

AGAIN ON PINDAR'S *O.2*  
I. MAJOR POINTS OF INTERPRETATION

In 1988 I published an article on Pindar's *Olympian 2*, in *Hellenika*. In 1995 Professor M. M. Willcock published his learned commentary on seven Pindaric odes, one of them being *Olympian 2*. In the present paper I return to *O.2* to voice my disagreements with Willcock.

The article begins with an attempt at refuting major points of his overall interpretation of *O.2*—Willcock basically follows the tenants of the now in vogue E. L. Bundy school—and then it passes to matters *minoris momenti*, but still important enough to the correct understanding of the poem, matters where to a major extent my understanding of the poem differs from his.

*O.2* is probably Pindar's masterpiece, and therefore understanding this poem correctly amounts to understanding Pindar at his best correctly. It is with this belief that I publish these δεύτεραι φροντίδες on the poem. Because of its length the article will appear in two consecutive installments<sup>1</sup>.

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1. The second installment will appear in the next fascicle of the present volume. References are made by author's name. Kühner and Gerth appear as *K.-G.*, *Entretiens Fond. Hardt* as *Entretiens*, and Stephanus as *TGL*. Pindar's text is that of Willcock except where indicated otherwise.

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Köhnken<sup>1</sup>, A., *Die Funktion des Mythos bei Pindar*, Berlin 1971.

Köhnken<sup>2</sup>, A., in the discussion section of the article by Lloyd Jones in *Entretiens Fond. Hardt* 31 (1985) 280-4.

Koniaris, G. L., «On Pindar's *Olympian II*. ΑΧΙΑΛΕΥΣ, and much more», *Hellenika* 39 (1988)

On p. 155 commenting on (v. 57) ἀπάλαμνοι Willcock writes: «“defenseless”, “without resource”, not “wicked”» and takes (v. 57) μὲν to correspond to (v. 68) δ'. I find both suggestions unlikely<sup>2</sup>. *O.2* is briefly punishing the «bad» souls, but extensively glorifying the «good» ones, that is to say, the interest of the ode overwhelmingly centers on praise of the «good» souls, a praise which culminates with those souls who by their scrupulous justice eventually win entrance into the Isle of the Blessed, the place of absolute happiness.

The word (cf. v. 58) ποινά by itself can mean «penalty», «reward», or «remedy», but the expression ποινὰς (= inner object) τίνω can only mean «I pay the penalty [for wrongdoing]». In the ethical orientation of *O.2* it is nonsensical to make Pindar in vv. 57-60 put «good» and «bad» souls in one basket, and make both «pay the penalty». In *O.2* the underworld judge offers his judgment on the basis of the personal record of each soul rather than on any sin which might weigh upon all souls collectively in a ritualistic sense (as in Christianity the προπατορικὸν ἀμάρτημα weighs on everyone to be removed by baptism).

A joined punishment of «good» and «bad» souls would be meaningless in *O.2*, as would presentation of the «good» no less than the «bad» as «helpless» before the nether judge. One can easily see how the «bad» soul, facing this inexorable judge and forthcoming punishment, may be presented as «helpless» but it would be odd to view the «good» soul as well as «helpless». Willcock cites the Christian hymn *Dies irae* 19-21 *Quid sum miser tum dicturus, / quem patronum rogaturus, / dum vix iustus sit securus?* But it is bizarre to understand the ethos of the early 5th cent. B.C. Greek aristocrat and his poet, Pindar, in terms of Christian ethos, for the Christian, no

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237-69.

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LSJ<sup>9</sup> = *A Greek-English Lexicon*, eds. H. G. Lidell, R. Scott, H. Stuart Jones, R. Mackenzie, Oxford<sup>9</sup> 1940, with supplement 1968.

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2. The text from v. 56 εἰ till v. 61 νόκτεσσιν has been variously understood, see Hummel, § 487 with his note 2 and, on p. 388, note 1, as well as § 436 with his notes 3 and 4.

matter how saintly, thinks of himself as ἐλάχιστος, ταπεινός, and ἁμαρτωλός. The aristocrat, whom Pindar praises in *O.2*, cannot be presented as «helpless», for he goes to the nether world with complete confidence in the record of his ἀρετά which will speak irrefutably on his behalf. For Pindar to make the good soul «helpless» before the nether judge is to discard the significance of ἀρετά in the poem.

The judge who appears in the sequence (vv. 58-60) τὰ - ἀνάγκαι is presented as «giving his verdict with *hostile* [(v. 59) ἐχθρᾶι] compulsion» and his attitude makes excellent sense regarding the verdicts that pertain to the «bad», to the souls stained with (v. 59) ἀλιτρά, but would be utterly meaningless, indeed offensive, regarding the verdicts that pertain to the «good». «Good» souls that feel «*helpless*» before divine justice, as well as a divine judge with «*hostile compulsion*» toward «good» souls, violate the ethical thrust of *O.2*.

Willcock takes the view that in vv. 57-60 «The universal situation after death is described twice, from the point of view of the deceased and from that of the judge». The «twice» interpretation, however, is feasible only if we sustain ὁμοιομέρεια in the sequence (vv. 57-60) θανόντων - ἀνάγκαι, i.e. if ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες = ἀλιτρά (= sins) = «bad» φρένες, but not if ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες = φρένες in the «universal situation after death» = «bad» and «good» φρένες together. This being the case, why should we reject the interpretation of ἀπάλαμνοι as «lawless», or «wicked» in favor of Willcock's «defenseless»? I see no good reason.

The (v. 57) μὲν after θανόντων cannot be meaningfully opposed to (v. 58) δ'. This δ' simply reintroduces the content of the μὲν sequence (ἀπάλαμνοι [= «bad» φρένες] = ἀλιτρά [= sins = «bad» φρένες]) —I have elsewhere suggested that this δ' equals γάρ<sup>3</sup>. Willcock, as mentioned above, takes the view that (v. 57) μὲν is opposed by the δ' of v. 68, that is to say, by the δ' which introduces the μάκαρες, those who gain entrance to the Isle of the Blessed through the ἐστρίς ἐκατέρωθι ordeal. In his attempt to make (v. 57) μὲν be opposed by (v. 68) δ' Willcock (p. 155) sees «the general situation beneath the earth after death being contrasted with the escape of some souls to the Isle of the Blest». But Willcock's contrast is not persuasive: (a) it does not offer a logically satisfactory basis of διαίρεσις, one that is relevant to the ethical orientation of *O.2*, since his contrast is basically geographical-topographical (souls of the nether world as contrasted to souls in the Isle of the Blessed), not ethical. Clearly in the Pindaric text the difference between the «bad» souls and the «good» souls is

3. Koniaris, p. 248, note 28; cf. also Slater s.v. δέ, 2. g.h.

one of *kind*, while the difference between the «good» souls in the nether world and the «good» souls that entered the Isle of the Blessed through the ἐστρίς ordeal can be only one in *degree*. Therefore, in ethical terms the basic comparison must be between the «good» souls in the nether world and in the Isle of the Blessed vis-à-vis the «bad» souls in the nether world, not between the souls («good» and «bad») in the nether world vis-à-vis the souls in the Isle of the Blessed. (b) Willcock's contrast necessitates a jump from v. 57 to v. 68, a jump which renders the text unbearably confusing, the confusion resulting from arbitrary interpretation rather than from the demands of syntax, *ordo verborum*, and common sense.

Consider this. LS7<sup>9</sup> s.v. ἐσθλός correctly states that ἐσθλός is the antonym of κακός. Since ἀλιτρός is basically a synonym of κακός, ἀλιτρός too is an antonym of ἐσθλός. We have earlier seen that (v. 59) ἀλιτρά equals (v. 57) ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες. In view of the sequence (vv. 57-59) μὲν ... ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες ... ἀλιτρά, is it reasonable to suppose with Willcock that Pindar expected his hearers not to take (v. 61) δὲ as adversative, as establishing a contrast between the μὲν ... ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες ... ἀλιτρά sequence on one hand and the ἐσ(θ)λοί on the other, but instead expected them, his hearers, to wait till v. 68 to make (v. 68) δ' adversative to μὲν, in total disregard of (vv. 62-3) δ' ... ἐσ(θ)λοί? This is certainly not reasonable.

The above discussion, I hope, has established the correct interpretation of *O.2*, vv. 57-68. The units (v. 57) ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες and (vv. 58-60) τὰ - ἀνάγκαι refer not to the «good» and the «bad» collectively, but exclusively to the «bad». The class of the «bad» is first mentioned (αὐτίκ' - ἔτεισαν), and then is the judge who passes judgment on them (τὰ - ἀνάγκαι)<sup>4</sup>.

Understanding then the ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες as the «bad» souls, we should abandon the interpretation «helpless», and return to «lawless» and «wicked». To call the «bad» before their judge «helpless» does not add anything meaningful to the poem (could they be hopeful under the circumstances?), but to call them «lawless» and «wicked» has the advantage of distinguishing them sharply from the «good», and this distinction contributes to thought clarity<sup>5</sup>. θανόντων will be partitive genitive (= among the dead) with ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες constituting its first part. The second part of the partitive θανόντων will be the class ἐσ(θ)λοί, introduced with (v. 61) δὲ

4. (vv. 68-70) ἐτόλμασαν and ἔτειλαν are gnomic aorists, (vv. 72-78) περιπνέουσιν (= περιπνέουσι), φλέγει, φέρβει, ἀναπλέκοντι (= ἀναπλέκουσι), ἔχει, ἀλέγονται are presents of general truth (see Hummel, § 270).

5. In Koniaris, p. 247ff. I have argued against the view of Lloyd-Jones who perceives the dead of *O.2* as «feeble wits» (I have quoted him at the bottom of Koniaris, p. 247). In *O.2* the dead are intellectually entirely unimpaired.

