin geheiratet; dann wäre auch der Plural verständlich) has no importance.

At this critical juncture for Sparta, Perdiccas played an important rôle by advising Sparta to open a new front of military activity in the region of the Athenian allies in Thrace, and to deprive Athens of the important supplies of row in the Strymon area.

The political climate at that time in the region of Thrace was favourable to Sparta, and Athens had lost much sympathy because of the increasing of the tribute of the allies in the year 425.

Perdiccas was in close touch with Sparta from the outset of the war, as we have seen even during the time of his alliance with Athens. As we mentioned above (p. 263), Perdiccas in the summer of 429 without the knowledge of the Athenian commander sent thousand Macedonians to help the Spartan commander Cnemus who was preparing for a long expedition against Acarnania¹.

As a result of this on the part of Perdiccas intervention in Sparta, Brasidas, the most important figure in Sparta at that time, was sent to Thrace with strong forces. In Sparta Perdiccas saw the only ally against the designs of Athenian policy in the North, and the rôle he played was very successful. The occupation of Amphipolis by Brasidas in the next year (424) was a serious blow for Athens, which has neutralized the victory in Sphacteria as we can understand it from Thucydides' passage (4. 108) «...The Athenians were seriously alarmed at the lost of Amphipolis: the place was very useful to them, and supplied them with a revenue and with timber which they imported for ship building. As far as the Strymon the Lacedaimonians could always have found a way to the allies of Athens, if the Thessalians allowed them to pass; but until they gained possession of the bridge they could proceed no further, because for a long way above, the river forms a large lake, and below, towards Eion, it was guarded by triremes. All difficulty seemed now to be removed, and the Athenians feared that more of their allies would revolt».

The object of this paper has been to show the importance of Macedonian policy during the first period of the Peloponnesian War, and the successful interference of Macedonian diplomacy in the affairs of Southern Greece. This foreign policy of Macedonia towards Greece found its best representative in the person of Philipp, the father of Alexander the Great.

¹ Thuc. 2. 80, 7 = Hermippos Frgm. 63 Kock = CAH V 210.