(the following δ' in v. 62 is *additivum* [= καί], i.e. ἴσαις νύκτεσσιν ... καί (= δ') ἴσαις ἐν ἡμέραις<sup>6</sup>). The third part of the partitive θανόντων will be the class of those who gain entrance to the Isle, i.e. of those introduced with the δ' of v. 68. The poet first finishes quickly with the treatment of the «bad» souls (vv. 57-60 μὲν - ἀνάγκαι), and then proceeds to speak about the «good» souls<sup>7</sup>.

The course of thought in the (v. 57) μὲν - (v. 68) δ(ἐ) sequence is as follows (in Attic Greek): .. ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς [βιωσάντων καί] ἀποθανόντων οἱ μὲν ἀπὸ ἀνομίας διαζήσαντες αὐτίκα ἐξέτ(ε)ισαν τὴν δίκην, δικαστῆς γὰρ ὑπὸ γῆς ἀκριβέστατος τὰ ἀνομήματα αὐτῶν κρίναι σπεύδει, οἱ δ(ἐ) (= but) ἐσθλοὶ δέχονται ..., ὅσοι δ' [= and] ἐτόλμησαν...

In view of (v. 57) ὅτι which depends on an ἀπὸ κοινοῦ understood οἶδεν (cf. v. 56 οἶδεν) and explains (v. 56) τὸ μέλλον (= «knows the future, namely, (knows) *that* ...»), we shall facilitate the construction if we take (v. 61) ἴσαις δὲ to equal ἀλλ' ὅτι ἴσαις, and perhaps (v. 68) ὅσοι δ' to equal καί ὅτι ὅσοι<sup>8</sup>.

Obviously (v. 57) μὲν logically does not go with θανόντων (since there is not any opposition meant between θανόντων and, say, ζώντων), but rather goes with ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες (= ἀπάλαμνοι μὲν φρένες). That is to say, the position of μὲν after θανόντων aims at rhetorical tension, behaving *emotively* rather than referentially. Similar is the position of (v. 61) δὲ which logically belongs to ἐσ(θ)λοί, i.e. ἐσ(θ)λοί δὲ ἴσαις κτλ.

I take (v. 68) δ' as equaling καί because, as argued, we must put the ἐσ(θ)λοί and the μάκαρες in one class, the class of the «good». The δ' of

6. (vv. 61-2) ἴσαις ... ἴσαις = anaphora. (vv. 62-3) ἄλιον ἔχοντες, ... οὐ χθόνα ταράσσοντες (= asyndeton) = ἄλιον ἔχοντες ... καὶ οὐ ταράσσοντες χθόνα. Take νύκτεσσιν = ἐν νύκτεσσιν (cf. ἐν ἀμέραις), or else take ἐν ἀμέραις = ἀμέραις; in either case the datives seem to indicate time at which («on» rather than «within»). (v. 73) χερσόθεν = χερσόθι = *on the land*. Apparently ὕδωρ refers to the sea water which surrounds the Isle. (v. 75) ἐν (= inside) = *in compliance with*. (v. 76) ἐτοίμον ... πάρεδρον is predicate (= «as ready assistant») to the object ὄν of ἔχει. Obviously, αὐτῷ = *sibi* (= «for himself»).

7. There is only a very brief additional comment inserted in v. 67 about the «bad» souls: «but those others [= the “bad”] endure a punishment too horrible to look upon». This statement is offered in passing to stress the blessings of the ἐσ(θ)λοί. Notice that while the blessings of the ἐσ(θ)λοί are specified and expressed at some length, the punishment of the «bad» souls is obscurely and sweepingly expressed. Of course, the δ' in v. 67 is adversativum, «but they [= the “bad” souls in contrast to the “good” souls]...».

8. With regard to the ἀπὸ κοινοῦ understood ὅτι I wish to record Dissen(ius) - Schneidewin, vol. II, p. 40, «Logica igitur ratio membrorum haec est: οἶδεν, ὅτι ἀπάλαμνοι μὲν φρένες ποιναὶς ἔτισαν, ἴσον δὲ νύκτεσσιν αἰεῖ..., particula ὅτι ad utrumque membrum pertinente...», i.e. ἴσον δὲ - ἀλλ' ὅτι ἴσον [= ἀλλ' ὅτι ἴσαις (Dissen prints ἴσον given by Moschopolus in place of ἴσαις) ]». The apodosis of the protasis (v. 56) εἰ - μέλλον is missing by ellipsis or anacoluthon; see my detailed discussion of the passage below, pp. 14-15.

v. 68 can be opposed to (v. 57) μὲν (and therefore from «and» can become «but») only through the δὲ of v. 61, i.e. in the sense that the μάκαρες oppose the ἀλιτρά not independently of the ἐσ(θ)λοί— the contrast is between ἀλιτρά vis-à-vis ἐσθλοί + μάκαρες, not between ἀλιτρά + ἐσ(θ)λοί vis-à-vis μάκαρες, or ἀλιτρά vis-à-vis μάκαρες independently of ἐσ(θ)λοί.

A tension in clarity of thought develops in the Greek momentarily from the fact that the masculine θανόντων, which in vv. 62-9 is regularly followed by the masculine words ἔχοντες ... ἐσθλοί ... ταρασσόντες ... οἵτινες ... ὅσοι ... μείναντες, shifts in vv. 57-9 first to the feminine ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες and then to the neuter ἀλιτρά. The shifting can make θανόντων at first glance appear as genitive of possession (= αἱ ἀπάλαμνοι φρένες τῶν θανόντων ...) instead of partitive genitive (= τῶν θανόντων οἱ ἀπαλάμνους φρένας ἔχοντες ...)⁹. Nevertheless, θανόντων as partitive genitive is safely anchored on the text of vv. 57-70 read as a whole.

The judge is depicted extremely harsh to match the criminality of the «bad», not the virtue of the «good». We do not see this judge dealing with the «good», but we can conclude with certainty that he is as friendly to them as he is hostile to the «bad». As to why Pindar chooses to project the judge in connection with the «bad» rather than the «good» the answer is simple: judges (and for that matter laws, police, prisons, etc.) are far more needed to protect society from the «bad» than to congratulate the «good». The importance of the judge (the law, the policeman, the prison, etc.) is proportional to the criminality in a society. Therefore, Pindar sensibly introduces the judge confronting the «bad» with hostile attitude rather than complimenting the «good» with friendly attitude.

Commenting (p. 153) on (v. 54) ἀγροτέραν, Willcock tells his reader that the πλοῦτος ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος «supports deeply held racing ambitions»¹⁰. But the context reads ὁ μὲν πλοῦτος ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος

9. The construction of (vv. 65-7) ἀλλὰ - αἰῶνα is: ἀλλ' οἵτινες (= all those who) μὲν ἔχαιρον (sc. ἐπὶ γῆς = on their life on earth) εὐορκίαις, νέμονται (sc. νῦν ὑπὸ γῆς = now in their underworld life) ἄδακρον αἰῶνα παρὰ (= near) τιμίους (sc. θεοῖς) θεῶν (= the honored [gods] among gods). We shall say more on τιμίους θεῶν in installment 2, pp. 9-10.

10. ἀρεταῖς is instrumental dative of means (see Hummel, § 135). On p. 151 Willcock commenting on (v. 54) βαθείαν - ἀγροτέραν translates (vv. 53-4): «to be sure, wealth, if it is embellished with “virtues”, brings the opportunity for all sorts of things, supporting deeply held ambitious thoughts». This is obscure. I take τῶνδε καὶ τῶνδε to mean παντοίων καλῶν (see also Koniaris, pp. 241-2 and note 11), i.e. aristocratic wealth (which is presented as traditionally at the service of ἀρετά, notice [v. 53] the perfect δεδαιδαλμένος) offers to its possessor (= the aristocrat) the opportunity to achieve excellence in a broad spectrum of activities that serve ἀρετά in its various manifestations. The possessor of this wealth reacting to the offered opportunity activates his care (i.e. his φυᾶ [qua aristocrat] care) about excellence, a care which

φέρει τῶν τε καὶ τῶν | καιρόν, βαθεῖαν ὑπέχων μέριμναν ἀγροτέραν, | ἀστὴρ ἀρίζηλος, ἐτήτυμον | ἀνδρὶ φέγγος. The words φέρει τῶν τε καὶ τῶν ... ἀνδρὶ make it clear that here Pindar speaks *generaliter* about the πλοῦτος of the aristocrat as a class, not *specialiter* about the πλοῦτος of one aristocrat, Theron. Clearly (v. 53) φέρει is present of general truth [= *generally brings*], (v. 56) ἀνδρὶ (= to any man who has this πλοῦτος) refers to any aristocrat, not only to Theron, and (v. 53) τῶν τε καὶ τῶν suggests a whole spectrum of activities and choices varying from aristocrat to aristocrat and from situation to situation.

Notice also (v. 56) the following μιν (or νιν [= πλοῦτον ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένον]) ἔχων τις [= someone, anyone]), and further observe the preceding gnome (vv. 51-52) which shows no definite subject, τὸ δὲ τυχεῖν (sc. τινὰ) πειρώμενον ἀγωνίας δυσφρονᾶν παραλύει (= present of general truth). This gnome Willcock correctly translates «Success in an attempt at the games relieves a *man* [italics mine] of unhappy thoughts». Pindar clearly had widened the scope of the passage (vv. 51-56 τὸ - τις) beyond Theron.

Why, then, with Willcock should we limit athletics for the aristocrat at large to horse racing? We should not. If some aristocrats were interested in horse racing, others were interested in boxing, wrestling, the παγκράτιον, foot-racing etc..

Indeed, the spectrum of ἀρετά need not be limited to athletic practice. Is not P.12 written in praise of a flute-player, Midas of Acragas, and N.11, an installation ode, in praise of Aristagoras of Tenedos on his election as president of the council? Why should we suppose that in O.2 Pindar would exclude from πλοῦτος ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος the wealth which the aristocrat spends on activities of ἀρετά outside stadium and hippodrome?

But let us speak specifically of Theron. Pindar in O.2 celebrates Theron not only as victor of the chariot race at Olympia, but also as (v. 6) the bulwark of Acragas and (vv. 93-5) as the world's par excellence benefactor in the last hundred years. Why then suppose that Pindar perceives Theron's wealth as exclusively supporting «deeply held racing ambitions», as if

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is deeply felt in him and which pursues excellence with the zest of a hunter pursuing his quarry. Since the πλοῦτος ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος must accommodate the talents and personality not of one aristocrat but of all aristocrats who possess it, it must be allowed to extend to the entire field of ἀρετά. I translate: *Indeed, wealth adorned with excellence [= aristocratic wealth traditionally at the service of excellence] brings the opportunity for all types of worthy engagements, encouraging [its possessors'] eagerness to hunt for [and capture (= achieve)] the best.* As I have explained πλοῦτος is not meant to be restricted to Theron, and even if it were so restricted it could not narrowly refer only to Theron's horses. For the association of such a present of general truth (v. 51 φέρει) with the perfect participle (v. 53 δεδαιδαλμένος) in a gnomic context, see Hummel, § 317.

Theron was some Pheidippides obsessed with horses<sup>11</sup>. What of «ambitions» pertaining to the (v. 7) ὀρθόπολις and (v. 94) εὐεργέτας Theron, spending some of his money, say, to raise a fortification, to build a road, a fountain, a gymnasium, a temple, to feed the less fortunate Acragantines during a major festival?

It is true that *O.2* was commissioned to celebrate Theron's chariot victory in 476 B.C., but this hardly means that on this account Theron should be restricted in spending his wealth on horses, that his «deeply held ambitions» are nothing more than «racing ambitions». Such narrowness in ambition and use of wealth compliments neither the complex greatness of Theron, nor the intelligence of Pindar as his encomiast. I think we do a disservice to *O.2* by forcing its πλοῦτος ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος to become limited to equine victories.

We know Pindar's style well because we possess a very substantial part of his work. On the basis of what we possess from him, we can state confidently that vv. 56-8 εἰ - ἔτεισαν remain harshly unapodotic, whether one wishes to call the irregularity an ellipsis (as I prefer), or an anacoluthon (the possibility that the irregularity is the result of corruption is extremely remote). The editor-commentator of *O.2* is expected to acknowledge the ellipsis-anacoluthon and to attempt to discover the logical and/or esthetic reason for which the poet chose here to write the way he did.

Willcock, however, treats this ellipsis-anacoluthon as typical Pindar, citing as parallels *N.4.* 79-81, and from Homer, *Il.1.*135,580;21.487, and 6.150. The supposed irregularity in *N.4.* 79-81, far from paralleling the ellipsis-anacoluthon of *O.2*, is not even an irregularity. Open a parenthesis instead of putting a semicolon after (v. 81) λευκοτέραν, then close parenthesis after (v. 85) φῶτα, changing also the semicolon in v. 85 to comma, and in what follows, κείνος κτλ., you have the apodosis of εἰ - λευκοτέραν (conditional sentence relating to present with nothing implied as to fulfillment, *K.-G.* vol. II. 466α).

Nor are Willcock's examples from Homer parallel to the ellipsis - anacoluthon of *O.2*. Even if they were, they would have been hardly consequential, for we should interpret Pindar from Pindar not from Homer, especially since Homer is an oral poet and ellipses and anacolutha are expected to happen in impromptu composition based on formulae, whereas Pindar is not an «oral» but a «desk» poet.

Willcock, p. 154, remarks that regarding *O.2.56* εἰ δὲ ... τὸ μέλλον,

11. See Aristophanes' *Clouds*, vv. 10-35.



«Pavese (*Q.U.C.C.* 20, 1975, 81) perceptibly points out that the underlying thought is the same as that in a fragment from the book of *Threni* referring to those who have been initiated into the Eleusinian mysteries ὄλβιος ὅστις ἰδὼν κείν' εἶσ' ὑπὸ χθόνα «lucky the man who goes beneath the earth after seeing those things (fr. 137)».

But what precedes the εἰ δὲ ... τὸ μέλλον sequence in *O.2* refers neither to Eleusinian mysteries, nor to any other mysteries, nor to any initiates. And what of (v. 56) μιν (or νιν) = πλοῦτον? If we are to evaluate the ellipsis - anacoluthon of (v. 56) εἰ - μέλλον, we should do so on the basis of μιν (/νιν) and what precedes and follows εἰ - μέλλον. I wish that Willcock had done so and had offered in *Greek* the «underlying thought» before pronouncing this unique ellipsis-anacoluthon usual Pindar<sup>12</sup>.

Willcock strangely puts no comma after (v. 56) μέλλον, and thinks that the (v. 57) ὅτι and what follows it make the ellipsis - anacoluthon «unlikely to notice». But (v. 56) τὸ μέλλον (= *the future = that which will take place in the after life*) is the object of οἶδεν, while ὅτι κτλ. can be only an epexegetis (= «..., namely that...») to τὸ μέλλον. Clearly, the apodosis to εἰ - μέλλον is very noticeably missing, and the following epexegetis with (v. 57) ὅτι etc. only compounds the difficulty since it is not clear whether the epexegetis is supposed to end with (v. 71) τύρσιν, or somewhere earlier, or later, as late in fact as (v. 77) θρόνον.

There can be no doubt that this remarkable ellipsis-anacoluthon, unparalleled in Pindar's style, is purposefully introduced by the poet, and we are expected to take careful notice of it.

The reader who might wish to have my opinion on how this ellipsis - anacoluthon in *O.2* fits logically and esthetically its context may consult Koniaris, pp. 241-3. I would only like to add here that probably Pindar, as he entered upon his transcendental trip, felt that a dose of oracular incoherence displayed by prophets and prophetesses in trance was a desirable embellishment of his λόγος at this point<sup>13</sup>.

12. The scholiast (Drachmann, vol. 1, p. 87, 102d) supplies as apodosis οὐκ ἂν αὐτῷ [= τῷ ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαμένῳ πλούτῳ] εἰς ἀδικίαν ἐχρήσατο. But such contrary to fact apodosis is not easily understood after εἰ ... οἶδεν (= *knows*), and moreover (even if we change οὐκ ἂν ... ἐχρήσατο to οὐ χρήται or οὐ χρήσεται or οὐκ ἂν χρήσαιτο), it is strange to suppose that Pindar while praising the aristocrat's πλοῦτος so strongly wants us to think of the aristocrat who spends that πλοῦτος to commit injustice! Wilamowitz, p. 246, note 1, could obviously find no acceptable apodosis when he stated «man soll sich nicht abquälen, die unterdrückte Apodosis in Worte zu Kleiden», and Farnell, vol. 2, p. 16 even thought of «bad syntax» on the part of Pindar. G. Hermann saw in εἰ δὲ μιν ἔχων τις κτλ. an *anacoluthon audacissimum caeco fervore a poeta admissum* [see Dissen(ius) - Schnedewin, vol. 1, p. 16].

13. For oracular style in Pindar see Hummel, § 543 and the literature cited *ibid.* note 1.

On p. 139 Willcock observes that «when Pindar moves on to name those who inhabit the state of bliss [= the Isle of the Blessed] he no longer speaks of three<sup>14</sup> lives free from sin, but is back among the regular mythological heroes, with Kadmos, Peleus, and Achilleus».

The spirits that are successful in the ἐστρίς test must be thought as being received into the Isle, for otherwise *O.2* is reduced to nonsense (why should the gods allow and Pindar celebrate the ἐστρίς ordeal if it cannot materialize into entering the Isle?).

We must also take the view that in *O.2* Pindar is not suggesting to Greeks of 476 B.C. that the souls successful in the ἐστρίς ordeal enter the Isle as souls-in-bodies, in the manner Menelaus is said in Homer's *Od.* 4.563-9 to be destined to by-pass death and enter the Elysium as ἄνθρωπος (= soul-in-body).

In *O.2* (as opposed to *Od.* 4.563-9) the soul has indubitably experienced death (cf. v. 57 θανόντων), i.e. separation from mortal body. Bypassing death in the manner of the Homeric Menelaus, is meaningless in *O.2*. In Homer Menelaus experiences only birth (not rebirth) and from only a single life on earth he passes to the Elysium as ἄνθρωπος Menelaus, without any disembodiment. Why should the soul in *O.2* enter the Isle in her body, as ἄνθρωπος, at the end of the cycles of her reincarnation, when, all along reincarnation, bodies are treated as disposable material?

There is no special merit in the soul's last body, as compared to bodies she has previously shed. The identity of existence through the cycle of reincarnation depends on the oneness of the soul (= the same soul throughout), the body being only a contrivance to allow the soul to live for a while on earth as ἄνθρωπος, and amounting in value to a temporary χιτών. In the Orphic fr. 32c.6 the purified soul learns to say κύκλου δ' ἐξέπταν βαρυπένθεος ἀργαλείοιο (*I flew away from the unutterably painful cycle*), celebrating her freedom from rebirth and body.

Nor do we have any basis to suppose that Pythagoreans or Orphics taught that reincarnation leads to a state of soul-in-body, since for them<sup>15</sup> the body is the prison or tomb in which the soul suffers. In metempsychosis, entrance of the soul into a body is a punishment for the soul who has fallen of her proper status through sin. The soul ends the circle of reincarnation when she has ascended to her early proper status.

True, the souls that in *O.2* undertake the ἐστρίς ordeal are not fallen

14. Willcock, p. 158, believes, that (vv. 68-9) ἐστρίς ἑκατέρωθι means six lives. Why then here «three lives» rather than six? Either he means three lives on each side (= six lives on the whole), or else he wrote this part before he took the view that the lives are six.

15. See Guthrie, vol. 1, pp. 311 and 331.

souls but brave (cf. v. 68 ἐτόλμασαν) souls that attempt to achieve the highest record in justice —their entrance to bodies is not meant as punishment, but even so, these bodies are still to be understood as tombs and prisons for them, just as a body is for every soul.

The ἐστρίς ordeal we meet with in *O.2* could not be meaningful to the archaic Greek of Homer's time, but it was very meaningful to the Greek of c. 476 B.C., for reincarnation and reward or punishment of the souls *post mortem* constituted the quasi-scientific view of the times. Since the Greek of c. 476 B.C. did not expect the Homeric translation of soul-in-body for himself and his contemporaries, Pindar had no reason to offer the ἐστρίς ordeal in a manner which could not accord with the convictions of his time. Moreover, in the eschatology of *O.2* which focuses on the rewards and punishment of *souls in after life*, it would have been a gross irrelevancy to present Achilles, Peleus, and Kadmos on the Isle not as souls but as ἄνθρωποι, as souls-in-bodies<sup>16</sup>.

We may conclude, therefore, that Achilles, Peleus, and Kadmos on the Isle are disembodied souls<sup>17</sup>.

However, these three souls belong to a group which in one respect differs from the group of souls who enter the Isle by the ἐστρίς process. They entered the Isle through means other than the ἐστρίς ordeal. We are expected to infer this with certainty from Pindar's text (vv. 79-80) where we are told that Thetis brought Achilles to the Isle after she made a successful appeal to Zeus. Clearly, close relationship of the deceased to divinity provides here passport to the Isle<sup>18</sup>. Achilles entered the Isle as son of Thetis (and probably also as grand grandson of Zeus), Peleus as husband of Thetis (and probably also as grandson of Zeus), and Kadmos as husband of Harmonia, daughter of Ares and Aphrodite<sup>19</sup> (and probably also

16. See also Koniaris, p. 254.

17. We may suppose that after death the soul keeps the appearance of its body unless rebirth takes place, in which case the soul sheds the appearance of its previous body and, as if stamped anew, receives the appearance of its new body. This preserves the identity of ἄνθρωπος and his soul when the body of the ἄνθρωπος is destroyed, and, no doubt, the preservation has a comforting influence on the living —the soul is still appearing as Achilles, or Theron etc. rather than as something else.

18. Cf. and Homer *Od.* 4.563-9 where we are explicitly told that Menelaus is to enter the Elysium because, as Helen's husband, he is the son-in-law of Zeus.

19. We must suppose, of course, that Achilles, Peleus, and Kadmos have entered the Isles partly on their own merit, for, say, Tantalus was also the son of Zeus, but he was suffering in Tartarus. In having chosen Achilles, Peleus, and Kadmos from among the heroes, Pindar has represented the heroic age with its three most distinguished men in terms of ἀρετά, and thereby has obscured the fact that the three have primarily entered the Isle on the ground of their belonging to the family of the gods.

as grandson of Poseidon).

The question arises: why in a poem celebrating ἐστρὶς victors does Pindar mention Achilles, Peleus, and Kadmos instead of mentioning three names chosen from among ἐστρὶς victors? Although perforce we are in the realm of speculation, we can offer a tentative answer.

Greek tradition does not speak of the ἐστρὶς process in relation to any epic heroes. Therefore, Pindar cannot show any epic heroes as having entered the Isle through the ἐστρὶς process without the danger of turning the eschatology into a farce. On the other hand to mention personalities of the post-heroic period as successfully involved in the ἐστρὶς process runs a double hazard. Such individuals could be of local rather than panhellenic status, and even prove to be offensive for political or other grounds to this or that influential person, group, institution, or city. And so Pindar prudently avoids offering such names.

By mentioning Achilles, Peleus, and Kadmos he introduces three awesome names from the heroic world to exemplify, as much forcefully as safely, the *high quality* in ἀρετά of all souls on the Isle. It is as if Pindar says: *the souls of Kadmos, Peleus and Achilles entered the Isle by other means than the ἐστρὶς process. I mention them because every one agrees about their greatness in ἀρετά, especially the greatness of Achilles, the ἄριστος Ἀχαιῶν, and because that greatness exemplifies the excellence (even though that excellence diversifies among the various groups) of the souls that dwell the Isle.*

To those who may observe that Pindar did not have to introduce specific personalities on the Isle, we shall answer that without them the pictorial aspect of the Isle would have suffered considerably. But I think, there is a more compelling reason inviting Achilles (and with him Peleus and Kadmos by rhetorical amplification) to the Isle, if indeed the eschatology is relevant to Theron, as I am inclined to believe it is, and Pindar suggests that upon death Theron will enter the Isle. We may suppose that the (v. 6) ὅπι δίκαιον ξένων adequately exemplifies Theron's eminent «justice», and that Theron's soul will qualify for entrance to the Isle in the required ethical terms of the ἐστρὶς ordeal. Pindar, however, in *O.2* wishes to celebrate Theron comprehensively, not only for his «justice» but also for his renown as the great champion of ἀρετά at large in the last hundred years<sup>20</sup>. The appearance of Achilles (but also Kadmos and Peleus) widens the spectrum

20. Perhaps (v. 67) ἀδίκων (and its antonym δικάων) extends beyond our concept of injustice (and justice), to cover respectively impropriety (and propriety) determined broadly by the norms of class and society as a whole, in which case the ἐστρὶς ἐκατέρωθι ordeal is meant to involve ἀρετά widely rather than «justice» in our narrow sense.

of ἀρετή beyond justice, and Theron is thus projected as about to enter the Isle in his *full greatness*, measuring up, as it were, not only to the ἑστρῖς requirements, but also to the greatness of Achilles (Kadmos and Peleus), the modern champion of ἀρετή vis-à-vis the old champion(s) of ἀρετή<sup>21</sup>. Pindar thus achieves the best under the circumstances.

On p. 140 Willcock speaking of Kadmos, Peleus and Achilles (v. 78ff.) remarks: «the credentials of the last of these [= Achilles] in 81-3 are a close repetition of *I.5.39-41*, in a very normal epinicion». I do not know what a normal epinicion, let alone «a very normal» one, is supposed to mean, and whether *O.2* is a normal or *abnormal* epinicion if *I.5* is a normal one. However, Achilles in *O.2* closes in crescendo the poem's eschatology, while in *I.5* Achilles is introduced as representative of the Aeacides in celebration of Aegina and an Aeginetan victor. In the economy of *O.2* and in that of *I.5* the appearance of Achilles (and also of Kadmos and Peleus) has a widely different logical-esthetic purpose, so that the function of Achilles in *O.2* cannot be defined through Achilles in *I.5*.

Willcock, I think, commits the same error when on p. 160 commenting on vv. 78-83 he writes: «The tenor of the description brings us back to Pindar's normal heroic mythology. Kadmos and Peleus, greatest of mortals who ever lived ... are firm favourites, as is Achilleus, hero particularly of the Aeginetan odes».

We must remind ourselves that Pindar wrote each ode in an individual meter<sup>22</sup> and therefore in an individual musical tune as well. This interest in individual form strongly suggests that Pindar also aimed at giving each ode an individual content as well. If so, the principle toward understanding *O.2* (and for that matter every Pindaric ode) correctly is *ex poemate ipso poema nobis interpretandum*, i.e. *O.2* begins with its first word, ends with its last word, and whatever element is in the poem (including mythological references) must be understood in terms of the poem's economy of thought and form.

I am writing this because not only Willcock but other contemporary scholars who follow E. L. Bundy tend to see a Pindaric ode as a mechanical as much as superficial συρραφή of conventions, motifs, etc. that are repeated from poem to poem rather than as an ode to be understood and appreciated by itself (in this regard they remind one of Anaxagoras' [fr. 11] principle «in everything there is a portion of everything except mind»).

21. See and Koniaris, pp. 264-8.

22. With the exception of *I.3* and *I.4* both of which are written in the same meter and celebrate the same victor, the Theban Melissus. Here we either have one poem, or else two poems but somehow in a diptych.

That element x occurs not only in ode y but also in ode z is irrelevant to the understanding of ode y and ode z (unless we can establish relevance). Nor should element c in an ode be considered more significant than element d in the same ode on the ground that element c occurs nowhere else in Pindar while element d does —our interest in the «new» and «innovative» was not shared by the ancient Greeks<sup>23</sup>. «Pindar's normal heroic mythology» by itself (what is «normal» supposed to mean?) and in relation to *O.2* makes no sense.

Again, on p. 12, Willcock speaks of a «typical» Pindaric ode. But of how much practical use can the «typical» Pindaric ode be when each of Pindar's odes is «individual» in economy of form and content, and when the «typical» has to be distilled from as many as about forty-three extant atypical Pindaric odes? Obviously, to attempt to gather similarities in an area characterized by dissimilarities is to expect a nebulous «typical» Pindaric ode at best, one that even if objectively arrived at is likely to offer no practical help toward understanding Pindaric poetry.

Willcock, pp. 12-13, perceives the «typical» Pindaric ode in terms of: A) Striking opening, B) circumstantial information intermixed with moralizing, C) myth, D) more circumstantial evidence and moralizing, E) quiet close. Let us assume that this pattern is acceptable (even though one may wonder, for example, what «*striking opening*», or «*quiet close*» is supposed to mean, and whether the eschatology of *O.2* can satisfactorily be classified as «myth», and so on). The pattern at best can offer Pindar's reader of *O.2* no more help than the witness that identifies the perpetrator of a crime to police as a person with A) a head, B) a neck, C) a torso, D) two hands, and E) two feet. Equally useless are the «three ingredients» offered by Willcock on p. 12.

The problem in vv. 68-71 is the meaning of ἐστρίς ἑκατέρωθι. Does it mean a total of three or six lives? Willcock unhesitatingly decides in favor of six lives, rejecting the three lives alternative as no more than an unfortunate aberration. He writes (p. 158): «There has been a persistent wish on the part of some scholars to do away with the picture of three perfect lives on each side of the grave, partly because they have not seen how one could commit injustice in the underworld, and partly because the even total of lives would mean departure for the Isle of the Blest from Hades rather than from this earth, which is thought unsatisfactory in itself and also inconsistent with what is said in fr. 133». He then goes on

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23. See and Koniaris, p. 258, note 56.

to express his surprise that Gildersleeve among others adhered to the interpretation of three lives total.

I believe that Willcock here unwisely minimizes the difficulties involved in the six lives interpretation (= three lives on each side of the grave).

Thucydides in 3.6 writes ἐτείχισαν στρατόπεδα δύο ἐκατέρωθεν τῆς πόλεως, and he obviously means «they built *two* fortified camps, *one on each side of the city*». If here «two» is the total number (= two on the whole, *not* four on the whole), one could rewrite the sentence with the same meaning but using (the locative) ἐκατέρωθι in place of (the ablatival) ἐκατέρωθεν. One may here also cite Homer *Il.*23.329 Λᾶε δὲ τοῦ ἐκατέρθεν ἐρηρέδαται δύο λευκῶ, where δύο offers the aggregate —one white stone on the one side of the dry stump, and another white stone on the other side— two white stones on the whole.

We may then grant that «two» used with ἐκατέρωθεν / -θι can represent a total. I see no strong reason to deny that «three», «four», etc. can also represent a total. True, if one says «total three distributed on both sides», he does not make clear which side receives the one and which the two. But do we have to suppose that Pindar wished to achieve such clarity here? Is clarity desirable in a transcendental passage? In addition, if Pindar's contemporary audience knew (and they were likely to have known), what Pindar meant by ἑστρίς ἐκατέρωθι, what was Pindar adding to the poetic value of the passage by being more explicit?

The difficulty of deciding the meaning of ἑστρίς ἐκατέρωθι most probably results from our severely limited knowledge on the subject. Our best chance then to reach the correct interpretation of ἑστρίς ἐκατέρωθι is to decide in favor of that number, three or six, which poetically serves *O.2* best.

Pindar has made it clear that in life beyond the grave «goodness» is sharply differentiated and separated from «badness». The judge who performs the separation is certainly one that cannot be fooled. This must be all the more the case, if we assume with Willcock (see his discussion of [v. 56] τας on p. 155) that the judge is no other than Hades himself, the very lord of the underworld. We cannot exclude the possibility that a «good» soul during her life beyond the grave might deteriorate into a «bad» soul, but such cases must obviously be thought of as occurring very rarely. The point is that the judge in distinguishing «good» from «bad» souls allots the *suum cuique* with a wisdom which leaves little room for later surprises.

A soul that in her life as ἄνθρωπος on earth, where injustice reigns, succeeds in staying out of injustice, is by no stretch of imagination likely to become unjust on her own during her nether world life. If a soul is «good», i.e. if she belongs to the group of the ἐσ(θ)λοί, she has neither pro-

pensity (qua «good» soul) to shift from justice to injustice, nor is there anything in *O.2* to suggest that injustice is a viable, let alone preferable, alternative to the soul in afterlife, for the soul knows from direct experience that gods punish «badness» as severely as they lavishly reward «goodness».

Therefore, while for the soul to manage to be just in her life on earth as ἄνθρωπος is a glorious ethical accomplishment, for the same soul to remain just in the afterlife is, by comparison, no ethical accomplishment at all, but what is routinely expected.

Obviously, a soul living in a body on earth has no knowledge of what takes place in the other world—in case of rebirth, all that the soul had known is lost after she drank the water of *Lethe*, which invariably she had to drink before descending to earth to enter a body—and, of course, she is constantly encouraged to follow badness since on earth to be «good» is to swim against the torrent's flow, the teachings of priests and philosophers about rewards and punishments after death lacking proof at best.

To envision a scenario according to which a soul involved in the ἐστρῖς ordeal finds her life in the underworld comparable in ethical challenge to her life on earth as ἄνθρωπος, we must abandon the text of *O.2* and imagine a situation where such a soul, while in the underworld, (a) has lost her awareness of the judge and the gods (for if she has such an awareness how can she dare go astray?), and (b) she is tempted to go astray by powerful, evil forces (for being «good» she is not likely to become «bad» on her own).

Obviously, then, to follow Willcock and suppose that Pindar has the «good» soul prove its moral strength against injustice not only in three lives on earth but also in three lives beyond the grave, is to question Pindar's common sense.

It would then be desirable, for the reasons given above, that we stress life on earth over life after death. In the case of three lives aggregate this can be accomplished if the first and the third lives are lives on earth, and the second life is life in the underworld. Making the first life a life on earth, is also supported by psychological considerations. Humans (and thereby Pindar and his audience) project death and afterlife as future events, cf. *O.2* 56 where the afterlife is called τὸ μέλλον, i.e. *that which will happen in the future*. The pattern then of the birth-rebirth sequence in reincarnation (regardless of the number of lives) is: birth → life on earth → death → life in the nether world → [beginning of reincarnation] rebirth → (second) life on earth → (second) death, and so on.

With three lives total, the last life on earth leads, after death, to the



Isle, while with the six lives total the last life on earth leads to one more life in the nether world before the soul's entrance to the Isle. Thus with two lives on earth and one in the underworld we have a satisfactory arrangement of 2:1 in balancing the greater significance of «justice» on earth with the lesser significance of «justice» after death.

If we follow Willcock's arrangement of six lives, the entrance of the soul into the Isle depends 50% on how the soul deals with injustice on earth, and 50% on how she deals with injustice after death, a logically unsatisfactory arrangement by comparison.

The three lives total also serves Pindar well if *O.2* is to be relevant to Theron. If Theron is to enter the Isle, rhetorical considerations strongly recommend that Pindar should project this entrance immediately after Theron's death, making Theron's present life on earth his last life in the *ἔσπρις* ordeal (Theron will look as Theron on the Isles, see note 17). Since Pindar's audience and Theron are contemporaries, the sequence of Theron's last life on earth leading through his death to the Isle has a fascinating immediacy, it is as if Theron's entrance to the Isle is to happen before the eyes of this audience. But if the *ἔσπρις* amounts to six lives, this immediacy disappears, for Theron's last life on earth must be followed by a whole life of Theron's soul in the underworld before Theron's soul can enter the Isle. To make the sixth life a life on earth, one has to resort to the unsatisfactory solution that the first life of the *ἔσπρις* ordeal is a life in the nether world.

But, one may ask, how can Pindar know that this is the second and last life of Theron's soul on earth in the *ἔσπρις* ordeal? Perhaps Pindar knows it being (v. 86) σοφὸς ... φυῶ. Or perhaps Pythagoreans and Orphics have spread the rumor that this is the last life in Theron's cycle of *μετενσωμάτων*, and Pindar builds on this rumor.

Consider also this. In fr. 133, we find Persephone sending to the upper world, through rebirth, souls that will become men of the highest distinction. The fr. indicates on the whole three stages: (a) birth and life on earth, (b) life in the nether world, (c) one rebirth leading to an exceptional man and to his heroization after death. No further rebirths are mentioned. If we take the position, which is likely, than in fr. 133 Pindar basically expresses a view of his contemporaries rather than a peculiar view of his own, fr. 133 provides the evidence that for the Greek of c. 476 B.C. persons exceptionally eminent on earth are the products not of birth but of *rebirth* to be followed by heroization upon death. Theron, a man of great eminence, fits to the category of these men, and this suggests that upon

Theron's death his soul will break away from the wheel of reincarnation<sup>24</sup>.

I should also draw attention to the fact that the number three has cosmic properties for the Greek. Writes Aristotle (*De caelo* 268a 10): καθάπερ γάρ φασι καὶ οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι (notice the reference to the Pythagoreans), τὸ πᾶν καὶ τὰ πάντα τοῖς τρισὶν ὠρίσται· τελευτὴ γὰρ καὶ μέσον καὶ ἀρχὴ τὸν ἀριθμὸν ἔχει τὸν τοῦ παντός, ταῦτα δὲ τὸν τῆς τριάδος. Διὸ παρὰ τῆς φύσεως εὐληφότες ὡσπερ νόμους ἐκείνης, καὶ πρὸς τὰς ἀγιστείας χρώμεθα τῶν θεῶν τῷ ἀριθμῷ τούτῳ. *As the Pythagoreans say, the whole world and all things in it are summed up in the number three; for end, middle, and beginning give the number of the whole, and their number is the triad. Hence it is that we have taken this number from nature, as it were one of her laws, and make use of it even in the worship of the gods* (the triadic concept going at least as far back as Homer's *Il.* 15.189 τριχθὰ πάντα δέδασται, *in threefold wise are all things divided*). Is it not then better to take the number three in *O.2* 68 as aggregate, as beginning, middle, and end of the entire ἐστρίς ordeal, rather than turn it to number six?

I hope that the above discussion has shown that in *O.2* 68-9 the number three as the total of lives ἐκατέρωθι is legitimately extracted from the Greek text, offers what one expects from an intelligent poet who is in full control of the thought and form of his poetry, and also gives a fitting mystical redolence to the passage. Willcock's confident rejection of «three» in favor of «six» is unjustifiable.

Regarding Willcock's treatment of the eschatology of *O.2* as a whole (see Willcock, pp. 137-40) I believe that he makes Pindar Homeric far beyond what Pindar's text allows. There are similarities between Pindar and Homer, but the similarities are only superficial.

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24. It is by no means impossible that the metaphysical pattern of fr. 133 is only a variation of the ἐστρίς pattern of *O.2*. If we ask which souls are to be given the chance of the ἐστρίς ordeal, the reasonable answer will be: those few souls who have achieved a perfect score of justice in their life on earth as well as those more numerous whose score is not too far from the perfect score. If those few souls who have achieved the perfect score are given a life's credit in the ἐστρίς ordeal for what they have already achieved, then for them the ἐστρίς is reduced to an ἐς δίς ordeal. In such a case the pattern of fr. 133 can easily be understood as extended silently to Theron in *O.2*, who is thus complimented as belonging to the small group of those who have received one life's credit in the ἐστρίς ordeal, and who therefore upon closing his present life is to enter the Isle. At any rate ἐστρίς and ἐς δίς totals are very close to each other but far remote from an ἐς ἑξάκις total. In fr. 133 the exceptional soul becomes an ἀγνὸς ἥρωας. Since *O.2* projects the Isle of the μάκαρες as the higher of the two paradises (the lesser paradise being in the area of the nether world where the ἐσ(θ)λοί live), and since Theron is praised in *O.2*, Pindar is likely to project the soul of Theron, who is the *laudandus* in *O.2*, on the Isle of the Blessed, regardless of the paradise to which the ἥροες ἀγνοί of fr. 133 are sent.

In *O.2* the «bad» and «good» souls in the underworld are fully conscious, judged, and offered punishment or rewards respectively. The «bad» endure unbearable suffering (cf. v. 67 ἀπροσόρατον ... πόνον), the «good» enjoy a life which, at the least, is better than the life they enjoyed on earth as ἄνθρωποι (cf. vv. 61-7). By sharp contrast, in *Od.* 11 souls in the underworld live in an undifferentiated vegetative existence. They must drink blood to function mentally for a while, and, as a rule, there is no punishment and reward for them, no ethical differentiation between the «good» and the «bad» soul (for rewards and punishments without full consciousness on the part of the soul would have been meaningless).

Things in the Homeric Hades are such that in *Odyssey* 11, 489-91 Achilles states that he would have preferred to live on earth even as hireling of a poor man than as lord over all the dead: βουλοίμην κ' ἐπάρουρος ἐὼν θητεύμεν ἄλλω | ἀνδρὶ παρ' ἀκλήρω ᾧ μὴ βίοςτος πολὺς εἴη, | ἧ πᾶσιν νεκύεσσι καταφθιμένοισιν ἀνάσσειν.

And only the fact that Pindar makes the sun shine in the area where the «good» live in the underworld, as opposed to the murky darkness, ζόφον ἠερόεντα, of the Homeric underworld, suffices to show the vast difference between Pindar and Homer in their eschatologies.

I should now like to point out the significance of (v. 66) εὐορκίαις in *O.2*. The word means «fidelity to the oath one takes» (i.e. acting in full accordance with the oath one has sworn). Obviously εὐορκία classifies under εὐσέβεια, piety. Paying due attention to εὐορκίαις, Pindar's ἐσ(θ)λοί appear substantially no different than the εὐσεβεῖς mentioned in fr. 129<sup>25</sup>.

Pindar in *O.2* could not praise the ἐσ(θ)λοί in the glowing terms he praised the εὐσεβεῖς of fr. 129, for, obviously, rhetorical consideration demanded that in *O.2* the glowing terms had to be reserved for the inhabitants of the higher paradise, the μάκαρες of the Isle<sup>26</sup>. Willcock in an attempt to bring the ἐσ(θ)λοί section of *O.2* close to the Homeric underworld adopts Solmsen's unfortunate suggestion that Pindar builds the section of the ἐσ(θ)λοί in «negative» terms, this «negative» quality pertaining to the life of the ἐσ(θ)λοί and surfacing with v. 62 ἀπονέστερον and v. 66 ἄδακρυον, «the positive» quality thus being reserved for the bliss on the Isle of the Blessed.

But if Pindar wanted to present the section of the ἐσ(θ)λοί in «negative» terms why did he bring the sun in the underworld in «positive»

25. See Koniaris, p. 249 note 32 and passim; for the Greek text of fr. 129 and its translation, see Willcock, pp. 170-1.

26. See Koniaris, p. 249, note 32.

terms (i.e. ἄλιον rather than οὐ σκότος or οὐ ζόφον and the like). Surely, he said ἄλιον not because he wanted to create an inconsistency with his «negative» approach to the ἐσ(θ)λοί section and thereby confuse his audience, but simply because he was not entertaining any such «negative» approach. And this becomes all the more obvious if we notice that in the section of the μάκαρες where according to Solmsen the «positive» is supposed to be utilized, Pindar uses a negative expression in defining the very purpose of the ἐστρίς process, for he says (v. 69) ἀπὸ ... ἀδίκων ἔχειν (= ἀπέχειν ... ἀδίκων = abstain from injustice) rather than δικαίων μετέχειν (= partake in justice). Surely Pindar is not likely to suggest that one would gain life in the Isle of the Blessed if he just stays away from injustice, but rather if one immerses himself in justice<sup>27</sup>.

In addition, rhetorical Greek theory teaches that one can stress the positive by using the negative (= λιτότης), e.g. if one wishes to stress πολλοί (= many) one can say οὐκ ὀλίγοι (= «not a few» = «anything but a few»). There is no rhetorical theory of juxtaposing a «negative» picture to a «positive» picture in the Solmsen - Willcock fashion.

For all these reasons I believe that Solmsen's suggestion has no basis to be considered as practiced by Pindar and understood by the Greeks of 476 B.C.<sup>28</sup>.

A further case where Willcock forces Pindar's ἐσ(θ)λοί to become Homeric is when he translates (v. 62) ἀπονέστερον as «without toil» and comments «The comparative does not need to be stressed». Willcock is bothered by the comparative because he wishes to remove the ἐσ(θ)λοί from any πόνος (= toil), and to engulf them in the lethargic «peace» of Homeric death.

But ἀπονέστερον goes together with that follows. The backbreaking work with its painfully low recompense which «good» souls experienced as ἄνθρωποι (= soul-in-body) on earth is compared with the toil of their life as ἐσ(θ)λοί in the underworld. They are now involved in «less painful» toil than the digging, and rowing they performed on earth.

Pindar does not specify in what the πόνος of the ἐσ(θ)λοί in the underworld consists, but we may first think of πόνος on their part on the

27. For «justice» and «injustice» see also note 20.

28. The difficulties for the «negative» writing theory are not restricted to ἄλιον. One may ask: if Pindar was interested in the «negative» why did he write τιμίους rather than something meaning οὐκ ἀτίμοις, and why did he use the «positive» ἴσαις ... ἴσαις instead of something like οὐκ ἀνίσουσι ... οὐκ ἀνίσουσι and so on? The answer is: Because Pindar had no interest in differentiating between «positive» and «negative» imagery. This is, pace Solmsen and Willcock, what common sense suggests.

ground that they live (vv. 65-7) close to the «honored» gods, and this easily implies religious duties, e.g., temple activities, as well as various other pursuits in relation to these gods. Moreover, in fr. 129 we hear that the εὐσεβεῖς in the underworld spend time in «riding and gymnastics» (which suggests athletic πόνος), in playing «board games» and music on «stringed instruments» (activities which suggest intellectual πόνος), and, what is more important, in the same fr. the word προάστιον indicates that the εὐσεβεῖς in the underworld have also a city, and we may reasonably project on their part endless activities, and the concomitant πόνος, in relation to that city. Therefore, through fr. 129 we have good reason to expect that there is considerable πόνος in the case of the ἐσ(θ)λοί of *O.2* as well. Pindar keeps the ἐσ(θ)λοί section of *O.2* sketchy for, as we have been pointing out, his rhetorical interest centers on the Isle, but the comparative ἀπονέστερον ... βίον makes clear that the ἐσ(θ)λοί are no Homeric vegetables<sup>29</sup>.

Why does Pindar present life on earth so unpleasant even though the aristocrat on earth has a pleasant life? The answer must be that Pindar, interested in projecting the bliss of the ἐσ(θ)λοί post mortem, reverses the Homeric order of values to make life on earth as undesirable as Homer's life is under the earth (cf. the aforementioned statement of Achilles in *Od.* 11.488-491), and life under the earth as desirable as Homer's life on earth is.

To achieve the reversal, Pindar evaluates life on earth vis-à-vis life in the paradise of the ἐσθλοί from the viewpoint of the poor masses who suffered on earth<sup>30</sup>. I should add that (v. 66) ἄδακρυον (= without tears) can hardly be devoid of positive bliss for the reader of *O.2* who observes not only that the ἐσ(θ)λοί are living close to the honored gods, not only that the sun signifies that these gods are gods of life, of a better life than life on earth, but also that (vv. 66-7) ἄδακρυον ... αἰῶνα characterizes the ἐσ(θ)λοί in contrast to those who ἀπροσόρατον ὀκχέοντι [= αἰεὶ ἔχουσι] πόνον, i.e. to those [= the «bad» souls] who «endure a punishment too horrible to look upon». The ἄδακρυον ... αἰῶνα is the polaroid opposite of ἀπρο-

29. I take ἀπονέστερον as adjective qualifying βίον. The possibility remains that it is adverb qualifying δέχονται (= δέχονται). With either alternative the meaning of the passage remains the same.

30. Not all ἐσθλοί were rich in their life on earth. And that poor men on earth could be eminently εὐσεβεῖς (and therefore post mortem projected as ἐσ(θ)λοί) is not difficult to envision, cf. Burkert, p. 274. The appearance of Achilles, Peleus and Cadmus on the Isle and the verb (v. 68) ἐτόλμασαν may suggest that on the Isle, as opposed to the underworld paradise, one can find only aristocrats.

σώρατον πόνον, just as ἐσ(θ)λός is the polaroid opposite of ἀλιτρός, and logically it takes the «good» souls as far in the direction of a happy existence as ἀπροσώρατον πόνον takes the «bad» souls in the direction of an unhappy existence.

In short: in *O.2* the ἐσ(θ)λοί (with their wits about them in un-Homeric fashion) enjoy a life of happiness in the underworld which can be second only to the life of happiness on the Isle. They live in a paradise which has little to do with the sad life in Homeric Hades. This paradise becomes all the more clearly a paradise if we take the view of those (including Willcock —see Willcock, p. 156) who think that in vv. 61-2 ἕσταις ... ἔχοντες means that the ἐσ(θ)λοί live in eternal spring. Elsewhere<sup>31</sup> I have suggested that the paradise of the ἐσ(θ)λοί is in origin Homer's *Elysian Plain* transferred from the upper to the nether world and given an ethical content (just as in the sixth book of Vigil's *Aeneid*). In all likelihood the same is the case with the paradise of fr. 129<sup>32</sup>.

I may add, in concluding this section that there are some external similarities between Pindar's *Isle* and both Hesiod's *Isles* (*Works and Days*, 166ff.) and Homer's *Elysium* (*Od.* 4,561-9), but Pindar's *Isle* through the ἐστρίς ethical ordeal exudes a spirituality which, totally absent from the Hesiodic *Isles* and the Homeric *Elysium*, sharply differentiates Pindaric eschatology from epic eschatology here too.

On p. 147 commenting on vv. 30-4 Willcock writes: «Another transitional gnome leads from the eternal life of two of the daughters of Kadmos to the temporal disasters of Laios and his family» and goes on to say that in vv. 30-3 Pindar expresses «the commonplace that life is uncertain, and we cannot guarantee happiness even to the evening of the day». Willcock's opinion on the meaning of vv. 30-4 basically endorses the prevailing opinion among scholars about the meaning of these verses, which goes back to Boeckh, (vol. 2.2, p. 125): «*incertum est quando obituri simus*». Hummel (§ 417 and *ibid.* note 4) cites Boeckh with approval, appending also Brandt's (p. 23) comment, «*Duas ... habemus sententias in*

31. See Koniaris, p. 263, note 67.

32. Willcock, pp. 170-2, has reviewed the views scholars have taken in answering the question of what was the πρώτη ὁδός in the poem to which fr. 129 belongs. I believe that the only thing we can state with reasonable certainty is that the density and beauty of fr. 129 makes clear that, whatever the πρώτη ὁδός might have been, the poem to which fr. 129 belongs was written to celebrate the εὐσεβεῖς in the underworld. Guesses about the πρώτη ὁδός contribute little toward the understanding of fr. 129, and nothing toward the understanding of *O.2*.

Pindari verbis; primam: mors mortalium incerta est; alteram atque etiam hoc incertum est, num (donec vita fruimur) diem peracturi simus qui plane faustus vocari possit», as well as Thiersch's comment (vol. 1, p. 207) «in eo loco duplex constructio in unam conflata: ὅποτε τελευτάσομεν, et εἰ σὺν ἀγαθῷ τελευτάσομεν».

Willcock translates (v. 30) *κέχριται* as «has been fixed», and *πεῖρας οὐ τι θανάτου* as «no final point for death»<sup>33</sup> and takes *πεῖρας θανάτου* as analogous to the Homeric *τέλος θανάτου*, which he understands as «“the end consisting in death”, i.e. death». According to Willcock «Pindar is not saying that death is not the end, as some recent scholars have believed, because of the eschatology later in the ode, but merely that we cannot *know in advance when it will come*» [italics mine].

Now, referring to vv. 22-30, Willcock, p. 145, correctly takes these verses as illustrating «the principle just enunciated, that fortune sent from god raises mortals to the heights from out of previous unhappiness». But what Willcock does not observe is that, regarding Semela, the first example, vv. 25-8, Pindar tells us that she is *alive* among the Olympian gods *after she died* by Zeus' thunderbolt, ζῶει ... ἀποθανοῖσα. The example clearly presents Semela as having experienced *death* and having come out of it *alive*, obviously because the soul is *immortal*. Zeus, Dionysus and Pallas in vv. 26-7 have nothing to do with Semela's *post mortem* immortality, but only with her *post mortem rank*. Semela's soul lives among the Olympians: without divine intervention her soul would have lived where the other immortal souls live who have experienced death (whether by thunderbolt, as in Semela's case, or by some other means). Clearly then the Semela example speaks not only about the happiness that gods can bestow upon an individual, but also, in a corollary fashion, about *the immortality of the soul*. If Pindar had wished to make the Semela example relevant only to the divinely dispensed happiness after unhappiness, he could easily have suppressed the details of her *death* and of her *life-after-death*, by simply stating that Semela suffered but in due course was recompensed with life among the Olympians.

The example of Ino, which follows immediately upon that of Semela, is less detailed, but with the Semela example preceding, the details can be supplied unmistakably. Ino experienced death by drowning, and her soul, surviving death (just as all souls do regardless of the kind of death they experience), was allowed, by divine intervention, to join the Nereids. One should here stress that in the case of Ino's *post mortem* life, Pindar

33. I have difficulty to see how the genitive *θανάτου* corresponds to «for death».

presents that life explicitly as an *absolutely immortal* life, ([vv. 29-30] βίσιον ἄφθιτον ... τὸν ὄλον ἀμφὶ χρόνον) rather than as a happy life —happiness is only implicit in Ino's association with the Nereids, immortality is explicit.

It is therefore clear, pace Willcock, that the Semela and Ino examples look not only to the motif of happiness that god can bestow upon a previously unhappy person, but also, in the foreshadowing technique, to the *immortal-life-after-death* motif, the motif proper of the eschatology. Therefore, Willcock's complaint, that those who understand vv. 30-4 to make a reference to life after death read into these verses what comes only later in the eschatology, is not justifiable.

Indeed, the exempla of Semela and Ino are not relevant to Willcock's truism (p. 147) «we cannot know in advance when it [= death] will come». Whether Semela and Ino *knew* or did not know *when* (and *how*) they would die *has no relevance* to what Pindar tells us about them in vv. 22-30, and *no relevance* to «the principle ... that fortune sent from god raises mortals to the heights from out of previous unhappiness».

Moreover, if we endorse Willcock's interpretation of vv. 30-33 ἦτοι - τελευτήσομεν, how are we to explain the use of the asseverative (v. 30) ἦτοι (= ἦ τοι)? Of course, (v. 30) ἦτοι «verily, I tell you» (see Denniston<sup>2</sup>, p. 553, s.v. τοι (8) ἦτοι), will make excellent sense if it responds to the Semela and Ino examples<sup>34</sup>. Is it better to take ἦτοι with Willcock as introducing a shift to a new topic? It is not.

Let us now examine the text of vv. 30-4. Unfortunately Willcock has neither construed, nor translated vv. 30-4 in their entirety. He only translates *κέχριται* as «has been fixed» without telling us what is the agent of «has been fixed», and he keeps silent about the construction of βροτῶν, of ὁπότε, of σὺν ἀγαθῶ, and of the verb and its meaning that must be understood after (v. 32) οὐδ'. Under the circumstances it is difficult for me to know with what construction and corresponding translation of the text he reaches his free paraphrase, «... we cannot know in advance when it [= death] will come». I can only argue that his paraphrase cannot derive easily from Pindar's text.

I take *κέχριται* as basically a *verbum iudiciale* (passive perfect of *κρίνω*) and supply as its agent «by the gods» (ὑπὸ or πρὸς or παρὰ θεῶν, or θεοῖς [= dat. of agent]). With Slater I take *κέχριται* to mean «(it) has been

34. Köhnken<sup>2</sup> in *Entretiens*, p. 281, rightly observes «das auf die vorhergehenden *paradeigmata* der Kadmostöchter Semele und Ino zurückweisende ἦτοι». See also Köhnken<sup>1</sup>, p. 123ff.



allotted», i.e. (it) has been decided -and- allotted. The subject of *κέχριται* is *πείρας* [= nominative]. I take *πείρας* to mean *end* (when, for example, a Greek says *πείρας γῆς* he means the end of earth, i.e. *the point beyond which there is no more earth*). I take the words *βροτῶν ... πείρας ... θανάτου* as forming the usual Greek construction (cf. Smyth, §1338) of a noun (= *πείρας*) with two adnominal genitives (*βροτῶν* and *θανάτου*). I understand *θανάτου* as subjective genitive and *βροτῶν* as objective genitive, *ὁ θάνατος ἄγει βροτοὺς εἰς πείρας αὐτῶν* = *ὁ θ. ἄ. β. ε. π. τοῦ εἶναι αὐτούς* = *death brings mortals to their end* [where *their end* = *the end of their existence*]. I take *οὐ τι* as adverb introducing a strong denial (= «definitely not», *οὐ τι* equaling the adverb *οὐδέν*), and (with Slater s.v. *γέ α.*) I understand *γε* (which I translate «at least») as referring to the preceding *βροτῶν*.

Putting the whole sentence together, from *ἦτοι* to *θανάτου* (with semicolon, rather than comma, after *θανάτου*), the construction and translation is: *πείρας θανάτου βροτῶν γε οὐ τι κέχριται* (sc. *θεοῖς*) = *end [of existence] in death, at least for [= of] mortals, has definitely not been allotted by the gods = the gods have definitely decreed that death, at least for man, shall not lead to nothingness*. In case one wishes to take *θανάτου* as appositive genitive with *πείρας* (see *K.-G. I.* 264d; Smyth § 1322) the meaning will still not change: «end [of existence] consisting in death, at least for mortals, has definitely not been allotted by the gods»<sup>35</sup>.

The translation involves an oxymoron, namely, that *mortals* are pronounced *immortals*, but, I think, the illogicality is easily explained psychologically. In Pindar's *Parth.* I vv. 14-5 we read *ἀθάνατοι δὲ βροτοῖς ἀμέραι, σῶμα δ' ἐστὶ θνατόν* (= *the days of mortals are immortal [= never ending, «hören nimmer auf» Wilamowitz quoted by Slater s.v. ἀμέρα]*), *but their body is mortal = mortals are immortal, for only their body is mortal*. Pindar thinks of *βροτοί* as *ἀθάνατοι* on the psychological ground that man (cf. Orphics, Pythagoreans, Empedocles, etc.) identifies himself with his immortal soul rather than his mortal body.

The central difficulty of deriving Boeckh's meaning out of the text of

35. For death as destruction and *annihilation of existence* cf. Pindar fr. 131 b 1-2 ... *σῶμα ... πάντων ἔπετα θανάτῳ περισθενεῖ* = *the body ... of all men follows [= is destroyed by] all-powerful death ...*; *Parth.* I.14-5 *ἀθάνατοι δὲ βροτοῖς ἀμέραι, σῶμα δ' ἐστὶ θνατόν* = *the days of mortals are deathless, but their body perishes*; *P.10.47* *νασιώταις λίθινον θάνατον φέρων* (sc. *Περσεύς*) = (*Perseus*) *bringing destruction to the islanders by turning them into stones*; *O.2.19* *πῆμα θνάσκει .. = calamity ends ...*; fr. 121.4 *θνάσκει ... σιγαθὲν καλὸν ἔργον* = *every noble deed ceases to exist, if suppressed in silence*; *Lyc.* (c. *Leocr.*) [155]61 *πόλιως ἔστι θάνατος ἀνάστατον γενέσθαι* = *expulsion of its people is death for a city*; *Soph. O.C. v. 611* *θνήσκει δὲ πίστις, βλαστάνει δ' ἀπιστία* = *loyalty is on its way to extinction, but disloyalty on its way to blossoming*.

O.2.30-1 ἦτοι - θανάτου comes from the fact that out of *κέχριται* it is not easy to derive «has been *known*», and therefore the drift of thought cannot lead to «the day (= the date) of death is *unknown* to mortals» = «mortals *do not know* when they will die». This difficulty becomes even greater in Willcock's translation of *κέχριται* as «has been *fixed*». There is of course, nothing wrong with translating *κέχριται* as «has been *fixed*». The objection to such a translation for O.2.30 is that with it the context becomes obscure. A sentence stating «death has not been *fixed*» would have confused Pindar's audience who, like all Greeks, believed that a man's day of death was *fixed* by divinity on the day of his birth. It is therefore very strange to suppose that Pindar meant to say *our day of death is not known to us*, but instead he said *our day of death has not been fixed for us*.

We may now proceed with the remaining part of vv. 31-3, οὐδ' - τελευτάσομεν. The construction is ἀπὸ κοινοῦ: οὐδ' (ἐ) (sc. *κέχριται* θεοῖς) ὁπότε (= indirect question corresponding to the direct question «πότε ...;») τελευτάσομεν ἡσύχιμον ἡμέραν (= direct object of *τελευτάσομεν*) σὺν ἀτειρεῖ ἀγαθῶ = *nor (has it been allotted by the gods) when we shall end (= when we shall reach the evening of) a peaceful day, daughter of Sun, with (our) good unspoiled*. I take the ἀγαθόν to be the given person's «blessing(s)», his health, and/or reputation, and/or property, and/or family, etc., i.e. the person's well-being. The day is presented as «peaceful» to dramatize the situation —misfortune can strike not only in a troublesome day of war, or of social upheaval and the like, but also in a peaceful day when trouble is least expected. Since the day is presented as the daughter of the sun (all days are daughters of sun, at least from sunrise to sunset) the day is personified or semi-personified. The thought of the passage then is: *by god's will, the scheme of human affairs being what it is, a man cannot be sure that any given day of his life, even a day in peaceful times, will keep him out of harm's way from sunrise to sunset*<sup>36</sup>.

36. Köhnken (in Köhnken<sup>1</sup>, p. 281) translates (vv. 30-33) ἦτοι - τελευτάσομεν (leaving out πατὶδ' ἀλίου) as «für die Sterblichen ist also wirklich eine Todesgrenze durchaus nicht festgelegt und (es ist) auch nicht (bestimmt), wann wir den friedlichen Tag in unzerstörbaren Glück geenden werden». I basically agree with his translation from ἦτοι till θανάτου. For the remaining part I have doubts. 1. The shift from «festgelegt» to «bestimmt» does not seem to render closely the sequence *κέχριται* ... οὐδ' (sc. *κέχριται*). 2. In view of the preceding violent deaths of Semela and Ino, and the fact that only a few people are lucky enough to die in peace, one wonders why Pindar would choose to call the day of death «peaceful» (I take it that Köhnken's «den friedlichen Tag» refers to the day of death —I do not see to what other day it can refer given his translation)? Even if we go so far as to say that ἡσύχιμον does not mean that the day of death is peaceful (it may be violent and painful) but that it bestows the gift of peace the soul will enjoy in afterlife, still difficulties remain. The bad souls cannot find peace in their horrifying punishment in afterlife, peace does not fit the ordeal of the ἐστρίς process

With this understanding, vv. 30-1 ἦτοι - θανάτου constitute a gnome looking back to the Semela and Ino exempla, while vv. 32-3 οὐδ' - τελευτάσομεν constitute a gnome which looks forward to v. 33ff. The δ' (after ῥοαί, v. 33) is progressive-connective, that is to say, it approximates in meaning «and so», thus connecting (vv. 32-3) οὐδ' - τελευτάσομεν with ῥοαί and what follows to at least as far as v. 42 ἀρήιον<sup>37</sup>.

Why the future v. 33 τελευτάσομεν? The interest gravitates not towards past days, but obviously towards the future days which have not yet revealed what they have in store for the individual.

O.2 is built on a sequence of widenings and narrowings of scope. The process starts with the celebration of Theron's chariot victory at the Olympic Games of 476 B.C. But almost immediately Pindar expands beyond that victory, toward (v. 6) Theron's «justice» to his guests and toward his being the «bulwark» of Acragas.

From v. 15 (τῶν κτλ.) to v. 45 (included) the poet uses gnomes and mythological *exempla* which, broadening the poem's scope beyond Theron, function as a foreshadowing of the eschatology proper (v. 56 εἰ κτλ. till v. 83 Αἰθίοπα).

With v. 46 to v. 51 (ἄγαγον) Pindar returns to Theron, thereby narrowing the poem's scope, but then (after a quick mention of the victories of Theron's brother) beginning with v. 51 (τὸ κτλ.) and in a continuous widening of scope he first passes from Theron to the Greek aristocrat *generaliter* and to the Greek aristocrat's (v. 53) πλοῦτος ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος (that is to say, Pindar passes from one aristocrat, Theron, to the whole class of aristocrats) until with (v. 56) μιν ([or νιν] = πλοῦτον) the widening reaches a metaphysical level, that of the eschatology proper (v. 56ff.), which takes us to the underworld and from there to the Isle of the Blessed.

Then, Pindar with (v. 89) ἔπεχε νῦν narrowing again the poem's scope,

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undertaken by good souls, and even for the good soul who enjoy life in the two paradises, I feel uncertain that ἡσυχία is the *mot juste* to describe the quality of that life. 3. τελευτῶ τι means I bring something to its end-completion. Since people do not necessarily die at the end of a day but any time within a day, τελευτῶ ... ἡμέραν is likely to mean *I bring a ... day to its end* (cf. τελευτῶ αἰῶνα, βίον, λόγον, ἔργον, κτλ.), that is to say, *I live throughout a given day*, not *I die on a given day*. 4. What is the logic behind ἀτειρεῖ σὺν ἀγαθῷ translated as «in unzerstörbarem Glück» (= «in indestructible hapiness/good luck»)?

37. For δ' = *and so*, see, for example O.1.59; ib. 88; O.6.64 al.. With v. 35 οὕτω δὲ the ῥοαί from their broad application to (v. 34 ἀνδρας) men, are narrowed to apply to the Ἐμμενίδαι, to which family Theron belongs (cf. v. 36 τῶνδε [= τῶν Ἐμμενιδῶν]), and to this family's Theban ancestors (v. 38 ἐξ οὔπερ κτλ.).

returns to Theron to stay basically with him till the poem's close (v. 100), the segment of the poem from (v. 83) πολλά till (v. 89) θυμέ constituting a bridge leading from eschatology to Theron. The poem in the ring composition technique begins (v. 1 ἀναξιφόρμιγγες till v. 15 γένει) and ends (v. 89 ἔπεχε till v. 100 δύναιτο) with Theron.

Those who knew Theron and experienced the performance of *O.2* in the atmosphere of the festival in honor of Theron's victory most likely felt that *O.2* was a poem about Theron (thus subjugating the broader aspect of the poem to the narrower one), but for us *O.2* is a poem broader than Theron, it is a poem about πλοῦτος ἀρεταῖς δεδαιδαλμένος of the aristocrat at large, and, even more, a metaphysical poem that speaks about after-life.

For its audience of 476 B.C., *O.2* was an encomiastic poem, but for us it is primarily a didactic poem, didactic in the highest meaning of the word. The poem's highest value, which kept the poem alive and relevant to its post-476 B.C. generations, long after Theron had become *cinis et fabula*, resides clearly on this «didactic» quality.

It seems to me that Willcock (following the catechism of the E. L. Bundy School) has missed the poem's didactic breadth and ὕψος and misinterpreted the poem as just an accumulation of conventional motifs and traditional mannerisms, mechanically and narrowly serving a given *laudandus* and a given occasion<sup>38</sup>.

University of Massachusetts

GEORGE L. KONIARIS

38. It is wrong to suppose that Pindar wrote *O.2* for only Theron and his contemporaries. Do great artists, writers, architects, painters, sculptors, musicians produce their masterpieces just to satisfy their customers? Pindar wrote *O.2* at least as much for himself as for Theron, and through himself (whether he was conscious of it or not) for us and for those who will come after us, for Pindar in his greatness is and will never cease being modern, the greatest modern lyric poet. In *O.2* Pindar alludes to himself (vv. 86-8) with σοφός ὁ πολλά εἰδώς φύαι and with Διὸς πρὸς ὄρνιχα θεῖον. In Willcock's interpretation of *O.2* (and in Bundy's views on Pindar) I have detected no presence of either the «wise» Pindar or of Pindar the «eagle». For a panoramic view and appreciation of *O.2* see also Koniaris, p. 269.